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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Published quarterly at 8 West King Street, Lancaster, Pa., for the Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, March 14, 1911, at the Post-Office at Lancaster, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER is Gouverneur Morris Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University. He is the author of a number of books in the fields of British imperial and American constitutional history, as well as articles in this QUARTERLY and other journals. He has been Managing Editor of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY and of the *American Historical Review,* Editor of the *Dictionary of American Biography* (Supplement II), and President of the American Historical Association.

SAUL K. PADOVER, Professor of Politics, Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, has had a lifelong interest in the Founding Fathers. He is the author of a number of works on the subject, including four on Jefferson, and at present he is at work on a book on American political thought.

CAROL EDLER BAUMANN is Instructor in Political Science and Project Associate, National Security Studies, at the University of Wisconsin. She is currently engaged in research and writing on political consultation and coöperation in the North Atlantic Alliance.

DONALD C. GORDON, Associate Professor of History at the University of Maryland, specializes in British Commonwealth History, and spent 1957 as a Fulbright Research Scholar associated with the Australian National University in Canberra. He is the author of a book and several articles on Australia and at present is working on a study of British Imperial Defense Policies from 1870 to 1914.

ROBERT D. TOMASEK, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas, specializes in Latin American affairs. His particular research interest is in the international relations of the area.

KENNETH N. WALTZ is Associate Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, and Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. At the present time he is studying political parties and foreign policy in England as a Research Fellow of Columbia University in Political Theory and International Relations. He is the author of *Man, the State, and War* which will be published shortly.

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Volume LXXIV *September 1959* *Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

CONTINGENCY IN HISTORY*

THERE are two different ways of thinking about historical development for which consideration is asked here. It would be found, I believe, that most of the historians who have concerned themselves with the philosophy of history have followed the way of determinism, and that the same is true of most of the philosophers who have concerned themselves with history. They have tended to look upon the course of events in the human past—at least in its broad outlines—as predetermined. Some of them, however, have been impressed by what seemed to them like chance occurrences and their momentous consequences. In metaphysics determinism has been questioned, and even denied, especially in the realm of the human will. But libertarianism has not exerted an influence comparable to that of determinism on historical interpretation. A determinist interpretation of history accords as well with dialectical materialism as with theological idealism, with Karl Marx as with St. Augustine.

Historical interpretation has always been influenced, of course, by prevailing intellectual climates. In what have been called the great ages of religious faith, when theology was the acknowledged "Queen of Sciences" and history was written by churchmen, past events were viewed as having taken place under an overruling, supernatural and anthropomorphic Providence. The course of history was seen as an unfolding of the changeless Will of God, by which it was purposefully directed toward its predestined end. A vast deal of history, from first to last, has been written in the shadow of St. Augustine and the theological doctrine of predestination. The Augustinian school of historical interpretation held sway for well over a thousand years. We do not generally think of the seventeenth century as falling

* An address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association held at Whittier College, California, December 29, 1958.

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within the great ages of faith, but St. Augustine was very much alive in that century, when Bishop Bossuet wrote his famous *Discourse on Universal History,* in which he upheld Divine Providence against those followers of Descartes who were arguing for a mechanical theory of the universe and the invariability of laws of nature, another variety of determinism. Bossuet was profoundly impressed by the long continuity of Jewish-Christian religious ideas, from the beginning of history (that is, from the Creation as recounted in Genesis) to his own day, while a succession of ephemerally great empires had risen and fallen, and he believed that this spiritual stability in such an unstable secular world could be explained only by reference to Providence. All history, according to Bossuet, was permeated with Divine purpose and controlled by Divine will, a conspicuous illustration of which was to be found in the establishment of the Roman Empire, which united under a single rule many different peoples formerly alien to one another, as a means employed by Providence for the spread of the Christian Gospel. (It is unnecessary to ask here whether these ideas were original with Bossuet.) He admitted that miracles were no longer common in his day, and he believed it to be the will of God that there should be lower and particular causes, and that, except in a few extraordinary instances in which God had willed that his hand should appear alone, no great changes in human affairs had occurred without causes in preceding ages. But above all such lower causes was a higher and ultimate cause. He said:

> Let us talk no more of chance [*hazard*], or of fortune, or let us talk of them only as of a name with which to cover our ignorance. What is chance from the point of view of our uncertain counsels is a design determined upon in a higher counsel, that is, in that eternal counsel which includes all causes and all effects in one and the same end of things. Thus everything concurs to the same end, and it is for want of understanding the whole that we find chance, or irregularity, in particular instances.

Various ideas have been propounded since Bossuet which take the place of the older theological determinism in historical interpretation, and in which contingency is equally ruled out, or regarded as causally insignificant. Such, for instance, is the *Zeitgeist,* which started somewhere east of the Rhine and has run such a prosperous course, serving at the beck and call of many an historical manipulator. Such, perhaps, is always the

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"fundamental cause", the *causa causans,* singled out by historians who cannot rest content with multiple causation.

The idea of a determining cause in history is to be regarded, it seems to me, as an *a priori* assumption rather than as anything analogous to a scientific hypothesis. For a scientific hypothesis must be such that it is capable of being confirmed or confuted by empirical evidence, and no historical evidence would necessitate the acceptance or the abandonment of a belief in Providence, or the *Zeitgeist,* or any "fundamental cause", as the ultimate, determining cause in historical development. If such a belief is held, or if it ceases to be held, this is not because it has been *shown* to be true, or untrue, but rather because of the intellectual climate.

But why talk, it may be asked, about Providence or any substitute conception of ultimate causation? Serious historians, it may be said, are not influenced by such notions any more. This is the age of science. Yes, this *is* an age in which natural science, pure and applied, occupies a position and enjoys an intellectual prestige comparable to that of theology in the ages of religious faith, and the blessed word *science* has broad coattails. We have all kinds of sciences known to our prestige-seekers, to our advertisers as well as to our universities. Historians, surely, could not escape the influence of science, especially of the biological sciences, from which it was easy to transfer concepts to social evolution—the concept of organism, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, for examples. Augustine and Bossuet are not patron saints of our present-day historical associations, and history is no longer written—at least not much of it—from the premise of theological predestination. But it would be rash to assert that habits of thought formed when theology was the queen of sciences have contributed nothing to the attitude of modern historians who think of their point of view as scientific. These habits of thought, indeed, probably go far to explain, historically, the acceptance by scientists themselves of a principle which has underlain all thinking in the physical sciences, a principle more general than any particular scientific law, the principle of causality.

According to this, everything that has happened in nature has been preceded by a continuous chain of cause and effect. What led to the triumph of this principle were regularities observed in nature, notably in the motions of heavenly bodies.

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Nature was presumed to be strictly law-abiding, and the founders of modern physical science—Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and the rest—agreed with the theologians at least in this, that they attributed the semblance of chance in nature to human ignorance. They had faith to believe that if knowledge could be extended sufficiently, all events in nature would be seen to be causally determined. It was, however, in minds conditioned by the idea of theological determinism that the scientific conception of causation arose. Those who first used the expression "laws of nature" in the scientific sense—and it seems not to have been used in this sense before the seventeenth century—thought of those laws as commands given by God to matter. "Laws impressed on matter by the Creator" is a phrase used by Darwin in *The Origin of Species*. When Newton called his laws of motion *leges* he was using a word that connoted legislative enactment. The conception of law as command was taken over by science from theology and jurisprudence, and scientific law, the divine law of the theologians, and what the jurists called "the law of nature" were all thought of as emanating from a supernatural lawgiver and as concomitant parts of a single world scheme. Even nowadays scientists, including those who have actually discarded the principle of causal determinism, continue to speak of phenomena *obeying* laws, but this, I take it, is nothing more than a survival of anthropomorphic metaphor. Scientific law and jural law have traveled far apart. The former has come to mean a generalized statement regarding natural phenomena, that may be in the form of a mathematical equation but need not be so, which is entitled to be considered a law only because it has been tested by observation and always found to be confirmed by empirical evidence. Law in the other sense is a rule of human behavior, which may be, and sometimes is, violated without ceasing to be law. If what has been regarded as scientific law is violated by the phenomena, you cannot punish the lawbreakers. You have to modify the law, as has been done again and again in the history of science.

* * *

About a generation ago, in 1923 to be precise, Professor Edward P. Cheyney of the University of Pennsylvania was president of the American Historical Association. He was a distinguished historian who engaged in research in a number of fields in European history; he is probably best remembered for his

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work in the history of Tudor England. He chose as the title of his presidential address "Law in History", from which the following sentences are quoted:

> Examined closely, weighed and measured carefully, set in true perspective, the personal, the casual, the individual influences in history sink in significance, and great cyclical forces loom up. Events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena, but voluntary human action. . . . Providence, fate, destiny, law, has controlled the affairs of man . . . as it controls all things. Human history, like the stars, has been controlled by immutable, self-existent law, by what Mr. Gladstone in his sonorous eloquence once described in Parliament as "those great social forces which move on in their might and majesty, and which the tumult of our debates does not for a moment impede or disturb."

Professor Cheyney proceeded, with all due modesty (for he was the most modest of men) and without any pretense to finality, to formulate certain tendencies which he believed to be discoverable in history, and which he thought of as laws of history. They were six in number, and I enumerate them merely to show the kind of thing he had in mind: (1) a law of continuity, (2) a law of impermanence, illustrated, for example, by the fall of historic empires, (3) a law of interdependence—of individuals, of classes, of nations—(4) a law of democracy, (5) a law of necessity for free consent, and (6) a law of moral progress. Being an optimist, Professor Cheyney looked forward to some future meeting of the American Historical Association "when the search for the laws of history and their application will have become the principal part of its procedure", when "the most conspicuous place on the program will be assigned to some gifted young historical thinker who . . . will propound and demonstrate to the satisfaction of all his colleagues some new and far-reaching law or laws of history."

Now if human history *has* been controlled by "immutable, self-existent law", no fault can be found with Professor Cheyney's opinion that "the personal, the casual, the individual influences in history sink in significance". Even if the Armada of 1588 had carried out its assignment and successfully convoyed a Spanish army from the Netherlands to England, it would not have mattered in the long run. Professor Cheyney was specific as to this: "Whether a Spanish or an English wind blew on a certain day

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really made little difference. England was bound to remain independent of Spain."

* * *

I come now to the other historical point of view. When I first read Seeley's *Expansion of England,* fifty years and more ago, these sentences made a lasting impression on me:

> Historians are sometimes ridiculed for indulging in conjectures about what would have followed in history if some one event had fallen out differently. . . . I think historians should deal in them much more than they do. It is an illusion to suppose that great public events, because they are on a grander scale, have something more fatally necessary about them than ordinary private ones, and this illusion enslaves the judgment.

The same thought seems to have been in the mind of a professional philosopher who took a deep interest in history and gave much reflection to it, the late Morris R. Cohen, when he remarked in his book, *Reason and Nature,* that we can no more appreciate the *historical* significance of Napoleon without asking what might have happened if he had been killed in his first battle than we can realize the *climatic* significance of the inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of its orbit without asking what would have happened had there been no such inclination. The kind of imagination that Seeley and Cohen had in mind is quite different from daydreaming, from the idle and unrestrained fancy that builds castles in the air. It comes into play only in historically informed minds, just as scientific imagination comes into play only in scientifically trained minds. The historian must, of course, or at least he ought to, strive by thorough and critical use of sources available to him to ascertain what actually happened. But if he is concerned with its significance, he should also ask himself what might have happened—for example, if the Armada had been successful. Imagination is an indispensable prerequisite for appraising historical significance, and I submit that it ought to be recognized as such in the training of historical scholars. If I have any message to give you today, this is it.

Those to whom it is congenial to assume that the course of human events has been predetermined, who find such a belief intellectually satisfying and spiritually comforting, will no doubt retain it. But it is not a helpful assumption for the student who aspires to recapture the spirit of a past age and estimate the

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significance of its achievements, who seeks to understand the joys and sorrows, the hopes and fears, the anxieties and tensions, which its men and women experienced. In our daily doings our outlook is not deterministic. We habitually think, and act on the tacit assumption, that choice, within certain ranges, is open to us, and that our future will be affected, to some extent at least, by our choices. In the language of theology we are Arminians rather than Calvinists, or, if you prefer to go farther back, Pelagians rather than Augustinians. This familiar point of view is more likely, I believe, to give us historical understanding than the great booming destiny-concepts of an Oswald Spengler. In a penetrating study that Maitland made of a medieval English parliament, which proved to be a landmark in parliamentary studies, he said, in speaking of the distorting effects of after-mindedness in historical thinking: "It is hard to think away out of our heads a history which has long lain in a remote past but which once lay in the future." Granted that this *is* hard, it is what the student of history who seeks to enter into communion with a past age, to comprehend its interests and its sense of values, must try to do.

A number of historians, and near-historians, have tried their hands at imaginary history, some with serious purpose, some (it may be suspected) in a spirit of literary virtuosity. George Macaulay Trevelyan once won a prize for the best essay on the subject "If Napoleon Had Won the Battle of Waterloo". The most serious work of this nature that I know of was written by the nineteenth-century French philosopher Charles Bernard Renouvier. In opposition to the dogma of necessity in history, and especially against the belief in necessary progress independent of human volition, held by followers of Hegel and followers of Comte and by many French socialists, Renouvier upheld the principle of libertarianism and the belief in contingency in history, and he developed them at length in his philosophical writings. He made an experiment in imaginary history, which bears the title *Uchronie,* meaning *Nowhen,* as *Utopia* means *Nowhere.* It was published in 1876, with this descriptive subtitle: *Esquisse historique apocryphe du développement de la civilisation européne tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel qu'il aurait pu être.* It begins toward the close of the second century after Christ, at the end of the age of the Antonines, and in it the familiar landmarks and historical periods are missing. There is

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no Fall of Rome, no Barbarian Invasions, no Middle Ages. Whatever else may be thought of *Uchronie,* it ought not to be thought of as just a stunt of imagination. It was intended to be a serious contribution to the philosophy of history, and it emphasizes the conclusion that follows if one accepts libertarianism and contingency in history, namely, that it is not only the details, the "non-essentials", that might have been different, but also the framework of history in its generalized outline. Looking at the idea of necessary progress from an ethical point of view, Renouvier believed not only that it had an enervating effect on the individual but that it *de*moralized history by its implication that what has actually taken place was not only necessary but that it was also good. Morris Cohen, who may, or may not, have been acquainted with Renouvier's writings, attributed what he called "the glorification of the historically actual" to "a lack of sympathy or imagination which prevents us from seeing all the finer possibilities, hopes, and aspirations, at the expense of which the triumph of the actual is frequently purchased."

* * *

Before going further let me say (though it may be superfluous) that I have not enjoyed the advantages of scientific or philosophical training, to say nothing of theological training. But it is my understanding, from having dipped into some of the writings of physicists intended for popular consumption, that in their domain of natural science eminent masters are to be found on both sides of the question of Determinism *versus* Indeterminism. The *old* historical determinism had a theological basis. The support which *modern* historical determinism has had has come mainly from the scientific doctrine of causation. A well-informed popularizer of scientific development, J. W. N. Sullivan, remarked in an article published twenty years or so ago that we had assented to the possibility of determinism in human behavior "because we thought that science had proved that determinism was triumphant in the external world, and we thought that what applied to matter might . . . apply to man." It turns out, however, that the so-called law of causality, as it was held in classical physics, has been distinctly weakened during the last generation.

Charles Beard expressed the opinion, and he did so in all seriousness, that the word "cause" ought never to be used in historical writing. This may seem to us pretty drastic. But the

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search for "fundamental" or "paramount" causes in history is, so at least it seems to me, necessarily futile. For, prior to every historical event there was an indefinite number of other events, and since historians cannot employ the experimental methods of the laboratory, they have no means of ascertaining which among these antecedent events were necessary conditions of the event in question, and which (if any) among the latter were determining, or fundamental, causes. In a high-school textbook of American history by David S. Muzzey, which was widely used, there appears this sentence: "The defeat of Blaine was attributed to various causes—the Mugwump revolt, the Burchard incident, . . . the last flicker of Stalwart revenge in Conkling's refusal to support his old rival, the commercial depression and 'panic' of 1884, and the bad weather on election day." Let us assume for present purposes that this is an exhaustive list of the causes of the defeat of Blaine, though of course it is not and Muzzey did not present it as such. How can we measure their relative influence and compare the effects, say, of commercial depression with those of the partisan indiscretion of an overzealous clergyman? We cannot reset the stage, call back the actors, and repeat the election of 1884, eliminating one antecedent and then another, and recording the differences in the result. We have no right to say that the Mugwump revolt was more *fundamental* or more *decisive* or even more *important* as a cause of the defeat of Blaine than the rain on election day was. The only advantage it seems to have over the bad weather is that it is a better talking point. You can say more about it. But the effectiveness of an antecedent is not to be measured by the number of words that can be used in discussing it.

Causation in history is always multiple, and to single out any one antecedent as a *fundamental* cause is a highly subjective operation. On this point some words of John Stuart Mill may be worthy of attention. In a chapter on "Universal Causation" in his *System of Logic,* Mill pointed out that causal sequence is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent.

> It is usually [he said, and this is always the case with historical causation] between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents, the concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce . . . the consequent. In such cases it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions. . . . The real Cause, however, is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right

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> to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. . . . in practice, that particular condition is usually styled the cause, whose share in the matter is superficially the most conspicuous, or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect, we happen to be insisting on at the moment.

The historian ought, I submit, to banish "fundamental" causes from his thought and from his vocabulary.

In a lecture delivered at Cambridge University in 1929 and published with the title *The Causal and the Casual in History,* John Buchan (later Lord Tweedsmuir and Governor General of Canada) made some remarks which strike me as sensible:

> In the kaleidoscope of the past we cannot, as a rule, sort out effects and causes with any precision, nor can we weigh events in the meticulous scales which science demands. Even when causes are reasonably plain, their classification eludes us. We cannot tell which is the *causa causans,* which are proximate, or efficient, or final. We must be content with generalizations which are only generalizations and not laws, with broad effects and massed colors.

Buchan, it may be added, was a novelist and, more to our point, a biographer and a military historian. For, of all the branches of history, the military and the biographical are perhaps the least hopeful for historical interpretations in terms of Mr. Gladstone's "great social forces." The most *Zeitgeist*-ridden historian would find it difficult to persuade his readers, even if not to persuade himself, that General Desaix *had to* arrive on the battlefield of Marengo just in time to turn into a victory for Napoleon what had had every appearance of imminent irretrievable disaster. It would be easier to leave Marengo out, even though there is excellent reason for regarding it as critical in Napoleon's career. It would be much easier to leave General Desaix out, which is what Napoleon actually did in his report of the battle.

The factor of contingency in history has been touched upon in some articles published during the last few years in the sumptuous historical magazine which has been so successful in appealing to a wide range of readers, *American Heritage.* In one of these Professor Richard B. Morris dealt with the Albany Plan of Union of 1754, of which Benjamin Franklin was the architect. It provided for an intercolonial union within the British Empire, with a federal government empowered to impose taxes and provide for a continental army. Had it been adopted, the revolt of the colonies twenty years later might well have been averted.

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This opinion can claim in its support something more historical than the conjecture of a modern historian. In an article published in a magazine in 1789, thirty-five years after the failure of his Plan, Franklin wrote that if it had succeeded and an intercolonial army had been established for colonial defense, a British army quartered in the colonies for that purpose would have been unnecessary. "The pretenses for framing the Stamp Act", he continued (and we recall that the Stamp Act was passed by Parliament in order to raise revenue to provide for the support of such an army), "would then not have existed, nor the other projects for drawing a revenue from America to Britain by acts of parliament, which were the cause of the breach, and attended with such terrible expense of blood and treasure; so that the different parts of the empire might still have remained in peace and union." Franklin, it may be thought, was not a disinterested judge of the importance of his own Plan, but this opinion of his does not seem to lack cogency. And it is a good example of historical imagination—in this case imagination on Franklin's part.

* * *

And now for a very brief excursion in the boundless field of imaginary history. Let us go back quite a way—four hundred years and a little more. And first a word of authentic history by way of introduction.

A Spanish queen was seated on the throne of England, the first reigning queen, incidentally, in English history, at least since the Norman Conquest. I call her Spanish not so much because Mary Tudor happened to be the daughter of Catharine of Aragon and granddaughter of Ferdinand and Isabella as because her filial devotion, for reasons easily understandable and generally well known, was to her revered and injured mother, and not to her father, from whose matrimonial instability she had suffered so grievously; and because her Spanishry was strengthened by her marriage, early in her short reign, to her Habsburg cousin, who was given the title of King of England and was very soon to become King of Spain as Philip II. It was her fondest wish and her ardent prayer that she might bear him a child, preferably a son, and she believed that it was her mission to do so.

Now suppose that Mary's prayer had been granted. At her death the Tudor dynasty would have come to an end, to be

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followed by a Habsburg dynasty. Even if the English and Spanish crowns had not been united on the same head, it seems extremely probable, to say the least, that there would have been a close dynastic alliance between the Habsburg rulers of Spain and the Habsburg rulers of England, something like the Family Compact which actually came into existence in the eighteenth century between the Bourbon rulers of France and the Bourbon rulers of Spain. And we do not forget that Spain was a greater Power than England in the sixteenth century, as France was a greater Power than Spain in the eighteenth. Can we seriously suppose, is it really thinkable, that the course of English history after the middle of the sixteenth century would have been in all essentials the same as it actually was—if Mary's prayer had been granted?

What about English oversea expansion? Its beginnings, as things actually were, date from the reign of Mary's half-sister, Queen Elizabeth, and her war with Spain. But if Mary's prayer had been granted, there would have been no Queen Elizabeth to encourage English sea dogs in their buccaneering raids on Spanish trade and Spanish treasure, in their bold defiance of Philip's claim to the whole of the New World. A principal argument during Elizabeth's reign in favor of English colonization was that English settlements in America would be useful as bases for naval attacks on Philip's treasure fleets transporting the silver of Mexican and Peruvian mines to Spain. But there would have been no war between England and Spain—if Mary's prayer had been granted. If we take our stand at the death of Queen Mary, in 1558, it would be difficult to find contemporary evidence pointing to a great future for England as a colonizing nation. She did not need outlets for an expanding population; the population of England and Wales was probably not over three millions. And in maritime activity and geographical exploration England was distinctly backward. Would a Habsburg dynasty in England have been likely to encourage English colonization in Spain's preserves, and would English colonization have been possible without government sanction and backing?

And what about the English parliament? Was its future, as that is known to us, assured? Might it not, indeed, have come to an end like the States-General in France, which, as the textbooks remind us, met in 1614 and never met again till 1789? We know what the policy of the *Spanish* Habsburgs was with

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regard to assemblies of estates in their dominions more or less similar to the English parliament. It was to get rid of them. In Castile and Aragon, for example, the old medieval *cortes* ceased to exist. Henry VIII had found parliament useful in his quarrel with the papacy; Mary found it useful in restoring papal supremacy. If Habsburg rulers in England had not found it useful, they would probably have followed the example of their Spanish cousins and refrained from summoning it. An England without a parliament may seem to us an anomaly, but is not that because "it is hard to think away out of our heads a history which has long lain in a remote past but which once lay in the future"?

And what of religion in England? The essentials of Catholic worship and the supremacy of the papacy over the English Church, both restored during Mary's reign, would presumably have been continued under a Habsburg and therefore, needless to say, a Catholic dynasty. Is it inconceivable that a Spanish Inquisition would have been imported into England and Protestantism overwhelmed in a persecution which would have made the fires of Smithfield pale into insignificance?

* * *

What has been said should not be taken to imply an opinion on my part that historians ought to so concentrate on what look like accidents as to neglect the effects on historical development of such factors as geography, climate, race, economic conditions, social habits, religious beliefs, philosophical systems. It is intended, rather, as a plea for finding a place in historical interpretation for the influence of the contingent, for the vagaries of that unpredictable goddess Fortuna, who is ever intervening in historical causation. For, as Sir Llewellyn Woodward has suggested, even though what is called "chance" may be something which, in its own field, is strictly determined, the determination is outside the knowledge of the historian. We need not believe that "the wind bloweth where it listeth." But granted that the direction and velocity of the wind which was blowing over the battlefield of Marengo at a certain time of a certain day in the year 1800, and which carried the sound of the cannonading to the ears of General Desaix, who was several miles away, were determined by physical causes, that determination is outside the knowledge of the historian.

NEW YORK CITY ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

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RALPH WALDO EMERSON

THE MORAL VOICE IN POLITICS

IT may, at first glance, seem to be incongruous to include Ralph Waldo Emerson among political thinkers. He was essentially a poet and essayist, a man of letters in the classic sense, a professional writer and lecturer who deliberately eschewed politics and strove to remain above the battle. But the flavor of his personality and the influence of his teachings were such that he left an ineradicable imprint on the leaders and thinkers of his age. No account of American thought—be its emphasis on philosophy or theology or society or politics—can be complete without reference to Emerson.

Emerson bestrode his time, intellectually and morally, as no other American poet before him or since. In a rough age of materialism and violence, his life personified the triumph of the contemplative, sometimes even rarefied, mind. From the year 1837, when he delivered in Boston the Phi Beta Kappa address, "The American Scholar", to the end of the Civil War, when his faculties began to fail him, Emerson's was the voice that echoed and re-echoed throughout the land, proclaiming the values of the spirit. In articles and books and, above all, lectures, the gentle poet-philosopher reached unprecedented audiences in every part of the expanding country. Everywhere, in teeming cities and uncouth frontier settlements, he disdained the vulgar and appealed to what was highest and noblest in the human character. He thus achieved the unique career of being, in the words of the literary critic Alfred Kazin, "the teacher of the nation." For he had, to an extraordinary degree, what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called "the gift of imparting a ferment."

Born in Boston in 1803, during the third year of Jefferson's Administration, Emerson was the product of nearly two centuries of New England Puritanism. Seven of his ancestors were preachers, among them Samuel Moody of Maine who chased sinners even into the alehouse, Joseph Emerson of Malden who prayed nightly that no descendant of his should ever be rich, and William Emerson of Concord who died while serving in the Revolutionary Army. Emerson's father, the Rev. William Emer-

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son, was minister of the First Church (Unitarian) in Boston, and his son Ralph Waldo followed family tradition by becoming, in 1829, pastor of the Second Church (Unitarian) in the same city.

It was the powerful Puritan tradition that molded Emerson into a psychologically sensitive and mentally tough instrument of self-expression. His background was one of proverbial high thinking and frugal living, with emphasis on the virtues of self-reliance, sobriety and morality. But the Calvinistic virtues, while steeling character, tended to crush the emotional life. Rigid Puritanism all too frequently led to ugly self-repression, righteousness and hypocrisy. But in many instances, as in the case of Emerson, who in his childhood suffered from the terrors of theology, the conflict between Calvinistic sternness and normal human emotions resulted in spiritual elevation and heightened introspection. It was this self-searching that led Emerson to keep a diary, which he began while still a young boy at Harvard; it has remained to this day a multivolumed treasury of his innermost thoughts as well as a matchless record of American culture in the nineteenth century.

From his earliest days, and in keeping with family tradition, Emerson was a reader of books. He was brought up on the Greek and Roman classics and the Bible, as well as the best in English literature, particularly Shakespeare, Bacon and Milton. He rarely read novels, having a special dislike for his contemporaries, Jane Austen, Walter Scott and Charles Dickens. Emerson's readings were confined mainly to poets, philosophers and biographers, among them Dante and Goethe, Plato and Swedenborg, Plutarch and Saint-Simon. He read not for imitation but for inspiration, saying of books: "I value them to make my top spin."

The author who had the deepest impact upon him was Michel de Montaigne, whose *Essays* he read at the age of 22 in Charles Cotton's translation (1685-1686). To the young divinity student of nineteenth-century Boston, the French skeptic of the sixteenth century came as a revelation. "It seemed to me", Emerson said of Montaigne, "as if I had written the book myself in some former life, so sincerely it spoke my thought and experience. No book before or since was ever so much to me as that."

Montaigne's exquisite introspection struck a responsive chord in Emerson. In his essay, "Of Presumption", Montaigne had

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written: "The world looks always opposite; I turn my sight inwards, there fix and employ it. Every one looks before him, I look into myself. I have no other business but myself; I am eternally meditating upon myself, control and taste myself. . . . I circulate in myself."

Emerson, too, was a self-seeker. He constantly searched his own self, holding his mirror with a steady hand and looking into it with an unsparing eye. In his personal microcosm, nature yielded him truths which he knew to have a larger relevance.

An early entry into his diary, dated May 13, 1822, is characteristic of his self-criticism:

> In twelve days I shall be nineteen years old . . . my heart [is] a blank. I have not the kind affections of a pigeon. Ungenerous and selfish, cautious and cold, I yet wish to be romantic; have not sufficient feeling to speak a natural, hearty welcome to a friend or stranger. . . . There is not in the whole wide Universe of God (my relations to Himself I do not understand) one being to whom I am attached with warm and entire devotion. . . . Perhaps at the distance of a score of years . . . these will appear frightful confessions;— . . . it is a true picture of a barren and desolate soul.

A mind as searching and as wide-ranging as Emerson's soon found itself uneasy in the pulpit. Although Unitarianism was a liberal creed, it was insufficient to provide him with the spiritual sustenance for which he searched. He began to distrust all religious sects. As early as June 20, 1831, in the third year of his pastorate, he wrote in his journal:

> I suppose it not wise, not being natural, to belong to any religious party. In the Bible you are not directed to be a Unitarian, or a Calvinist or an Episcopalian. Now if a man is wise . . . he will say to himself, I am not a member of . . . any party. I am God's child, a disciple of Christ. . . . As fast as we use our own eyes, we quit these parties or Unthinking Corporations, and join ourselves to God in an unpartaken relation. A sect or party is an elegant incognito devised to save a man from the vexation of thinking.

Gradually the pulpit became intolerable. His independent spirit rebelled against the rituals, and the prescribed requirements of institutionalized religion. In his journal, January 10, 1832, he wrote:

> It is the best part of the man, I sometimes think, that revolts most against his being a minister. His good revolts from official goodness. . . . The difficulty is that we do not make a world of our own, but fall into institutions already made, and have to accommodate our-

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> selves to them to be useful at all, and this accommodation is, I say, a loss of so much integrity and, of course, of so much power.

In June 1832, he informed his congregation that he was unwilling to administer the Lord's Supper, because Jesus "did not intend to establish an institution for perpetual observance when he ate the Passover with his disciples." He no longer believed in the usefulness of the pulpit, concluding that to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry. "The profession is antiquated", he wrote in the diary, June 2, 1832. "In an altered age, we worship in the dead forms of our forefathers. Were not a Socratic paganism better than an effete, superannuated Christianity?"

In September 1832, Emerson resigned the ministry—"this ice-house of Unitarianism", as he called it—and at the end of the year he sailed for Europe. Like Roger Williams, another New England Puritan clergyman who left the ministry almost two centuries earlier, Emerson henceforth cut all connection with established churches, which he regarded as being contrary to the real spirit of God and Christ. In his diary, March 5, 1835, he wrote:

> You can never come to any peace or power until you put your whole reliance in the moral constitution of man, and not at all in a historical Christianity. The Belief in Christianity that now prevails is the Unbelief of men. They will have Christ for a Lord and not for a brother. Christ preaches the greatness of man, but we hear only the greatness of Christ.

Despite his declaration of independence from organized Christianity, Emerson remained a profoundly religious man all his life. But his conception of God was remote from institutionalized religion. He objected to a divinity that was enshrined in edifices of brick and stone and in whose name man was relegated to comparative insignificance. Emerson, on the contrary, proclaimed God as an all-pervasive force, as immortal life abiding in the deathless spirit of man. In an ultimate sense, this was a democratic conception of religion, for, by proclaiming God-in-man, he elevated man to a central position of dignity in the scheme of the universe. His essential religious philosophy is perhaps best summed up in these words, taken from his diary (September 8, 1833): "The purpose of life seems to be to acquaint a man with himself. . . . The highest revelation is that God is in every man."

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Emerson's nine-month trip to Europe, taken at the age of 30 in 1833, widened his horizons and in a sense completed his education. For the first time in his life, he came in contact with cultural monuments and personalities not available to a young clergyman in America. In Italy he saw the striking remains of ancient civilizations, about which he had hitherto read in books. In England he met eminent poets and writers, to whose talk he listened with sensitive appreciation but not awe. In Scotland, he visited Thomas Carlyle in his farmhouse at Craigenputtock. Then and there the two formed a friendship that was to last the rest of their lives, despite the fact that no two men could have been more dissimilar. Where Emerson was tranquil, poised and quietly spiritual, Carlyle was tempestuous, dogmatic and strident, his utterances so bristling with exclamation points that Walt Whitman once referred to *Heroes and Hero-Worship* as written in a "rapt weird (grotesque?) style." But there was a moral force to Carlyle, an inner sweetness and a devotion to the general ideal of democracy, that the young American was quick to recognize. The political-minded Carlyle was to serve Emerson as a stimulant in areas—public affairs, for example—which were not his primary preoccupation.

Emerson's over-all evaluation of his European experience was a characteristic blend of generous appreciation and skepticism. On his way home, at Liverpool, on September 1, 1833, he wrote in his journal:

> I thank the Great God who has led me through this European scene, this last schoolroom in which he has pleased to instruct me, from Malta's Isle, through Sicily, through Italy, through Switzerland. . . . He has shown me the men I wished to see—Landor, Coleridge, Carlyle, Wordsworth; he has thereby comforted and confirmed me in my convictions. Many things I owe to the sight of these men. I shall judge more justly, less timidly, of wise men forevermore. To be sure not one of these is a mind of the very first class, but what the intercourse with each of these suggests is true of intercourse with better men, that they never *fill the ear*—fill the mind. . . . They [are] all deficient, all these four, . . . in insight into religious truth. They have no idea of that species of moral truth which I call the first philosophy. . . . But Carlyle—Carlyle is so amiable that I love him.

Upon his return from Europe, Emerson moved to Concord, where he was to spend the rest of his life and whence his voice, in speech and in print, was to radiate throughout the land. At

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first he lectured regularly in Boston and then, as his fame grew, his circuit widened until he went as far as California. He became a master of the art of lecturing, charming varied audiences with his wisdom and wit, his choice of diction that was poetical without being precious, and his learned allusions that were devoid of pedantry. An Emerson lecture was what he called "a panharmonicon", an instrument that combined the poetry of the soul with the truth of science, homely humor with monitory anecdote. Even those who did not always understand, or could not later paraphrase the words into prosaic language, were drawn into the "enchanting meshes" of the speaker's words. James Russell Lowell (1819-1891), himself a poet and essayist, thus described Emerson's performance as a speaker:

> I have heard some great speakers and some accomplished orators, but never any that so moved and persuaded men as he. There is a kind of undertow in that rich baritone of his that sweeps our minds from their foothold into deeper waters with a drift we cannot and would not resist. And how artfully (for Emerson is a long-studied artist in these things) does the deliberate utterance, that seems waiting for the fit word, appear to admit us partners in the labor of thought and make us feel as if the glance of humor were a sudden suggestion, as if the perfect phrase lying written there on the desk were as unexpected to him as to us!

George William Curtis (1824-1892), the journalist and editor *(Putnam's Monthly, Harper's Weekly,* New York *Tribune),* who heard Emerson lecture in Boston, was likewise impressed by the speaker's

> simplicity of manner that could be called rustic if it were not of a shy, scholarly elegance; perfect composure; clear, clean, crisp sentences; maxims as full of glittering truth as a winter night of stars; an incessant spray of fine fancies like the November shower of meteors; and . . . intellectual and moral exaltation.

What did Emerson talk about? The answer is, What didn't he talk about? In so far as he had a "message", it was the ultimate meaning of life and nature. He proclaimed the divine spirit of man and all living things. His subject matter embraced the totality of sensed and observed experience. Within the range of his often epigrammatic discourses came Napoleon and pickerel-weed, Empedocles and soft mushrooms, Pythagoras and wild geese, Swedenborg and cotton mills. He was particularly striking as a verbal painter of portraits of great men. Note, for instance, this description of George Washington:

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> The head of Washington hangs in my dining-room for a few days past, and I cannot keep my eyes off it. It has a certain Appalachian strength, as if it were truly the first-fruits of America, and expressed the Country. The heavy, leaden eyes turn on you, as the eyes of an ox in a pasture. And the mouth has gravity and depth of quiet, as if this MAN had absorbed all the serenity of America, and left none for his restless, rickety, hysterical countrymen.

Or this sketch of Daniel Webster:

> His noble and majestic frame, his breadth and projection of brows, his coal-black hair, his great cinderous eyes, his perfect self-possession, and the rich and well-modulated thunder of his voice (to which I used to listen, sometimes, abstracting myself from his sense merely for the luxury of such noble explosions of sound) distinguish him above all other men.

Or this one, after meeting Abraham Lincoln in the White House in 1862:

> The President impressed me more favourably than I had hoped. A frank, sincere, well-meaning man, with a lawyer's habit of mind, good clear statement of his fact; correct enough, not vulgar, as described, but with a sort of boyish cheerfulness, or that kind of sincerity and jolly good meaning that our class meetings on Commencement Days show, in telling our old stories over. When he has made his remark, he looks up at you with great satisfaction, and shows all his white teeth, and laughs.

Emerson did not construct a consistent philosophy of man or nature. He did, indeed, distrust rounded and logical structures so beloved of metaphysicians and philosophers. His ideas are scattered in his speeches, essays, and, above all, his diary, but a strain of unity runs through all his utterances. Despite his famous gibe that consistency was the "hobgoblin of little minds", a remarkable harmony underlies his thought.

At the risk of oversimplification, one may say that Emerson's philosophy is characterized by one-ness, universality and morality. To him, there was no distinction between man and nature. Both were part of the cosmic spirit. "To the dull mind all nature is leaden. To the illuminated mind the whole world burns and sparkles with light." He said that man was "made of the same atoms as the world is." The overpowering reality of nature-in-man he called the Over-Soul, in which every individual's "particular being is contained and made one with all others." This one-ness is immortal and universal. It embraces the totality of thought and energy, always incarnating the indi-

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vidual in the general. "There is one mind common to all individual men," and each human being is the incarnation of the "universal mind".

The core of this universal spirit, as incarnated in man, is the moral law, the substance of which is the ideal of freedom and man's struggle to rise upward. "The moral law", he wrote, "lies at the centre of nature and radiates to the circumference. It is the pitch and marrow of every substance, every relation, and every process." To break the moral law meant to lose the "central reality" of life, for thought and morals were an inseparable unity. "The high intellect is absolutely at one with moral nature."

Emerson's philosophy of universalism, or the Over-Soul, although couched in terms that appeared at first glance mystifyingly metaphysical, nevertheless did not shut out political realities. On the contrary, it provided a powerful rationale for democracy and a base for eloquent attacks on existing evils, among them slavery (in his *Ode* to Channing, he spoke of "The jackals of the Negro-holder"), political corruption and harsh materialism. Where certain influential Americans—Calhoun, for example—advocated a restriction on liberty as necessary for social stability, Emerson proclaimed man's freedom as divinely inherent in the system of the universe:

> For he that ruleth high and wise,
> Nor pauseth in His plan,
> Will take the sun out of the skies,
> Ere freedom out of man.

The existence of evil, Emerson said, only showed man's better nature. He explained the paradox by pointing out that the very act of recognition of depravity implied awareness of it, which in itself suggested possibilities of amelioration. Referring to the meanness of human life, he asked: "How did we find that it was mean?" Obviously only the moral sense could indicate goodness and badness. And this sense, Emerson said, being part of the totality of nature, was undergoing cosmic stages of evolution toward higher levels of morality and betterment, including the establishment of freedom in America.

> The civic history of men [he wrote] might be traced by successive ameliorations as marked in higher moral generalizations;—virtue meaning physical courage, then chastity and temperance, then justice and love;—bargains of kings with peoples of certain rights to certain

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> classes, then of rights to the masses,—then at last came the day when . . . the nerves of the world were electrified by the proclamation that all men are born free and equal.

In giving utterance to the divine spirit that encompassed all and transcended all, Emerson became the most eloquent and most widely known spokesman of the idealistic movement known as Transcendentalism, which flourished from about 1820 to the Civil War. Centering in Concord, Transcendentalism combined spiritual uplift with revolutionary utopianism, attracting reformers, abolitionists, anarchists and idealistic socialists. Among the outstanding members of the movement were the reformer Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888), the Unitarian minister William Ellery Channing (1780-1842), the writer Margaret Fuller (1810-1850), the abolitionist Theodore Parker (1810-1860), the critic George Ripley (1802-1880), and the philosopher Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), who, in 1841, moved into Emerson's house where he lived for two years. The group brought out a Transcendentalist journal, *The Dial,* the editorship of which Emerson took over from Margaret Fuller between 1842 and 1844.

In social and political matters, the Transcendentalists tended to be reformers, in sympathy with the Socialist (pre-Marxist) and utopian movements which, beginning with Robert Owen's New Harmony,[1] were then spreading in America. Emerson's heart was with the utopians too, but his head said no. Like many idealists of the period, he was shocked by the excesses of

[1] The utopian movement started at about the time when Emerson entered the divinity school. In 1824, an English industrialist and reformer, Robert Owen (1771-1858), arrived in America and proclaimed: "I have come to this country to introduce an entire new state of society; to change it from an ignorant, selfish system to an enlightened social system." He set up the first experimental "communistic" society at Harmony, renamed New Harmony, Indiana. Although New Harmony did not live up to its name and dissolved within three years, the experiments continued elsewhere. Owen's disciple, Etienne Cabet, established a colony on the Red River in Texas and, this having failed, he moved to Illinois, where he founded another in the village of Nauvoo, which had been deserted by the Mormons. Other utopian "Associations", following the teachings of the French Socialist, Francois Fourier (1772-1837), as propagated by the wealthy Albert Brisbane in the columns of Horace Greeley's New York *Tribune,* were established throughout the country, as far west as California. Between 1840 and 1850, there were no less than forty such colonies in the United States. Ultimately none of them, including the Transcendentalists' Brook Farm, was viable enough to survive the overwhelming pressures of a surging individualist economy.

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the rising capitalism, the cruel disregard for the rights of labor, the cheapness of morals and the corrupting political influence of the new rich. The "new moneyed feudalism" bribed legislatures and, in general, debased the spirit of the country.[2] "In America," Emerson wrote in *The Conduct of Life,* "the geography is sublime, but the men are not: the inventions are excellent, but the inventors one is sometimes ashamed of." In one respect he agreed with Calhoun—namely, that the Northern industrialist also bought his slaves. Emerson's diary contains entries showing his condemnation of the prevailing conditions, as for example (March 14, 1854):

> The lesson of these days is the vulgarity of wealth. We know that wealth will vote for the same thing which the worst and meanest of the people vote for. Wealth will vote for rum, will vote for tyranny, will vote for slavery, will vote against the ballot, will vote against international copyright, will vote against schools, colleges, or any high direction of public money.

A moral man, Emerson was offended by the cynicism and materialism of his time. He knew that the age was ripe for reform, and he admired the contemporary reformers and (pre-Marxist) Socialists who advocated programs for human betterment. In his *Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England,* he wrote:

> And truly I honor the generous ideas of the Socialists, the magnificence of their theories, and the enthusiasm with which they have been urged. They appeared the inspired men of their time. Mr. Owen preached his doctrine of labor and reward, with the fidelity

[2] Criticism of the prevailing social misery, attacks on Wall Street, and demands for reform were particularly widespread after the panic of 1837. An example of such criticism is to be found in the book, *Letters from New York* (1843), by the abolitionist and reformer, Mrs. Lydia Maria Francis Child (1802-1880): "In Wall-Street, and elsewhere, Mammon, as usual, cooly calculates his chance of extracting a penny from war, pestilence, and famine; and Commerce, with her loaded drays, and jaded skeletons of horses, is busy as ever fulfilling the 'World's contract with the Devil.' . . . I have often anathemized the spirit of Trade, which reigns triumphant, not only on 'Change, but in our halls of legislation, and even in our churches. Thought is sold under the hammer, and sentiment, in its holiest forms, stands labelled for the market. Love is offered to the highest bidder, and sixpences are given to purchase religion for starving souls. In view of these things, I sometimes ask whether the Age of Commerce is better than the Age of War? Whether our 'merchant princes' are a great advance upon feudal chieftains? Whether it is better for the many to be prostrated by force, or devoured by cunning?"

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> and devotion of a saint, to the slow ears of his generation. Fourier, almost as wonderful an example of the mathematical mind of France as La Place or Napoleon, turned a truly vast arithmetic to the question of social misery. . . . He thought nobly. A man is entitled to pure air, and to the air of good conversation in his bringing up, and not, as we or so many of us, to the poor smell and musty chambers.

Emerson could not bring himself to join the utopians. Despite his sympathies for their aims, he found their approach uncongenial. He, too, believed in reform but of a deeper kind. Much of what passed for political reforming in his day was, he said, meaningless superficiality. "The salvation of America and of the human race", he noted ironically in his diary in 1848, "depends on the next election, if we believe the newspapers. But so it was last year, and so it was the year before, and our fathers believed the same thing forty years ago." The general run of reformers wanted merely to change existing institutions or to improve the material conditions of the poor. For Emerson, physical betterment without moral improvement had no significance. "Alas, that I must hint", he wrote in his diary (August 31, 1841), "that poverty is not an unmixed good; that labor may easily exceed. . . . The Irish population in our towns is the most laborious, but neither the most moral nor the most intelligent." Something much more than improving labor conditions was necessary if reform was to be meaningful.

Looking beyond organized system, which, he knew, perpetuated evil and debased the human character, Emerson wanted a reform in the very nature of man. He wished to raise the moral character of the human being to make him capable of true brotherhood, to elevate his soul to a level where selfishness and materialism would be replaced by the ideals of love and sharing. Human love, once established as a guiding principle of society, would, he said, constitute a veritable political and social revolution—it would, in fact, be *the* revolution—in human affairs.

This idea of reform, Emerson developed in a lecture, "Man the Reformer", delivered before the Boston Mechanics' Apprentices' Library Association, on January 25, 1841. Acutely critical and, at the same time, spirtually elevated, the lecture marks a high point in the history of American idealism:

> Our age and history, for these thousand years, has not been the history of kindness, but of selfishness. Our distrust is very expensive. The money we spend for courts and prisons is ill laid out. We make, by distrust, the thief, and burglar, and incendiary, and by our court

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> and jail we keep him so. An acceptance of the sentiment of love throughout Christendom for a season would bring felon and the outcast to our side in tears, with the devotion of his faculties to our service. See this wide society of laboring men and women. We allow ourselves to be served by them, we live apart from them, and meet them without a salute in the streets. We do not greet their talents, nor rejoice in their good fortune, nor foster their hopes. . . . We complain that the politics of masses of the people are controlled by designing men. . . . But the people do not wish to be represented or ruled by the ignorant and base. They only vote for these, because they were asked with the voice and semblance of kindness. . . . Let our affection flow out to our fellows; it would operate in a day the greatest of all revolutions. It is better to work on institutions by the sun than by the wind. The state must consider the poor man, and all voices must speak for him. Every child that is born must have a just chance for his bread. Let the amelioration in our laws of property proceed from the concession of the rich, not from the grasping of the poor. Let us begin by habitual imparting. Let us understand that the equitable rule is that no one should take more than his share.

Emerson had small enthusiasm for Brook Farm, the 200 acres of dairy land where his Transcendentalist friends hoped to establish an ideal community based on "brotherly cooperation".[3] The whole scheme looked to him like a glorified gaol. He felt that the proposed utopia, even if it were successful, could stifle all ideas and imagination—an opinion that was to be confirmed later when, after the Farm's dissolution, its members unanimously told him: "We have no thoughts." Moreover, he was temperamentally averse to schemes based on euphoria. The holy fire in the eyes of his friends, when they discussed their projected millennium, left him embarrassed and uneasy, precisely because they were so enthusiastic. As he tells in his diary (October 17, 1840):

> Yesterday George and Sophia Ripley, Margaret Fuller and Alcott discussed here the Social Plans [Brook Farm]. I wish to be con-

[3] Brook Farm aimed: "to secure for our children and to those who may be trusted to our care, the benefits of the highest physical, intellectual, and moral education, which . . . the resources at our command will permit; to institute an attractive, efficient, and productive system of industry; to prevent the exercise of worldly anxiety by the competent supply of our necessary wants; to diminish the desire for excessive accumulation by making the acquisition of individual property subservient to upright and disinterested uses; to guarantee to each other the means of physical support and of spiritual progress, and thus to impart a greater freedom, simplicity, truthfulness, refinement and moral dignity to our mode of life."

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> vinced, to be thawed, to be made nobly mad by the kindlings before my eyes of a new dawn of human piety. But this scheme was arithmetic and comfort. And not once could I be inflamed, but sat aloof and thoughtless; my voice faltered and fell. It was not the cave of persecution which is the palace of spiritual power, but only a room in the Astor House hired for the Transcendentalists. I do not wish to remove from my present prison to a prison a little larger. I wish to break all prisons.

Here we have the essence of Emerson in his capacity as a citizen reacting to practical challenges. A physical utopia on a tiny scale troubled his sense of proportion, and its fixed intellectual assumptions were a denial of his philosophy of the moving and energizing spirit throughout the universe. For, on a personal level, Emerson was so finely balanced that he could not accept anything extreme, in the sense of being sharply and patently out of tune with the harmony of things. He had personally tried a number of small experimental departures from daily routines—being in all outward manifestations a quietly solid citizen, paying his taxes and obeying the laws—and found them uncompensating. For a short time, he was a vegetarian, but soon saw that eschewing animal flesh did him no particular good. To illustrate human equality, he tried to have his two servants sit at the table with the family, but the domestics were clearly inconvenienced by the arrangement. To test the theory that a scholar should give part of his time to physical labor, he attempted to work in the field only to discover that it took away precious energy from writing, and he thus concluded sensibly: "The writer shall not dig."

Emerson would not bind himself to anything that would confine him or the free flow of his ideas. He conceived his function to be that of a transmitter of thought, which he considered the transcendent reality, the universal mind that energized the world. He was at one with it, giving expression to its continuing and ever-changing flow. This is what he meant when he said of himself:

> I unsettle all things. No facts to me are sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back. . . . Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit. . . . No truth so sublime but it may be trivial tomorrow in the light of new thoughts.

If this sounded mystical and imprecise, Emerson had an answer for it. "I am", he said, "in all my theory, ethics, and

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politics a poet." He formulated his ideas in poetic language, only because that was the best way he knew to speak about things that could not be pinned down but were of ultimate significance. When one takes the trouble to read his phrases carefully, one finds, even in his utterances on politics, a hard core of practical sense and humane wisdom.

His essay, *Politics,* written in 1842, is a fine illustration of the poet as political thinker. It is a departure from the traditional writings on the subject, emphasizing not power but morality, not property but character, not the state but the individual above the state. The echoes of these ideas can be found reverberating in Thoreau.

To begin with, Emerson established the proposition that government was neither sacred nor fixed. It is purely man-made and hence subject to change:

> In dealing with the State, we ought to remember that its institutions are not aboriginal, though they existed before we were born: that they are not superior to the citizen: that every one of them was once the act of a single man: every law and usage was a man's expedient to meet a particular case: that they all are imitable, all alterable; we may make as good; we may make better.

From this it followed that the state was not an abstraction or an arbitrary ruler, but the individual citizen and his neighbor. "The State is our neighbor; our neighbors are the State." Politics, then, resolved itself to a question of the relationship between neighbor and neighbor. "My right and my wrong, is their right and their wrong." So long as the individual does what is fit and abstains from what is unfit, there are agreement and harmony in society.

Trouble, however, begins when a man cannot control himself, and finally undertakes to impose his will on his neighbors. This establishes a false relationship; it is a lie, and "hurts like a lie both him and me." The next move is to execute it through "a practical lie, namely by force." Emerson found force revolting. "I do not", he said, "like to see a sword at a man's side. If it threatens man, it threatens me. A company of soldiers is an offensive spectacle." Force was the ultimate blunder, a "colossal ugliness" that marked all "the governments of the world."

> We live in a very low state of the world, and pay unwilling tribute to governments founded on force. There is not, among the most religious and civil nations, a reliance on the moral sentiment and

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> sufficient belief in the unity of things, to persuade them that society can be maintained without artificial restraints, as well as the solar system; or that the private citizen might be reasonable and a good neighbor, without the hint of a jail or a confiscation. What is strange too, there never was in any man sufficient faith in the power of rectitude to inspire him with the broad design of renovating the State on the principle of right and love. All those who have pretended this design have been partial reformers, and have admitted in some manner the supremacy of the bad State. I do not call to mind a single human being who has steadily denied the authority of the laws, on the simple ground of his own moral nature.

The solution for the bad political situation was the same as the one Emerson suggested in his lecture, "Man the Reformer" —namely, an improvement in the human character through love and wisdom. "A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered. The power of love, as the basis of a State, has never been tried." Once tried, by men of moral stature and wisdom, it would ultimately abolish the state itself.

> To educate the wise man the State exists, and with the appearance of the wise man the State expires. The appearance of character makes the State unnecessary. The wise man is the State. He needs no army, fort, or navy—he loves men too well; no bribe, or feast, or palace, to draw friends to him.

Until man was morally elevated, government should remain as weak as possible. Power was too dangerous to be permitted in the hands of men of immature character. Emerson wrote in his diary (January 20, 1832):

> Don't trust children with edged tools. Don't trust man, great God, with more power than he has, until he has learned to use that little better. What a hell should we make of the world if we could do what we would! Put a button on the foil till the young fencers have learned not to put each other's eyes out.

Emerson thus believed in a strictly limited state. "The less government," he wrote in *Politics,* "the better, the fewer laws, and the less confided power." This dislike of strong government, which was really a distrust of politicians of low moral character, was in the prevailing liberal tradition. When Emerson said, "The root and seed of democracy is the doctrine, Judge for yourself," he expressed the essence of Jeffersonian individualism. In his belief that government should be as weak as possible and should, above all, stay out of all economic affairs, he was at one with such *laissez faire* democrats as John Taylor and Martin

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Van Buren.[4] "The basis of political economy", Emerson wrote, "is non-interference. The only safe rule is found in the self-adjusting meter of demand and supply. . . . Do not legislate. Meddle, and you snap the sinews."

Emerson's thinking about government was unquestionably colored by the struggle over slavery that convulsed his age. His general distrust of government, deriving from his ethical philosophy, was reinforced by the fact that the Southern slaveholders, for whom he had boundless contempt, wielded immense political influence in Washington. Up to the Civil War, that is, throughout most of Emerson's active life, the Southern slaveowners either dominated or held the balance of power in the United States Senate and, in addition, they often occupied key positions in the federal structure. That in itself, in Emerson's eyes, demeaned government. "I confess", he said, "I do not wish to live in a nation where slavery exists."

The Southern slavocrats who kept God's creatures in bondage and triumphantly lived on the labor of slaves filled Emerson with horror. He viewed them as a breed of men alien to God's higher purposes, worshiping at the cult of violence. "I have not", he said, "a syllable of all the language I have learned, to utter for the planter." When Emerson, the preacher of human brotherhood, referred to the type, he lost all his gentleness. His unsparing portrait of a typical Southerner, etched in his diary (October 8, 1837), is memorable for the light it casts on the abolitionist fire that was ultimately to consume the Old South:

> The young Southerner comes here a spoiled child, with graceful manners, excellent self-command, very good to be spoiled more, but good for nothing else—a mere parader. He has conversed so much with rifles, horses and dogs that he has become himself a rifle, a horse and a dog, and in civil, educated company, where anything human is going forward, he is dumb and unhappy, like an Indian in church. Treat them with great deference, as we often do, and they accept it all as their due without misgiving. Give them an inch,

[4] In his Message to Congress, on September 4, 1837, President Van Buren gave full expression to the contemporary *laissez faire* doctrine when he said: "All communities are apt to look to government for too much. . . . This ought not to be. The framers of our excellent Constitution and the people who approved it with calm and sagacious deliberation acted at the time on a sounder principle. They wisely judged that the less government interferes with private pursuits the better for the general prosperity. . . . Its real duty . . . is . . . to leave every citizen and every interest to reap under its benign protection the rewards of virtue, industry, and prudence."

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> and they take a mile. They are mere bladders of conceit. Each snipper-snapper of them all undertakes to speak for the entire Southern States. "At the South, the reputation of Cambridge," etc., etc., which being interpreted, is, In my Negro village of Tuscaloosa, or Cheraw, or St. Mark's, I supposed so and so. "We, at the South," forsooth. They are more civilized than the Seminoles, however, in my opinion, a little more. Their question respecting any man is like a Seminole's —How can he fight? In this country, we ask, What can he do? His pugnacity is all they prize in man, dog, or turkey.

Emerson felt so strongly about slavery that, despite his habitual reluctance to participate in public causes and his avowed skepticism of reformers, he was an open abolitionist. "It is impossible", he wrote, "to be a gentleman, and not be an abolitionist," because a gentleman is "the natural defender . . . of the weak and oppressed." He opposed the annexation of Texas (a slave state); and the Fugitive Slave Act (1850), which he called "this filthy enactment", moved him to a defiance of the government itself. "I will not obey it, by God," he said.

As the crisis over slavery deepened, Emerson's customary philosophical serenity began slowly to desert him. "This calamity", he noted in his diary in 1851, "darkens my days." The evil of slavery moved him to abandon his pacifism. "Root it out," he said, "burn it up, pay for the damage, and let us have done with it. It costs a hundred millions. Twice so much were cheap. . . . I would pay a little of my estate with joy." When the Civil War, which he had foreseen, finally broke out, he said, "Sometimes gunpowder smells good." But the fratricidal conflict, continuing for four desperate years and costing nearly a million lives, horrified him. In one of his poems, "Terminus", he cried out. "No more!"

Emerson never quite recovered from the holocaust. The Civil War and its consequences shattered his fastidious world of serene optimism and loving kindness. But by then his creative work was done. Material, and indeed revolutionary, changes in the American society in no way negated Emerson's essential philosophy. He had, in the midst of crass materialism, proclaimed the all-pervasive value of human intelligence. By his emphasis on the universal spirit of morality, he had enriched the democratic mind with his vision of human nobility. He may thus be considered, in the words of John Dewey, the moral "Philosopher of Democracy", its "prophet and herald".

SAUL K. PADOVER

NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

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OCT 22 1959

BRITAIN FACES EUROPE

I

ONCE again the British government has been engaged in the reëxamination of its policies toward the European continent. Just as the failure of the abortive European Defense Community provoked the British initiative for a Western European Union in 1954, so the proposal for a common market brought forth the British counterplan for an industrial free trade area. When the six nations comprising the continental community, as it is hopefully called, ratified and implemented the treaty[1] establishing a European Economic Community among themselves, the British government turned its attention somewhat more seriously to the promotion of a free trade area. It has regarded such a project primarily as a means of associating the United Kingdom with these newest continental developments.

The problem of European Union,[2] of course, has long been a thorn in the lion's paw. The basic dilemma has seldom appeared to the British as one of simple alternatives, however, and they have posed the question "to join or not to join" less often than such queries as "how far?" and "in what way?" Refusing to grasp the nettle of participation, Britain has preferred thus far gingerly to tread her chosen path of "close association". This was the policy which the Labour government adopted both toward the European Coal and Steel Community and toward the proposed European Army; it was continued by the Conservatives when they assumed office in the autumn of 1951. It is still their avowed policy today.

To understand this concept of close association and how it has evolved, it may be helpful and perhaps even necessary to review and analyze the principal factors which have influenced British policies toward Europe in the post-war years. Admittedly, these

[1] Effective as of 1 January 1958. "The six" refer to: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

[2] The term is used here in the broadest sense to embrace all of the principal post-war proposals for closer European organization—political, military or economic; it may refer to anything from federal union to intergovernmental coöperation.

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can be detected only by a close examination of specific British reactions to particular projects for European integration. Such projects include not only the afore-mentioned Coal and Steel Community, Defense Community, and Common Market, but also the Council of Europe, the proposed European Political Community, Western European Union and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. It is not intended to embark upon a detailed account of all of these here; by using a few selected examples, however, and by indulging in some initial generalizations, it is possible to outline the major themes which have permeated British attitudes toward European Union.

With regard to political union in general, no British government, Conservative or Labour, has seriously contemplated British membership and/or submergence in a European federation. The argument that Britain should not surrender the ultimate decisions of foreign policy or economic affairs to any organization or parliamentary body which she could neither control nor veto has been generally accepted and, in fact, was never earnestly challenged by responsible opinion. In the field of economics the government has shown a marked preference for intergovernmental coöperation as distinct from supranational control. Finally, although Britain has become increasingly bound to the continent in strategy and defense, her military commitments have nonetheless been limited by extra-European considerations.

These policies have been determined more by the exigencies of the period and by the practical needs of each situation than by general doctrinal considerations. Yet it is possible to isolate three recurring factors which have influenced the attitudes expressed in the policies finally adopted: namely, the Commonwealth and Empire, the Atlantic Alliance and national sovereignty. These three concepts—in essence and in myth—have served both as reasons and excuses for particular British policies toward the European continent in the post-war period. Their importance has depended not only on their objective merit in terms of the national interest, however that might be determined, but also on their subjective appeal to ministers and statesmen as well as to the public at large.

Hence, the "mystique" of the Empire—the myth surrounding it—has been just as real, and certainly as important psychologically, as the political and economic commitments of the Commonwealth. Much the same may be said of the Atlantic Alliance

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and British sovereignty. The British belief that Britain stands in a special relationship to the United States and exerts a unique influence over Washington has supplemented the realization that Britain is dependent on the American military commitment in Western Europe. In both respects, the Atlantic has afforded a countervailing attraction to the geographic pull of the continent. As for sovereignty, the British government, as most of its contemporaries, has maintained the legal fiction of national independence in foreign affairs, while recognizing the actual limitations on that independence. The legal theory of sovereignty, however, has at times been mistaken for a political reality, especially in Britain's relations with her European neighbors. With regard to all three of these concepts, then, the beliefs and feelings surrounding them have exerted almost as much influence on governmental policies as (and sometimes more than) the realities they represent.

II

Both the system of Commonwealth consultation and the policy of Imperial Preference have affected British policies toward European Union. Certainly with regard to British membership in a European federation, the Commonwealth relations of the United Kingdom present a genuine obstacle. The key to the Commonwealth relationship is the sovereign independence of all its members. If Britain were to merge her identity in a federated Europe to the extent of foregoing an independent foreign and defense policy, she would no longer retain that sovereignty necessary to Commonwealth status. Britain's membership in a European federation is not only logically inconsistent with her membership in the British Commonwealth, however. It is also opposed both emotionally and rationally by the British government and by several of the other members of the Commonwealth.

Opinions expressed at a Commonwealth Relations Conference in 1949 illustrate some of the factors underlying the attitude of many members. According to a summary of the proceedings, it was argued that a European federation "would reduce the United Kingdom to the status of a Virginia in the United States and prejudice its position in the Commonwealth."[3] Delegates from the Asian members and from Australia expressed concern that

[3] F. H. Soward, *The Adaptable Commonwealth* (London, 1950), p. 40.

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such a federation might underwrite the European colonial system which they regarded as dangerously outmoded. Moreover, it was argued, a European federation would continue to require support from the United States and from the Dominions to be militarily strong and economically viable. It would offer no real solution to the problem of securing those imports of foodstuffs and raw materials so essential to the British economy. On these grounds, and for other reasons equally important, the British government unequivocally rejected all proposals for the inclusion of the United Kingdom in a federation of European states.

Although the Commonwealth thus acted as an obvious barrier to federation, Commonwealth commitments did not prevent closer British participation in European military organizations. Since the war, Britain has continued to maintain and secure her lines of communication and trade with the Empire and to coordinate many of her defense policies with those of other Commonwealth countries; the integrated strategic arrangements of pre-war days, however, have very largely ceased to exist. Canada's defense, for example, has become more closely intertwined with that of the United States than with that of the United Kingdom. What is true of Canada is equally true of Australia and New Zealand. The post-war growth of American interests and commitments in the Pacific, the gradual decline of British strength in that area, and the negotiation of the Anzus Pact have only served to confirm what World War II had already indicated: both Australia and New Zealand have become more dependent for their national security on the United States than on Britain. Finally, when the former British colonies in Asia and Africa (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana) acquired the sovereignty of statehood, they not only asserted their right to pursue independent foreign and defense policies, but fully exercised that right.

In what concrete way, then, have Britain's military obligations to the Commonwealth and Empire affected her defense policies in Western Europe? Her actual Commonwealth commitments in terms of troops and equipment have not been so onerous as to prevent equal or even larger commitments to the continent. This was recognized in Britain's obligation under the Paris Agreements[4] to maintain at least four divisions and a tactical

[4] *Cmd. 9304:* "Documents agreed on by the Conference of Ministers held in Paris—October 20-23, 1954".

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air force on the continent—except in the event of an acute overseas emergency. The inclusion of this proviso, however, indicates a realization and an acceptance of the psychological fact that, should any of the Dominions or colonies become involved in a major conflict, Britain would find it difficult to remain neutral. Conversely, the British government is fully aware of the vital contribution made by the Dominions toward the survival of Britain in World War II and looks to their continued support in the future. These beliefs and expectations have prompted Britain to avoid any European defense arrangements which might (a) prevent independent British action on behalf of the Commonwealth and Empire or (b) involve the United Kingdom in a European imbroglio which the Dominions would not wish to enter. Aside from such political considerations, and certainly in terms of actual military commitments, the Commonwealth has presented no barrier to British participation and membership in European defense organizations.

The "economic ties" of the Commonwealth and Empire have generally referred to those commercial links of trade protected by Imperial Preference and long-term bulk purchase agreements, and to those financial links based on a common use of sterling and dependent upon the central banking services of London. Although these ties have been invoked insistently by the opponents to British participation in any European economic union, their objective validity has been greatly weakened in recent years. Some of the Dominions, Australia and Canada especially, have come to regard Imperial Preference with increasing suspicion and criticism and tend to place a greater emphasis on long-term bulk purchase agreements which can be negotiated on a strictly *quid pro quo* basis. Although Britain's trade with other Commonwealth countries continues to form a larger percentage of her total trade than her trade with other European countries, there have been numerous indications that the European market is expanding at a faster rate than the markets of the Dominions whose governments have begun to pay closer attention to the interests of their own domestic producers and manufacturers. Financially, Britain has been unable to supply the growing demands for capital from Dominions and colonies alike which have had to turn, partially at least, to other sources.

It is therefore of interest to note to what extent the economic ties of the Commonwealth and Empire have actually operated as

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restraints upon Britain's economic coöperation with the continental countries of Western Europe. The desire to maintain Imperial Preference obviously influenced the British government to insist that foodstuffs and drink should be exempt from the operations of any European free trade area. Moreover, the free trade area itself was suggested as an alternative or addition to the common market in order to maintain preferential treatment for Dominion exporters to Britain as against other non-European exporters and so to retain Britain's own preferences in Dominion markets. Yet it is notable that Britain went even so far as to accept the idea of an industrial free trade area which, as far as manufactured goods are concerned, can only operate to the detriment of the old system of Imperial Preference. This British decision well illustrates the primacy of facts over theory in British foreign policy: when it appeared that the Messina Powers[5] "meant business"—that they not only were determined to succeed but probably would succeed with or without Britain —then the dangers of British isolation from such a development could no longer be ignored; neither a skeptical nor a patronizing attitude would suffice to meet them.

Equally important as these political, military and economic factors, have been the psychological aspects of the Commonwealth relationship. The British public and press have exhibited a marked tendency to regard Britain's Commonwealth ties and her relations with the European continent as conflicting alternatives. Although it was pointed out by some, Churchill among them, that Britain's Commonwealth links would in no way prevent her closer coöperation with the continent, both proponents and opponents of European Union agreed that Britain could participate in specific European organizations only if, and provided that, they did not draw her away from the Commonwealth. It was the "Commonwealth experiment", not the "European idea", which spurred the imagination of the British and aroused their active interest:

> To the British of the nineteen forties the Commonwealth was essentially something which had worked, was working and would go on working. How it worked they neither knew nor cared, and indeed they may even have taken a certain perverse pride in not being able

[5] The six continental states which now form the European Economic Community. They first met at Messina, Italy, in June 1955 to discuss the possibilities of establishing a common market.

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> to explain these things to others, as though the invention of something which was at once both effective and irrational were the *ne plus ultra* of political genius.[6]

The ties of the Commonwealth, historical and cultural as well as practical and pragmatic, were bound to British hearts more firmly than the tenuous links of European Union. The fact that Britain is not solely a European Power was reiterated again and again by the government, party leaders and the press: as Britain's interests were not purely European, she could not confine her policies to the continent of Europe. Moreover, they asserted repeatedly that if the choice had to be made between the Commonwealth and Europe, the Commonwealth would not be abandoned.

The principal criticism of most of these arguments is that they were applied indiscriminately to projects for supranational integration and to proposals for intergovernmental coöperation alike. Obviously, the Commonwealth relationship has presented an effective barrier to British membership in a European federation. With regard to plans for closer international coöperation, however, the argument was seldom strictly relevant. For example, Britain's Commonwealth relations do not seem to have been adversely affected by her participation in the activities of such organizations as the Council of Europe, Western European Union and the O.E.E.C., or even by her association with the European Coal and Steel Community. Admittedly, the negotiations leading to the creation of these organizations were carried on with Commonwealth and Empire relations very much in mind and the resultant institutions or arrangements were shaped in such a way as to avoid injury to those relations.[7] Yet the very nature of the Commonwealth—an informal organ for consultation between sovereign states—and the types of European Union actually proposed made the likelihood of conflict between the two concepts very slight indeed. It may well be surmised, therefore, that the Commonwealth has served more often than not as a supporting argument to those decisions which had already been taken for other reasons.

[6] *Survey of International Affairs—1951,* edited by Peter Calvocoressi (London, New York, Toronto, 1954), p. 75.

[7] This was especially the case in the early discussions on a European Payments Union and it was also illustrated in the W.E.U. provision for overseas emergencies.

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III

The second major factor which influenced and shaped British attitudes and policies toward Europe has been the Atlantic Alliance. Whether this was used to refer primarily to NATO or to the Anglo-American alliance, it meant in essence American commitments in Europe. To preserve or to increase such commitments has been one of the principal aims of Britain's European and trans-Atlantic policies since the end of the war. Even in the inter-war period American policies had exerted an important influence on Britain's attitudes toward the League, the European continent and her international commitments in general. A recognition of common Anglo-American interests and beliefs was strengthened by successful experiments in coöperation during the Second World War and has continued throughout the post-war period. In a speech before Congress in January 1952, Sir Winston Churchill emphasized its significance: "Bismarck once said that the supreme fact of the nineteenth century was that Britain and the United States spoke the same language. Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the twentieth century is that they tread the same path."[8]

As with the Commonwealth and Empire, the Atlantic Alliance has served both as an excuse and as a reason for certain British policies toward the continent. The importance of good relations between Britain and the United States was evident long before the Russian threat made a defensive alliance necessary. The United States had attained a clear naval supremacy during the war and with control of the seas it virtually controlled Britain's life line to food and raw materials. With the division of world power between the Soviet Union and the United States and after Britain's decision to abandon all thought of a third force, the United Kingdom became a part of the Western orbit—politically, militarily and economically. Moreover, because of the developing alliances between other members of the Commonwealth and the United States, the Anglo-American alliance also influenced Britain's relations with the Dominions. As early as 1944 Professor W. T. R. Fox maintained that Britain's status as a first-rank Power was contingent upon support from the Dominions and the United States. As the support of the former could be counted on only if the support of the latter were assured, he

[8] Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, 18 January 1952.

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continued, Britain's position was doubly dependent on American good will.[9]

The British interest in the Atlantic Alliance has centered not only on American economic aid and military commitments, however, but on the attempt to create a "special relationship" with the United States through which Britain could exert a greater influence on the policies of that Power. This has been one of the elements in the British reluctance to become "just another European state" merged in a European federation. For, in such a situation Britain, qua Britain, would not be able to exercise that special influence on American policies which, as an independent state and America's chief ally, she has attempted to do. This was recognized by both major parties. Churchill repeatedly made this point when he emphasized the need for collaboration between English-speaking peoples. Thus, in his Fulton speech of March 1946: "Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States."[10] This, he continued, required not only a growing friendship and mutual understanding between the two systems but a continuation of the intimate military relations which had been established during the war. During the war itself Mr. Churchill had maintained that Britain and the United States should by constant contact attempt to ensure that the main lines of their foreign policy would run closely together in the post-war period. The importance of the Atlantic Alliance was also recognized by the Labour government. Indeed, Mr. Bevin acted as one of the prime architects of that alliance when in 1948 he made his proposals for a Western Union which he envisaged within an Atlantic framework. Both Mr. Bevin and Sir Stafford Cripps realized that American assistance in the economic and military spheres was a primary condition for the attainment and maintenance of British security and welfare.

It was this belief which so deeply influenced British attitudes toward European Union. The recognition that it was American power and aid that basically mattered, as far as British and

[9] W. T. R. Fox, *The Super-Powers* (New York, 1944), p. 57.

[10] Winston Churchill, *The Sinews of Peace* (Boston, 1949), p. 98.

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European security was concerned, tended to relegate the idea of a purely European organization to a position of secondary importance. As Mr. Bevin constantly reiterated, a European Union would be viable only within the larger setting of an Atlantic Alliance. It is primarily in the Atlantic Community, not the European, where British interests lie. The importance of the Atlantic Alliance affected British policies toward post-war proposals for European coöperation and integration in several different ways. On the one hand, there were those who argued that if Britain participated fully in any European Union, a false impression of European solidarity and self-sufficiency might arise in the United States where the old forces of isolationism might yet prevail upon the government to withdraw at least partially from Europe. On the other hand, there were those who subscribed to the opposite argument: if Britain did not participate in the creation of a strong and effective European Union, the American government might become thoroughly disgusted with this European "intransigence" and retire once again into isolation. Though both of these contrasting views can now be seen to have been based on an overestimation of the power of American isolationism, they were nonetheless quite prevalent in Britain during that early post-war period before the American commitment to Europe was either clearly stated or firmly established.

Later, however, when it appeared evident that the United States had become intimately involved in the defense of Western Europe, the principal argument vis-à-vis Europe and the Atlantic Alliance arose out of the general conviction that Britain could not afford to go any further in her commitments to the continent than the United States was also willing to go. In the realm of defense, Europe was indeed vital to British security but the effective means of defending Europe depended upon American power and not on any "European Army" of dubious strength. The proposed European Army project was also tainted by the supranational overtones attached to the whole concept of a European Defense Community; as in the dispute over the E.C.S.C., the British government made it clear that it would not consider membership in any organization which provided for the establishment of supranational authorities. In addition to the issue of sovereignty which this involved, there was a British suspicion that the continental urge for European Union, even

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as expressed in these "vertical" schemes of integration, was partly motivated by the third force idea which Britain had long since abandoned. Part of the British aversion to close integration with the continent, therefore, was due to an uncertainty whether the continental countries attached the same primacy to the Atlantic Alliance as Britain herself did.

Finally, there was the important but complicating factor of strong American support for European Union and the consequent tendency on the part of the American government to promote both the specific organizations which arose in the name of that Union and British participation in them. The relationship between American aid and European coöperation was regarded in two different ways: on the one hand, the American government considered American aid not only as necessary to European recovery and defense, but also as an inducement to European coöperation and unity; on the other hand, the European governments used the promise of coöperation and unity partly as an inducement to American aid. The British regarded such aid primarily as a contribution to European recovery and security rather than as a means to European Union. The Atlantic Alliance has thus acted both as a spur to Britain's participation in European coöperation and as a deterrent to Britain's membership in any European organization in which her identity would be submerged.

IV

Another factor of major importance in the formation of the attitudes of the British toward European Union has been their concept of national sovereignty and the aura of instincts and emotions, convictions and beliefs surrounding it. It has been mentioned that neither major political party in the United Kingdom would endorse British membership in a European federation. This was opposed for the reasons already familiar to even the casual observer of British affairs: it was inconsistent with Commonwealth membership; it would terminate Britain's close relationship with the United States and prevent any special British influence over American policy; finally, it would mean the subordination of British policies to European policies and the end of an independent national existence in foreign affairs. Such drastic measures were inconceivable to the British mentality unless absolutely necessary for any existence whatsoever—

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and this was not considered to be the case. The British government was convinced that the strengthening and maintenance of Western security could be achieved only through an organization in which both Canada and the United States played their full part; Western Europe could not stand alone. Therefore, the formation of a federal Europe in itself would not help to solve the basic problem of British and European security. Membership in a European federation of uncertain viability appeared to be a poor exchange for British sovereignty, however limited in fact that might be.

Part of Britain's emphasis on national sovereignty may be attributed to the marked impact of her wartime experience: the United Kingdom was not occupied. The full meaning of that fact can be realized only when it is contrasted with the defeat and occupation of almost the entire continent of Europe. From the fall of France until the entry of the United States into the war Britain had succeeded in "going it alone". Even later, it was not the countries of subjugated Europe that rallied to her side to secure an ultimate victory, but those Powers across the seas to which Britain had already looked in the troubled times of 1938 and 1939. It is understandable that the British should have tended to regard the continent as a liability rather than an asset and such countries as France and Belgium as not the most reliable of allies. These may not have been the sentiments expressed in public speeches and oratory, but they were nonetheless effective for their being unexpressed. It is often precisely the subconscious instinct or conscious but silent thought which is of more significant influence than the empty words of rhetoric.

In addition to such recent historical experiences, Britain has long exhibited a strong antipathy toward complicated constitutional arrangements which have never played an important part in her political history. Federation, though a familiar enough concept to Americans and many continentals, was alien to a British government accustomed to an unwritten constitution and the less elaborate structure of a unitary state. A form of cooperation far more amenable to the British mind has been and remains the informal consultation practiced in the British Commonwealth and to a lesser extent in the O.E.E.C. Thus, a combination of an insular suspicion of continental entanglements, conditioned and reinforced by wartime experience, a strong dislike of constitutional ties and a noticeable bias against conti-

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nental multi-party political systems has produced an almost instinctive aversion to British participation in continental schemes of integration.

In reviewing briefly post-war British policies toward projects for European Union, one is immediately struck by the way in which the line drawn between membership and association has paralleled the delimitation between organizations of coöperation and those with supranational overtones. That is, Britain has consistently joined those European organizations which have simply called for closer coördination between governments, while she has refused, equally consistently, to participate in those schemes of integration which she felt would have impinged upon her sovereignty. Thus, in the political field, Britain joined the Council of Europe (reluctantly, it is true) and actively sponsored Western European Union; at the same time she categorically refused to participate in the proposed European Political Community to which, however, she gave her blessings. Militarily, the British government spurned full membership in the European Defense Community on the grounds of its supranational overtones, though it offered to associate itself as closely as possible with the developing European community. A compromise was reached in the W.E.U.; although it committed British troops to the continent, it lacked the complicated political structure of E.D.C. Moreover, it clearly provided for overseas emergencies and was integrally bound to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, thus taking cognizance of both the Commonwealth and Atlantic interests of the United Kingdom.

The question of sovereignty was not only involved in matters of political federation and military integration, however; it also arose frequently in deliberations over European economic organizations. The supranational aspects of the European Coal and Steel Community, for example, were a deciding factor in Britain's refusal to join that body. The initial attitude of the Labour government was especially antipathetic toward the idea of foreign interference in the economic life of the United Kingdom at a time when its program of national planning had only begun to get under way. Aware of the basic importance of the coal and steel industries to the British economy, the government was inclined to distrust any project which might limit its control over those industries. This element of economic nationalism was not peculiar to the Labour government, however, for even out

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of office the Conservative party was no more eager for European control of Britain's economy than was Labour. Mr. Churchill made the point when he asserted firmly that he could not agree to the creation of a "supra-national authority which has the power to tell Great Britain not to cut any more coal or make any more steel, but to grow tomatoes instead." When the Conservatives came into office, moreover, they did not hasten to join the E.C.S.C., but followed the policy of association laid down by their predecessors.

A contrasting attitude was evident in Britain's policy toward the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. Under the leadership of Ernest Bevin, the British government eagerly accepted the Marshall offer of June 1947; moreover, it took the initiative in the creation of a new system of economic coöperation which would both utilize American aid and attempt to achieve European recovery as efficiently as possible. Emphasizing the unanimous agreement and mutual consent of all members, the O.E.E.C. has followed the principle of unanimity in all major decisions and operations. Britain has participated actively in the work of this organization since its inception and has referred to it as a prime example of effective and successful intergovernmental coöperation. With her national sovereignty insured by the unanimity principle, Britain has consistently regarded the O.E.E.C. as the most suitable institution for the consideration of European economic problems. Thus, it was not surprising that the United Kingdom turned to the O.E.E.C. as the organization in which to carry on the recent discussions and negotiations on a free trade area.

V

What light does this background shed on the problems which the creation of the European Economic Community has raised for Britain and on the policies through which she has attempted to solve them? During the negotiations between France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries on the establishment of a common market, the O.E.E.C. Council decided to set up a working party to study "the possible forms and methods of association" between the six nations planning the common market and the other O.E.E.C. members—including the possibility of a free trade area. Since the initiative in establishing the study group was generally regarded as a British one, this switch of emphasis

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to the O.E.E.C. was considered by some as a British delaying tactic designed either to postpone a definite decision on the common market or to sabotage the whole project. Though there is little evidence of the latter, the former motive may not have been entirely lacking. Just as important if not more so, however, was the British desire to alter the focus of the European free trade negotiations from the narrow ring of the six E.C.S.C. Powers to the wider circle of the O.E.E.C. For Britain, this change of focus did not herald a future policy of nonparticipation; on the contrary, it indicated a general realization of the need for British "association" with the common market in some form or other and the desire to secure this association through the organization most suitable to British interests.

As with the E.C.S.C. and the E.D.C., full participation in the European common market was regarded with particular uneasiness because of its possible implications for the political and economic sovereignty of its members. The nagging suspicion that a common market of the six would display the supranational tendencies of the Coal and Steel Community reinforced the more obvious objections to British participation in it: the threat to protected and/or inefficient industries, the fear of all forms of unfair competition, the supposed threat to wages and general living standards, the possibility of large-scale immigration and the whole problem of political control. Especially important for Britain was the reasoned belief that because British membership in a European customs union would not allow the continuation of preferential treatment in the British market for Commonwealth goods as against continental goods, it would also spell the end of Imperial Preference in Commonwealth markets for British goods. Despite all this, however, the arguments against complete isolation from the common market proved to be even more overwhelming, and "association" appeared once again as a compromise solution. The principal motivation behind the British move for association has not been the positive desire for benefits, but the negative force of fear.

On an economic level, the argument ran somewhat as follows: When the common market is finally established, British exports to any country within that market will have to face the common tariff. Similar goods produced by any member country will be able to enter any other member country duty-free. The duty on British exports to the union would increase their price in rela-

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tion to duty-free continental goods, and competition under such conditions would be extremely unfavorable to British goods. It was also argued, but somewhat less convincingly,[11] that the advantages of a large home market would allow the members of the common market to pursue methods of mass production and specialization of labor that would permit them to compete in non-European markets at prices lower than those offered by countries (that is, Britain) which could not engage in similar procedures. Another negative inducement to British association was the argument that if Britain did not associate with the common market it would probably fall under the economic and political domination of Germany, the strongest member of the group. This had also served as the French plea for British participation in the European Defense Community. Economically, British manufacturers have already felt the pressure of German competition to an ever increasing extent and could see few prospects for British exports to a European market in which they would have to face German competition under the conditions mentioned above. Politically as well, Britain can hardly regard with equanimity an upsurge of German influence on the continent of Europe when the whole history of her European policy has recorded her numerous efforts to prevent the domination of that continent by any single Power.

On the political level, the common market proposals resurrected the old question of the leadership of Europe. The "pro-Europeans" in Britain have often argued that the British government abdicated the political leadership of Europe by its hesitant policies toward the post-war proposals for European Union—the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan, the European Army. They maintained that the continental countries of Western Europe had again and again urged Britain to assume the lead in the movement for closer union but that Britain, obsessed by the importance of her overseas ties and interests and failing to recognize a correspondingly vital interest in her nearest neighbors across the channel, had refused the offer. It was then that the six had decided to "go it alone". This argument was recently revived and applied to the question of association with the common market. The common market was, after all, not only an

[11] It is doubtful whether the economies of large-scale production or the competitive status of a country's exports is quite so directly related to the size of the home market.

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economic venture but a political reassertion by the six of their faith in the cause of European integration which had been so severely damaged by the failure of E.D.C. The new Western European Union had not succeeded in winning their enthusiasm as an embodiment of the "European Idea" or even as the proper institution through which to advance toward it. But the common market and Euratom—the progeny of Messina—were regarded as successors to the European Coal and Steel Community, that one notable success of integration on a European scale. As such they acquired an almost symbolic significance as the latest manifestations of the movement for European Union.

This attitude was so prevalent on the continent that if Britain had openly opposed the scheme, her action might have been regarded there as opposition to the very idea of European unity. The political implications of this were quite clear. If British opposition to the common market had prevented the creation of that market, it might have destroyed not only a scheme for the abolition of European tariffs, but the very concept of European Union out of which that scheme had grown. It might even have affected Western European coöperation in the wider organizations of the O.E.E.C. and W.E.U. If, however, as has happened, British opposition did not hinder the development of the common market, it might nonetheless have resulted in the final abnegation of British influence in the counsels of the six. It was feared that the six might achieve such a degree of economic integration and political union among themselves as to form a continental bloc of greater economic strength and political influence than Britain herself. Moreover, Britain retained the lingering suspicion that a continental union might develop, not as an adjunct of the greater Atlantic Alliance, but as a neutral bloc or non-committed area. It was partly this thought which provoked the view that Britain should assume the lead herself, participate in the negotiations and shape the common market proposals in such a way as to answer both the aspirations for union among the six and the concrete interests of Europe as a whole. According to such an analysis, Britain's rôle in the economic field as in the political would be to reconcile "Big Europe" and "Little Europe" within the wider compass of the Western Alliance.

British policy was thus faced with a double dilemma: (1) to avoid the disadvantages of full participation without suffering

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the even greater disadvantages of complete isolation; and (2) to reconcile Little and Big Europe in a united Europe without disrupting either the political ties of the Atlantic Alliance or the economic ties of the British Commonwealth. This problem of the common market thus involved most of the many facets of Britain's policies and attitudes toward European Union which have thus far been examined. In the past, the British answer to European Union was found to lie in the two policies of "coöperation" and "association". In the Council of Europe, Britain pursued a policy of political coöperation both in the Committee of Ministers and in the Consultative Assembly and looked toward a policy of association with other organizations through the terms of the Eden Plan. In the field of defense, Britain coöperated in the organization of the Brussels Treaty and defined her policy toward the proposed European Defense Community as that of the closest possible association. With the collapse of E.D.C., Western European Union was evolved as an organization of European military coördination under the overall strategy and direction of NATO. So also in the field of economic organization: coöperation was the key to the operations of the O.E.E.C., and an associative relationship was eventually developed between Britain and the European Coal and Steel Community. The policies of coöperation and association were thus evolved to coördinate the continental need for unity with Britain's own interests in the preservation of her national sovereignty, in the maintenance of her Commonwealth ties and in the continuation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The United Kingdom attempted to solve the dilemma of the common market by the same formula: though association was regarded as the proper approach for British policy toward the common market, it was given a new twist by the parallel proposal for a free trade area. When it seemed evident that the common market would become a reality with or without Britain, the choice appeared to some as one of simple alternatives—to join or not to join. Others,[12] however, seized upon a third possibility, the compromise policy of association with the common market by means of participation in a free trade area. Avoiding some, though not all, of the difficulties of a full customs union,

[12] Among them, Mr. Harold Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade, the chief British architects of the proposal for a free trade area.

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a free trade area could be negotiated through the auspices of the O.E.E.C.; this in itself would help to dispel any overtones of supranational control. Imperial Preference could be retained as against other non-European competitors and if agricultural produce were exempt from the scheme, the bulk of Commonwealth exports to Britain (foodstuffs and drink) would not be affected even with regard to European competition. If, then, Britain were to "participate" in a free trade area of Western Europe, it would not necessarily be at the cost of her Commonwealth ties. Moreover, such an area would no longer be the limited and cohesive agency of six states but an extended system which would embrace, perhaps, the whole of Western Europe. This shift of emphasis from the common market to the free trade area and from the treaty making of the six to the negotiations of the seventeen clearly reflected the influence of those factors which have already played such an important part in the formation and modification of British policies toward the continent.

Whether the failure of the Paris negotiations will spell the end of the free trade area is yet to be seen. Admittedly many difficult and complex problems remain to be solved. The special position France has secured within the European Economic Community has led to her insistence on similar arrangements in a free trade area. Denmark and the Netherlands are both opposed to the British proposal for the exclusion of foodstuffs: they understandably object to the duty-free admission of foreign manufactured goods without receiving corresponding tariff reductions on their exports of dairy and other farm products. The decision of the six to associate their overseas territories with the common market, moreover, presented additional difficulties for Britain, the Commonwealth and the colonies. If the produce of French and Belgian territories, for example, can enter continental markets at preferential or duty-free rates, similar exports from the Commonwealth and from British colonies will have to compete at a great disadvantage in those markets and face the probable prospect of losing them altogether. If, however, Britain were to suggest the same arrangement for the Commonwealth and Empire, then agricultural goods could not be excluded from the free trade area; that is, Commonwealth and Imperial produce would have to compete in the British market with products from the continent and from French and Belgian colonies.

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In Britain these problems, though recognized, have not been regarded as insurmountable. From the beginning, both Government and Opposition (Liberals included) have favored the creation of a free trade area,[13] neither the Federation of British Industries nor the Trades Union Congress has opposed it, and nearly all organs of the British press have given it their support. In March 1957 Mr. Macmillan openly referred to the "enormous problems" and "very great difficulties" involved in the negotiation of a free trade area in Western Europe; but, although it was a complicated problem, he felt that it could be solved if the nations concerned wanted to solve it.[14] Since that time the O.E.E.C. discussions bogged down more than once in the morass of economic pressures and political considerations which constitute the "national interests" of negotiating states. In spite of these delays and problems, the British government remained hopeful of final agreement. During the Paris negotiations the *Economist* expressed what appeared to be an attitude representative not only of the press, but of the government as well:

> Whatever the vicissitudes of the European negotiations, the long-term problems remain the same: to find ways of associating Britain more closely with Europe; and to explore all the possibilities of strengthening the ties between the Commonwealth and that prosperous continent, which seems to have such a big future both as a market for primary products and as a source of capital.[15]

These "vicissitudes", however, were such that the negotiations for a free trade area were suspended in November 1958. Proposals have since been made for some other form of association between Britain and the common market, among them the suggestion that the Commonwealth as a whole be linked with the European Economic Community. To prognosticate the fate of such schemes is beyond the realm of political science, but it is not improbable that an arrangement similar to that now existing between the United Kingdom and the European Coal and Steel Community may yet provide the desired solution.

In conclusion, it may be well to summarize some of the basic political and economic arguments which have been evoked in British discussions concerning participation in a common market

[13] *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 561, Cols. 35-54 and Cols. 55-70, 26 Nov. 1956.

[14] Reported in the *Manchester Guardian*, 11 March 1957.

[15] "A Prayer for Free Trade", *Economist* (London) (19 July 1958), p. 187.

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or free trade area of Western Europe. Politically, there was the realization on the part of the United Kingdom that the common market idea had assumed a significance in continental minds as the new symbol of European Union. Outright opposition not only would have been resented by the "Europeans", but might easily have damaged the wider cause of Western unity. Moreover, Britain's association with such a scheme might yet enable her to guide its precepts and to influence its operations in such a way as to provide for her own world-wide interests. Politically and economically, the fear of increased German influence on the continent of Europe has added to the dangers of a policy of isolation. Among the economic arguments for association, the most effective is the admitted possibility of eventual exclusion from a market of continental proportions barred to British exports by a common tariff wall. In view of these factors, the free trade area was proposed as a means of avoiding the Scylla of complete isolation and the Charybdis of full participation by the intermediary path of "close association". Even if the free trade area is completely abandoned, it will not necessarily mean the end of any association whatsoever, for such has been the consistent compromise approach followed by both parties in their post-war policies toward European Union—political, military and economic.

CAROL EDLER BAUMANN

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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SCHISM IN AUSTRALIAN LABOR

ROBERT Gordon Menzies has been Prime Minister of Australia longer than any previous holder of that office. By the process of political survival he has become a dean among British Commonwealth prime ministers, a sort of senior statesman of the empire. And the recent election of November 1958 returned him, and the Liberal-Country party coalition which he leads, to office for another three years with a larger and more effective majority than he had previously commanded. Apparently the leaders of the Australian Labor party are fated to continue in dour possession of the opposition benches in Canberra which they have been warming since 1949.

The fact that Menzies holds the power he does is due not only to his very considerable abilities, but also in great part to the harassed and bedeviled condition of the Labor opposition. Seldom in the stormy history of that party has there been as much bitterness and discord in its ranks as there has been since 1954; and, as the din of battle has mounted, the party's political fortunes have receded. Firmly in control of the Commonwealth government and of the governments of five of the six Australian states less than ten years ago, the ALP has since watched its strength steadily drain away. Not only has it lost control of the federal government and been defeated in five federal elections since 1949; it has also been driven from power in two of the major states. Labor leads the government today in only two states, and in one of these its grip is precarious. It was a particularly bitter blow when, in 1957, the ALP lost control of the government of Queensland, after having been continuously in power there for more than thirty years. Indeed, Labor had been so tenaciously in command in Queensland almost since the inception of the Commonwealth that this seemed to be part of the divine order of things, though the gerrymander too seems to have played its part. But in the parliament chamber in Brisbane today a Liberal-Country party coalition occupies the government benches over which Labor party leaders must surely have felt they had squatters' rights. Without question, Labor has paid a very great price for its factional quarrels.

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Of course, internecine warfare is nothing new to the Australian Labor party. During World War I, the party divided on the issue of conscription for overseas military service. In the years of the great depression, it split over matters of inflation and deflation. The current difficulties in which the party is embroiled are just another instance of the tendency of ALP members to turn and rend each other rather than attack their political foes.

I

During these recent melancholy years it has been the responsibility of Dr. Herbert V. Evatt to furnish leadership for the Labor party. He has been its parliamentary leader, and its possible prime minister, should the ALP manage to win a federal parliamentary election. Yet Evatt, jurist of international repute, a former president of the United Nations General Assembly, historian and scholar, has also been one of the major divisive factors pulling Labor asunder, and much of the struggle within the party has been reduced, at times, to the issue of whether or not "Doc" Evatt would continue to lead it. But there are much greater matters at stake in the battle within the Australian Labor party than the retention of Evatt as party leader. Basically, the struggle that has so divided the party had its origins in struggles against Communist influence in the Australian trade-union movement. For, since the linkage between trade unions and the Labor party is close and intimate, any major conflict within the unions is bound to have a "fall-out" affecting the position of political labor.

The disruptive tactics to which the Communists resorted in industrial disputes became a source of acute embarrassment to the existing Labor governments of the 'forties.[1] For, while the Communists are few in Australia, they have sometimes attained a power in the unions out of all proportion to their numbers, and in the hey-day of their power, about 1945, Communists were in control of the policies of trade unions in every basic industry except agriculture.[2] The struggle between the Labor govern-

[1] Herbert E. Weiner, "The Reduction of Communist Power in the Australian Trade Unions", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, September 1954, p. 401. Weiner points out that, from 1945 to 1949, man-days lost annually in strikes per union member were 31.5 in Communist-led unions, as compared to .9 in non-Communist unions.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

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ments, responsible for the maintenance of peace, order and good government, and the Communist unions reached a climax in the great 1949 strike in the New South Wales coal fields. In defiance of the whole elaborate system of arbitration, court legislation, and other devices for the maintenance of industrial peace, the Communist-controlled Miners' Federation came out and remained out on strike until much of the economy of eastern Australia was paralyzed. The Labor governments of both the Commonwealth and the state of New South Wales were eventually forced to drastic and distasteful measures to break the strike. Union funds were sequestered, strike leaders jailed, and the headquarters of the Communist party in Sydney were raided and the membership rosters and records seized by the police.[3]

Meanwhile, within the membership of many of the trade unions, anti-Communist forces had for some years been slowly organizing to drive the Communists from their positions of power. This battle against Communist influence in the unions found staunch supporters among the large Roman Catholic membership, whose influence within the Australian labor movement has been strong and of long duration. Australian Catholics have been largely of Irish origin, and the hostility of Irish migrants toward Britain, combined with their predominantly working-class status, led many of them to support the anti-imperialist, welfare-state party which Labor was in its beginnings. They have contributed many leaders to Australian labor's political activities. Two of the last three Labor prime ministers of the Commonwealth have been Catholics. There were eight Catholics among the thirteen members of the Labor party cabinet of Prime Minister Scullin from 1929 to 1931.[4] In only five of the annual conferences of the ALP between 1917 and 1951 have delegates of Irish ancestry, largely Roman Catholic, formed less than 40 per cent of the membership of the conference.[5] In 1950, forty-five of the eighty-two members of the Labor party in the Australian federal parliament were Roman Catholics;[6] and nearly all of the members of the Labor cabinet in Queensland

[3] Louise Overacker, *The Australian Party System* (New Haven, 1952), p. 192.

[4] Don Whitington, *The House Will Divide* (Melbourne, 1954), pp. 177-78.

[5] L. F. Crisp, *The Australian Federal Labour Party* (London, 1955), pp. 311, 316.

[6] Leicester Webb, *Democracy and Communism in Australia* (Melbourne, 1954), p. 26.

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which was defeated in 1957 were Catholics.[7] Since Roman Catholics form slightly over 20 per cent of the Australian population, their weight in the affairs of labor is evident.

Obviously the conflict between the Labor party's official espousal of socialism and the Church's official and real hostility toward it has not been any real barrier to Catholic membership in the ALP. The objective of the party was stated in 1921 to be "the socialization of industry, production, distribution and exchange". But this was cautiously coupled with an interpretation which stated that the party did not seek to abolish private ownership of any means of production where such private ownership was exercised in a socially useful manner and without exploitation.[8] This was a fine friendly muddle, admirably suited to the politician's need to be all things to all men, and grounded on the obvious fact that the ALP, like all large political parties, was a confederation of varying interests, not all of which could be expected to accept the dogma of socialism. As a matter of fact, the leaders of the ALP have rarely acted as if they were convinced that socialism furnished the solution to Australia's various economic problems. Leadership has generally come from the ranks of trade-union officials who have risen slowly to positions of power, and who have been more concerned with industrial disputes about wages and working conditions than about the establishment of the socialist commonwealth. Such men are largely practical politicians rather than socialist "true believers". There is much in the comment of one observer that "Labour in Australia often behaves as if socialism were a mystery to be contemplated with reverence from afar, but not to be understood or approached."[9]

Between the attitude of the Labor leaders on socialism and the pronouncements of some of the Church leaders on state ownership of production there is little apparent difference. In a 1948 pamphlet published with the approval of the Church hierarchy in Australia it was declared that state ownership of public utilities and of basic industries and monopolies which could not be left safely in private hands was not offensive to Christian principles.[10] Some of the more doctrinal-minded

[7] "Political Chronicle", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Brisbane, November 1955.

[8] J. B. D. Miller, *Australian Government and Politics* (London, 1954), p. 72.

[9] *The Round Table*, London, December 1956, p. 81.

[10] Crisp, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

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Catholics have occasionally caviled at the party's 1921 statement of its socialist objectives,[11] but it appears to have deterred few Catholics from supporting the party if they wished to do so.

Socialism was one thing, however; communism another. The growth of Communist influence in the unions aroused a number of Catholic unionists to action. Starting in the early 1940's, a Catholic faction developed in union ranks, organized for a struggle against the Communists. Its activity had the support of many members of the Catholic hierarchy, and was led by a young Melbourne lawyer of Italian ancestry, B. A. Santamaria, who was lay secretary of a number of Catholic social agencies. The "Movement", as this organization was cryptically called, was entirely secret in its operations, and so successfully did it emulate the "boring-from-within", underground tactics of its foes that the complete story of its activities is still obscure.[12] Apparently, however, the secret pressures of the Movement gave its members increasing influence, so that they were eventually able to arouse the Labor party leadership to initiate its own anti-Communist drive. The ALP sanctioned the creation of "Industrial Groups", which were to be cells operating within each union for the combating of Communist ascendancy. These Industrial Groups functioned out in the open, but the vitality, leadership and energy for much of their activity came from the still largely unknown Movement.

By 1949, the power of the Industrial Groups in the ranks of organized labor had grown enormously. The Groupers had made these gains not simply by zeal and diligence, but also through their shrewdness in securing amendment to laws affecting trade unions that greatly increased their strength. For example, in the state of New South Wales, the Industrial Groups were largely responsible for securing the passage of a law requiring compulsory union membership of all workers. This brought into the unions large numbers of workers, mostly in clerical positions, who had hitherto remained aloof from union affiliation because of middle-class identifications, and who, once in, added to the Right-wing element of the unions.

[11] In the federal party conference of 1953, Catholic pressure led to an emphasis upon social justice rather than upon socialism as the ALP's principal aim. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[12] Indicative of the secrecy of the Movement is the fact that there is no mention of its activities in the 1954 article by Weiner, *loc. cit.*, on the anti-Communist struggle in the Australian unions.

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In addition to such a device as compulsory union membership, Groupers were also successful in securing amendments to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, by which appeals from results of trade-union elections could be taken to the Arbitration Court. This was regarded by the Groupers as an important aid in combating the rigged elections frequently staged by the Communists. They also obtained the adoption of the absentee ballot in union elections, feeling that they had a better chance to win the vote of a member if he voted in the privacy of his home, than if he were subject to the excitement and pressure of the union meeting.

The Industrial Groups won spectacular victories against the Communists. Union after union was captured from its apparently entrenched Communist leaders. So-called "Unity" tickets in trade-union elections, which Communists used as a device to hide their own affiliation, were defeated with large majorities, and the ALP was "relieved of serious internal pressure from unions which had had Communist officers."[13] It was perhaps to be expected that, with the ejection of the Left wing from its position of power, the balance within the party would swing heavily to the right. But the mounting successes of the Industrial Groupers meant that within the ALP ranks there was emerging a Right-wing element that not only was strong and powerful, but sought to secure acceptance by the party of a viewpoint largely Catholic in conception. For the growing power of the Groupers naturally brought into the trade unions and into the ALP leadership some of the doctrines and ideas of the Catholic lay agencies from which the Groups, via the Movement, had drawn so much of their strength and direction. Despite inclusion of men of other religious faiths in the Group, and despite the fact that there was no official connection between the Movement and the Catholic Church, it would be hard to deny that a Catholic and sectarian political movement had developed within the ranks of the Labor party.

With the scalps of the Communists apparently firmly in their belts, Industrial Group leaders could now turn to other objectives. These were largely objectives advocated in Catholic social doctrine and, specifically, advocated by Santamaria himself. The Industrial Groupers called for greater attention and governmental support to primary industry and for the encourage-

[13] Weiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 409.

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ment of small-town and rural industries, with consequent decentralization of population. They sought wider social benefits for families, greater encouragement for European migration, coöperative housing programs, and the wider use of profit sharing in industry. In foreign affairs, they demanded a militant anti-Communist policy. They were firmly opposed to recognition of Communist China by Australia, and totally condemned suggestions that Australia might improve her relations with the new nations of Asia by adopting a neutralist position in the cold war.[14]

These demands would certainly seem to be of a type that could be easily absorbed into the Australian Labor party's program of practical objectives. In Australia as in the United States, all political parties are firm friends of the farmer; and it is practical economics that keeps industry grouped near the large cities and limits decentralization of population, not the hostility of politicians to the idea. The encouragement of a high rate of migration to Australia is a program which was initiated by a Labor government, and which has been supported in the main by all Australian parties since World War II. And no politician in his right mind is against greater social benefits for families. Perhaps the rural emphasis, plus migration, did encourage the belief that the Groupers' program would mean the introduction into Australia of small, family-sized farms, and the fear was entertained that this would lead to a sort of European peasantry farm system in a farm economy totally unsuited for it.[15] But Australian politics has never given a large place to dogma, and there would seem to have been no ideological reason why party unity could not have been maintained.

While the struggle against Communist power and influence in the trade-union movement was under way, major changes were taking place in the position of the Labor party on the national scene. The ALP under Prime Minister John Curtin

[14] W. G. Smith, "A Political Manoeuvre", *The Month*, London, December 1955, p. 346.

[15] This emphasis on small farms was reportedly characterized by Governor-General William McKell, a former Labor party leader and premier of New South Wales, as a "one goat, one sheep, three acres and a migrant" program. *Sun-Herald* (Sydney), October 17, 1954. And a Minister of Lands in the Labor party government of Victoria resigned in resentment against what he called Santamaria's attempt to force him to adopt such a program. "Political Review", *Australian Quarterly*, December 1954, p. 109.

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had given the nation effective leadership during the latter part of World War II. On Curtin's death, his place as leader of the party and as prime minister was taken by J. B. "Ben" Chifley. Chifley, though not an impressive speaker, was a man of deep convictions, a hard worker, and a leader who displayed an increasing command of the detail and intricacies of government, especially in economics and finance. Nevertheless, he and the Labor party were defeated in the Commonwealth parliamentary election of 1949. Of course, after Labor had held office for a number of years, its defeat would have a multitude of causes, but outstanding among them were the embarrassment caused the party by the wave of Communist-led strikes previously referred to and the public hostility to the Labor party's program for the nationalization of the private banks. Efforts had been made at first by the Labor government to enlarge the powers of the government-owned Commonwealth Bank as compared with the private banks, but when these met with the constitutional veto of the courts, Chifley had decided upon outright nationalization of the private banks. This measure, though carried through parliament, likewise met the constitutional ban of both the High Court of the Commonwealth and, on appeal, the Imperial Privy Council. The Labor policy toward the banks naturally formed a major issue in the election of 1949, and on this, plus the Communist issue and accumulated grievances, Labor was defeated by the Liberal-Country party coalition led by Menzies.

Two years later Labor suffered another loss in the death of Chifley, who had won a large measure of regard for himself both in and out of the Labor party. A man of wide personal popularity, Chifley was an electoral asset of great value, so much so that in 1949 the party departed from its usual policy of emphasizing program rather than personality and sought definitely to cash in on his personal appeal. Evatt, who was Minister of External Affairs in Chifley's cabinet, called him the Abraham Lincoln of Australia.[16] He was certainly an authentic "father image" type.

Herbert Evatt was elected to the leadership of the Labor party in parliament after Chifley's death, and while there is nothing of the "father image" about Evatt, there was much to justify and explain the choice. After a brilliant career at the bar and as a justice of the High Court of Australia, he had retired from

[16] Overacker, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

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the bench to enter politics. He had served as Minister of External Affairs under two Labor prime ministers, and his active rôle in the United Nations had made him a world figure. More than any other man, he had been the architect of a distinctively Australian foreign policy. In terms of achievement no member of the party could rival him. Yet it could reasonably be questioned whether he was representative of the basic qualities of the Labor party. He was an intellectual in a party that has usually been distrustful of the species and has generally kept the intellectuals at arm's length; and his experience with the trade-union movement, the fundamental source of strength of the Labor party, was limited. It was also questionable whether Evatt possessed the necessary gifts for compromise and conciliation so essential to the political leader.

Evatt was to need all of the skills of a political craftsman he could muster when he assumed the leadership of the party in 1951. During the year preceding his assumption of that office, the defeated Labor party had been placed in a position of increasing embarrassment by the unfortunate conjunction of its own Right wing's struggle against the Communists and the announced policy of the Menzies government to outlaw the Communist party. The banning of the Communist party had been one of the election promises of the Menzies campaign in 1949, and in 1950 an act dissolving the party had been passed in the House of Representatives. Labor still retained a majority in the Senate, and there the banning bill had been at first rejected. But finally, after a considerable amount of undignified public squirming, the Labor members in the Senate were forced to yield to the pressures exerted on them by the Right-wing Groupers in the party. They passed the bill, but their wobbling and vacillation had presented a rather unedifying spectacle.

The outlawing of the Communists was challenged in the courts by several Communist-led unions, and these had employed Evatt, then virtually second-in-command of the Labor party under Chifley, as counsel to plead their case before the courts. When the High Court declared the act unconstitutional, the Menzies government resolved to seek the amendment of the constitution, something that could be done only through referendum. A referendum was held in October 1951, and the proposed amendment was defeated by 52,000 votes out of a total of 4,700,000. Evatt, by now official leader of the Labor party,

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was in the front line of battle against the adoption of the amendment. Had it not been for the vigor and zeal of his opposition, in addition to a somewhat lacklustre performance on the part of the government sponsoring the proposition, it seems likely that the amendment would have been approved.[17]

There can be little doubt that Evatt's active leadership in the contest against the proposed amendment was motivated largely by his concern for civil rights and the maintenance of political liberties. He has long held that democratic procedures were as important as democratic ends, and he has been a consistent champion of the underdog.[18] His leading rôle as counsel for the Communist-led unions and his leadership of the political campaign against the proposed amendment testify both to the tenacity of his faith in civil rights and to his political courage. But they also added greatly to his political embarrassment. While the Labor party was officially united against the proposed amendment, the unity was more nominal than real. It was notable that many of the Right-wing leaders of the party, especially in the state of Victoria where the Groupers were most powerfully established, either failed to oppose the amendment or in some instances came out in favor of its adoption.

Yet, in the interests of party harmony, relations remained superficially agreeable. The ideological differences within the party might be acute, and the increasing strength of the Groupers might force consideration of some of their demands for the reshaping of party objectives, but the fires of controversy were banked and smoldering rather than bursting into flame. Reputedly, Evatt had even sought the advice of Santamaria on matters of party policy. With the tide running so strongly in favor of the Groupers, they could afford to wait. They had no great need to drag points of difference within the party into the open.

But the passage of time brought, not healing, but rather further cause for quarrel and contention. For one thing, Labor won no major electoral battles under Evatt's leadership. The Menzies coalition remained in command of the government as the result of elections in 1954; and, while Labor showed some gains, these

[17] A full account of the referendum battle is found in Webb, *op. cit.*

[18] In his *Rum Rebellion* (Sydney, 1937), Evatt tried to rescue Captain Bligh from some of his historian traducers; he wrote sympathetically of the Tolpuddle martyrs in *Injustice Within the Law* (Sydney, 1937); and some of his opinions as a justice of the High Court reveal his concern for the maintenance of civil rights and liberties.

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were only what might be expected after a government has been in power for some years. The balm of victory was not available to heal the wounds in Labor's ranks.

It was the startling events of the Petrov affair, however, that forced the dispute between Evatt and Labor's Right-wing Group movement into the open. The defection of an officer of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, and his disclosures of the existence of a Soviet spy ring in Australia, naturally captured and dominated Australian headlines and created a clamor for the fullest possible airing of the facts. A Royal Commission was established by the Menzies government to investigate the allegations made by Petrov, and among those eventually called to appear before it were members of Dr. Evatt's official staff. Evatt seems to have been convinced that much of the Petrov affair had been contrived and manipulated to embarrass him and, with a generous warmth quite in keeping with his forthright courage and advocacy of those seeming to be victims of injustice, he rushed to the defense of some of those involved. Whether his appearances before the justices of the Commission were of major benefit to those whom he defended is doubtful, for an interim report of the Commission said of his efforts that "As day followed day . . . all we heard was the constant reiteration of vague charges of infamy. . . ."[19] The appearance of Evatt, however, as counsel for those allegedly implicated in charges of Soviet espionage, coming on top of his record in the struggle against the efforts to outlaw the Communist party, turned the sniping attacks that had been directed against him by some of the Right-wingers into a fusillade of criticism.

Rather than keep the issues which divided him from the Groupers buried any longer, Evatt now determined upon a showdown. Like Foch at the first Marne, with his center broken and his left reeling, he attacked. His first move was in October 1954, when he came out with a public indictment of some of the members of the Victorian Labor party, claiming that they were under the domination of an outside influence. The group he singled out was the one that voiced its views through the Groupers' journal, *News-Weekly*. Unidentified members of the Labor party were quoted by the press as saying that Evatt had embarked upon a terrific gamble; at stake were not only his leadership, but also the future political course of the Labor party.

[19] *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 27, 1954.

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But if he attacked from a position that seemed to be rapidly weakening, he still possessed substantial assets. For one thing, the activities of the Movement within the Industrial Groups had been generally hidden from the public. (Indeed, most Australians learned of it for the first time in the flurry of news following Evatt's attack on some of its leaders.) The secrecy of the Movement—its lack of open avowal of its objectives—made it vulnerable to the charge that it was trying to subvert the traditional faith of the Labor party, using tactics remarkably similar to those of the Communist movement it was so bitterly combating. Indeed, one astute observer suggested that the Movement was comparable in some ways to the Worker-Priest movement in France, which came under the ban of the Papacy because too many of the priests were being infected with Marxist ideas.[20] The foes of communism in the ranks of Australian labor seemed to be acquiring only too easily some of the characteristics of the enemy.

There were other considerations working in Evatt's favor. The importation into the political arena of a distinctly sectarian viewpoint—the establishment within the party of an essentially Catholic body of ideas—was bound to weaken a party which had historically appealed to a broad and comprehensive portion of the Australian population. Especially was this so in the light of the rather bitter history of sectarian conflict in the nation. To have sect arrayed against sect would do no service to the party, nor to the Australian community as a whole. There was also the further advantage for Evatt that many in the ALP would naturally resent what might be regarded as an attempt to dictate Labor party policy from the outside. ALP members felt strongly that their party, the oldest on the Australian political scene, represented a sturdy Australian viewpoint, and any effort by an outside movement to impose its ideas upon the party was certain to arouse indignation. As the Communists had seemed to encroach upon party autonomy, they had created resistance to themselves; now those who had fought them were in turn encountering resistance to their growing power in the party.

In the struggle that followed Evatt's attack on members of the Victorian Executive, he received substantial support from the Australian Workers Union. This is the largest of Australian

[20] This was the view of Professor Leicester Webb of Australian National University, as stated in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1955.

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unions, and while most of its members are employed in pastoral and mining industries, it also organizes in manufacturing, a situation which has often led to jurisdictional conflicts with craft unions. It is especially powerful in the less populous states and is in virtual control of the Labor party in Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia, but it also wields considerable influence in New South Wales and Victoria. Because of its frequent involvement in jurisdictional disputes with other unions, it has never been affiliated with the Australian Council of Trade Unions, the general governing body of the Australian trade-union movement. The AWU has perhaps a longer experience in politics than any other Australian union. It has always been militantly anti-Communist, but by the same token it has been equally opposed to any other movement that threatened the autonomy of the labor movement. And so it strongly supported Evatt's fight against the Groupers, even though the Groupers were as bitterly anti-Communist as the AWU itself.[21]

Shortly after challenging the Victorian Groupers, Evatt strengthened his position for the approaching battle by offering to the party caucus his resignation as Leader of the Opposition. Again this was a gamble, but one that paid off for Evatt. While there was intense opposition to his reëlection as leader, those who opposed him were unable to agree on any Right-wing candidate capable of attracting support from the moderates of the party, and the result was that Evatt was reëlected by a majority of 54 to 28. Though the proceedings of the caucus are supposed to be confidential, it was no secret that the meeting had been the scene of bitter dispute and violence and had ended in general pandemonium, but with Evatt and his followers still in command of the parliamentary leadership of the party.[22]

With this demonstration of his command over the Labor members of parliament, Evatt marshaled his other support for the fight. While the highest federal authority of the Australian Labor party is the party conference, in the period between conferences authority is held by the Federal Executive, which

[21] Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 69. In further explanation of the AWU's hostility, it should be noted that this union, with much of its membership composed of a skilled rural working class, would naturally be antagonistic toward the "small farm" emphasis of the Group program.

[22] *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 21, 1954.

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is composed of two delegates from each of the six states. The Federal Executive has many powers, including that of declaring that a state executive or branch is acting out of harmony with the rules of the party. In a memorandum to the Federal Executive, Evatt complained that the Executive of the Victorian Labor party was encouraging the Industrial Groupers to subvert the Australian Labor party and was intent upon dedicating the party to nothing more than a narrow anti-Communist crusade. He accused the Victorian leaders of flaunting their defiance of party policy in the 1951 referendum dispute and on the anti-Communist legislation issue, and further charged that the Movement had acted in secretive and concealed ways to secure its objectives, instead of submitting them to the open scrutiny of the party membership.[23]

The Federal Executive also in effect gave Evatt the vote of confidence and the support he asked for. It ordered the election of a new Executive for the Victorian party, to be held at a party conference on February 26, 1955, and it stated that the existing Victorian Executive was vacated as of that date. It further ordered the disbanding of the Industrial Groups in the party in Victoria. One of the reported reasons behind the relatively severe action taken was the demand of the leadership of the Australian Workers Union for sternness toward the Movement. The AWU reportedly threatened disaffiliation from the Labor party unless harsh measures were taken against the Victorian Executive.[24]

The Victorian leaders defied the order of the Federal Executive, though not to a man. Premier John Cain, the leader of the Labor party government in the state, resigned from the Executive rather than stand in defiance of the party authority, and his example was followed by others. This split in the ranks of the state Executive obviously raised the probability of two Labor parties in Victoria, greatly to the detriment of Labor's election chances.

The contending elements prepared for the meeting of February 26. The members of the Evatt wing of the Victorian party mustered all their strength for the meeting, and in order to increase their voting power in the conference the Federal Executive allowed disaffiliated unions to rejoin the party and thus

[23] *Ibid.*, December 1, 1954.
[24] *Ibid.*, December 4, 1954.

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become entitled to representation at the party conference. The Federal Executive also waived the requirement that delegates had to have at least two years' membership in the party before they could be representatives at a party conference.

The defiant members of the old Victorian Executive advised their supporters to boycott the conference, charging that the attempt of the Evatt faction to control it was leading to a new lease on power for communism in the unions.[25] They claimed that unions such as the Waterside Workers' Federation, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the union of the tramway workers, which they alleged were Communist-dominated, were furnishing much of the voting power that the Evatt faction was counting on in the coming contest. The insubordinate Victorians also had recourse to the courts. But their efforts to secure an injunction against the Federal Executive from a justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria failed, largely on the ground that most of the members of the Federal Executive were outside the jurisdiction of the Court.

The Victorian party conference met on the appointed date; but with cries of political outrage ringing in the air there was little prospect that it would lead to any results acceptable to the contending factions. The new Executive was elected as the pro-Evatt Federal Executive had ordered, but its first pronouncements could not have given much encouragement to official Labor party leadership. Premier Cain, who had loyally stood by the federal party leaders, was now accused of having headed a government worse than a Conservative government of 1900. Others among the newly elected executive officers dourly suggested that each day Labor party leaders should ask themselves what they had done to forward the cause of socialism that day.[26] To have opened the way for the appearance of such apparent true believers in the socialist dogma boded no good for the future election prospects of the party.

With the Victorian *brouhaha* over, the scene of the combat shifted to Hobart, where the Federal Conference, the highest governing body of the ALP, was scheduled to meet in March. The atmosphere in Hobart reeked with drama and intrigue. Naturally there were two groups of delegates from Victoria, each claiming to be the authentic voice of Victorian labor, and

[25] *News-Weekly* (Melbourne), January 26, 1955, p. 12.

[26] *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 1, 1955.

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there was much anti-Evatt feeling among the delegates from New South Wales and Queensland. But the Evatt forces remained in the saddle, even if somewhat unsteadily. The Group-led delegation from Victoria, representing the deposed Executive there, was stoutly denied admission to the conference, and the official Evatt faction was accepted. With these six disputed votes, the pro-Evatt forces held command of the conference. But by the time the delegates left Hobart for home, party unity was a shambles.

The split in the party was now carried into the federal parliament. A small group of Labor members, all from Victoria, broke away from the party caucus and demanded recognition from the parliament as the Anti-Communist Labor party. In a debate charged with extraordinary bitterness and venom, members of the new faction called Evatt the best friend the Communists had in Australia and a "colossal egotist who betrayed this country in the interests of his insatiable ambition",[27] and accused him of having received a large fund from the Communist party during the course of the referendum fight of 1951.

In Victoria, the split in the Labor party led to the collapse of the Labor government and to a consequent general election with two Labor factions in the field. The Right-wing elements, those associated with the Groupers and the expelled members of the former Executive, naturally charged the pro-Evatt faction with being the protectors of Communists. And, further, into the already highly charged atmosphere of the contest there was injected the explosive matter of religion. Shortly before the election, the Roman Catholic bishops of Australia issued a joint pastoral letter stating that "At the moment there is one outstanding issue for the Nation and the Church. It is the immediate Communist threat to the security of the people and to the freedom of religion in Australia."[28] Evatt retorted that the Catholic hierarchy had no right to interfere in the internal government and organization of the Australian Labor party.[29] Leaders of other religious groups also were quick to mingle in the

[27] Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates,* Representatives, Session 1954-55, vol. 6, H. of R. New Series, pp. 17-40.

[28] "Joint Pastoral of the Catholic Bishops of Australia on the Menace of Communism", *Australasian Catholic Record,* Manly, N. S. W., July 1955, p. 197.

[29] *Sun-Herald* (Sydney), May 1, 1955.

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fray. Methodist leaders rejected what they called the implied claim of the bishops' statement that the Catholic Church alone fought communism, and referred darkly to ecclesiastical totalitarianism. The Church of England Dean of Melbourne accused the Catholic Church of betraying its spiritual responsibilities in an unscrupulous pursuit of political power.[30]

The split in the Labor party was disastrous for the Victorian government. The pro-Evatt Labor party showed a firm command of the loyalties of most Labor voters. But the members of the dissident Right-wing faction, calling themselves here (and in New South Wales too) the Democratic Labor party, also demonstrated most effectively their ability to prevent Labor from winning; first, by casting some 13 per cent of the votes for their own candidates, and, second, by distributing their second-choice votes, available to them under the system of preferential voting, to Liberal or Country party candidates.

With a somewhat different scenario and cast, the Victorian election of 1955 was repeated in Queensland in 1957. There the largely anti-Evatt Labor government led by Premier Victor C. Gair came under fire from the pro-Evatt Queensland Labor Executive, until eventually an election was called for with two Labor parties contending for the voters' favor. The result was a virtual runaway for the opposition Liberal-Country party coalition, a combination that had last been briefly in office there about 1930.

Among the states where the Industrial Groups attained some strength, only in New South Wales has political disaster for the existing Labor government so far been avoided. With the catastrophes of Victoria and Queensland as warnings, party leaders in New South Wales have tried valiantly to paper over the cracks in party solidarity and to maintain the appearance of unity. In this they have had some success. Owing in some measure to confusion within the Democratic Labor party's own ranks, and a reputedly lukewarm attitude toward it on the part of some of the local Catholic hierarchy, the DLP never got rolling, and the Labor party led by Premier John J. Cahill was able to survive an election contest early in 1959.

But elsewhere recent elections have been disastrous for the ALP. The Right-wingers, organized under various names in

[30] "Political Chronicle", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, November 1955, p. 110.

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different states, have not been able to win any major contests themselves, but have been an effective barrier to any victories for the official Labor party. In an election in Victoria in May 1958, the Democratic Labor party lost the few seats it had in the state parliament, yet increased its percentage of the total vote and, by splitting the labor vote, assured the return of the Liberal government to power with greater strength than it had had before. More recent contests in Tasmania and Western Australia have further demonstrated the power of the Right-wing group to harass and frustrate the ALP. And in the larger field of Commonwealth politics, the election of November 1958 indicated clearly the hapless position of the ALP as long as the DLP gnaws at its flanks.

III

For the Australian Labor party, then, the outlook is bleak. It has lost five Commonwealth elections since 1949. What made the loss of the latest election the more galling was the general hope in the ALP ranks that even though the odds were against their capturing control of the parliament, they had at least a good chance of shifting the balance in the House of Representatives somewhat in their favor. This hope was based upon a faith in the well-known Australian predilection for giving the outsider a chance. After nine years of the Menzies régime, it seemed reasonable to expect that the Australian voters might have tired of it, and might be willing, in the tradition of the Australian "fair go", to give the ALP the responsibility of government.

Other factors encouraged this optimism. Prices for Australia's primary exports had slumped seriously since the last election, and the farmer's income was consequently lower. Pockets of unemployment had developed here and there in the Australian economy, inflationary pressures were squeezing those on fixed income, and there existed a belief that a bolder economic policy than that pursued by the Menzies government might be necessary if the Australian economy was to continue to boom along as it has done in the post-war years.

Evatt conducted an effective campaign, offering in his policy speech a wider distribution of social welfare benefits, plus an appealing program of government assistance to newly married couples. It was vigorous without being radical; generous with-

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out seeming extravagant. And he threw something of a bombshell into the campaign by offering to resign from the ALP leadership if the DLP members would give their second preference votes to the ALP candidates (an offer which the DLP leaders promptly rejected). But the activity of Evatt, nourishing as it was to ALP hopes, was all in vain.

Of course, the ALP still has substantial assets. Australian election results tend to exaggerate the swing of a small proportion of the voting population. The ALP still commands the loyalty of about 45 per cent of the voters, and with so large a group of faithful members and supporters, the most enduring of Australian political parties need have no fears for its existence. But victory at the polls is another matter. An obvious first step in this direction would seem to be a *rapprochement* with the DLP, and here the DLP's terms are clear: jettison Evatt, repeal the decisions of the 1955 Hobart Conference, ban "unity tickets" with Communists in trade-union elections, support the fight against Communist influence in the trade unions, and adopt a militantly anti-Communist foreign policy. In view of the continued evidence of the power of the DLP leaders to cripple the ALP, they are not likely to qualify these demands greatly. There can be no guarantee of victory if the ALP pays this price for unity, but all the counsel of expediency seems to be in favor of this payment.

Yet the breach with the DLP will not be easily healed. The bitterness and hatred generated by the conflict have been far too great for all to be easily smoothed over and then apparently forgotten in the interests of unity. The traditions of the ALP suggest that there is little hospitality for the prodigal; the way of the dissenter is hard, and ties, once sundered, are seldom restored. Furthermore, during the period of the dispute, the ALP and many of its supporting unions have come increasingly under the influence of Left-wing leaders. For these men, and they include some who made a better-than-average showing for Labor in the recent election, the path of salvation for the Labor party lies in another direction: in the continuing support of socialism as a party doctrine, and in watchful waiting for disaster to befall the Liberal-Country party coalition.

On the DLP side there can be little reason for sacrificing much for the sake of reconciliation with the ALP. The DLP has dis-

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played a surprising command over the loyalties of its supporters; it has refused to wither away as hopefully anticipated by many of its opponents, and as frequently predicted by some Australian political pundits. Indeed, it seems to have gone on to further strength in the two states, Victoria and Queensland, in which it is most firmly established. In these states the DLP appears to control about 15 per cent of the vote, but of even greater importance is the fact that about 75 per cent of the DLP voters gave their second-choice votes to the Liberal-Country party coalition, and that in many electorates this proved decisive in the defeat of ALP candidates.

Yet whether the DLP has any survival power would seem to depend in large degree upon the ability of its leaders to formulate an attractive liberal program to supplant their present negative, anti-Evatt, anti-Communist emphasis. For the voters who shifted from the ALP to the DLP were drawn largely from the Right wing of the ALP; and it is possible that the break in ALP ranks is but a larger and more spectacular form of a constant leakage from the Right wing of Labor into the ranks of political conservatism. For many, it is likely that the DLP is but a way station on the road in their journey from ALP to Liberal affiliation. The DLP's slim hope would be to catch the travelers on the way, and to hold them with a positive policy.

Complicating the future of the DLP is its identification in the public mind as a Catholic party. There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of its voters are of that religious persuasion, and the existence of a political party largely identified with one particular religious group cannot be highly regarded by thoughtful Australians. Such a party is bound to arouse sectarian bitterness and to exacerbate political hostilities by the injection of religious prejudice. The reactions to the April 1955 pronouncements of the Catholic bishops, cited above, are indicative of this peril.

Unfortunately for the DLP, it bears the onus of sectarian label, without the compensating support of that sect. Its staunchest supporter in the Catholic hierarchy is the ninety-four-year-old Dr. Daniel Mannix, Archbishop of Melbourne. Most of the other members of the hierarchy appear to be either lukewarm or definitely hostile to it. Indeed, it has been suggested that Santamaria and his associates have been rebuked for some of

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their activities by Vatican officials.[31] Catholic religious leaders have no desire to allow the rôle of the Church in politics to become a major issue in Australian life.

The situation seems to suggest either that the DLP will become a satellite to the Liberal party in some form of coalition, or that the bulk of its present supporters will shift further to the right and affiliate directly with the Liberals. But until one of these things happens, or the DLP languishes simply because of its inability to capture office for itself, its contribution would seem to be to confuse the political scene in Australia, to confound the ALP, and to promote a sense of smugness and security on the part of the Liberal-Country party opposition.

For the past forty years, control of the Australian government has shifted back and forth between the ALP and anti-Labor coalitions. Within this structure, a reasonable measure of political stability had been secured. But, with the addition of yet another party, the Australian political scene becomes one of considerable confusion. With four political parties, none of which is powerful enough by itself to secure a majority of the voters, and with the recent European migrants forming an increasing proportion of the electorate, Australian political life seems to be breaking out of the old patterns. For the moment, at least, "whirl is king."

DONALD C. GORDON

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

[31] Matthew Vaughan, "Santamaria Revisited", *The Observer*, Sydney, November 1, 1958, p. 583.

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BRITISH GUIANA: A CASE STUDY OF BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY*

FEW people had heard much about British Guiana until her Constitution was suspended by the British in October 1953. This event dramatically illustrated the problems Britain had been facing in the colony. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate British policy in terms of preparing British Guiana for eventual self-government. In doing this an analysis is first made of the geographic, economic and land-holding conditions of the country for the purpose of better understanding what real improvement, if any, can be made. Next an appraisal is made of the growth of the nationalistic People's Progressive party and Britain's effort to give it some political power in the hope that it would be responsible. The failure of the attempt is described.

After the suspension of the Constitution, Britain made strenuous efforts to improve conditions. These efforts are analyzed. Their limited success is indicative of the difficulties any colonial government faces in attempting to build up moderate groups within the colony. Fortunately for Britain, Cheddi Jagan and other leaders of the People's Progressive party have recently become less extreme, and the outlook has improved considerably.

I

The troubles besetting British Guiana have resulted from both geographic difficulties and human neglect. The nationalistic leaders of British Guiana, however, lay the blame predominantly on imperialism and the sugar planters of the country.[1] As the truth or falsity of this charge colors the whole attitude toward what the Jagan movement is trying to accomplish, the subject is worth investigation.

* Research for this paper was assisted by an Elizabeth M. Watkins scholarship grant.

[1] See for instance Cheddi Jagan, *Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana* (New York, 1954), p. 13. In a chapter titled "Man-Made Difficulties", Jagan claims that British reports have been too eager to point out geographic problems.

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Primarily the difficulties seem to stem from geographic causes. Of the country's area, 86 per cent is forest, 10 per cent savannah, and 4 per cent coastal belt. In the narrow coastal strip, two to eight miles wide, between the Corentyne and Essequibo Rivers in the eastern part of the colony, live most of the people and is concentrated virtually all of the agricultural and industrial activity. This narrow strip had to be rescued from swamps by a system of expensive and laboriously constructed sea walls, dykes and drainage systems, and in some respects it was a wonder the colony was not abandoned altogether.[2]

In the coastal strip is found a dual agricultural economy, one part consisting of sugar-cane estates cultivated by wage labor and the other a peasant community of small rice farm owners or tenants. Almost all of the sugar is grown on seventeen large plantations varying in size from 1,000 to 13,000 acres, with an average size of 7,000 acres. These plantations are laid out in parallelograms along the coast. An average plantation with a depth of seven miles and a width of one and one-half miles will be laid out with the first mile from the sea given over to grazing, followed by the factories, offices and houses of the workers, with the cane fields next stretching inland three to five miles. It is estimated that each square mile of cane cultivation involves forty-nine miles of drainage canals and ditches and sixteen miles of high-level waterways.[3]

The rice area is actually larger than that used for sugar cane and is second only to the latter in annual cash value. The holdings average about six acres. Some of these holdings are on abandoned sugar estates which were bought up by private individuals and let out in small units to tenants. Others are in or near villages, and the remaining are on lands leased from the government.

Dense forests cover most of the country behind the coastal plain and have little potential value. They are largely uninhabited except for a few agricultural settlements along the river banks and scattered mining and timber operations and Amerindian settlements. Great rivers traverse the area from the interior

[2] James Rodway, in *History of British Guiana from 1668* (Georgetown, B. G., 1891), vol. I, p. I, mentions thousands of plantations that were abandoned in the early period.

[3] *British Guiana and British Honduras: An Economic Survey* (London, 1955), p. 4.

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to the sea but do not provide cheap and easy water transport because of rapids thirty to one hundred and ten miles upstream. Their wide estuaries cut the coastal strip into four distinct sections, also creating transport problems.

In the southwestern interior and behind the northeastern coastlands the forests give way to open savannahs. Here again, however, the geography is poor. The soil is sandy, subject to flooding in the rainy season and drought in dry weather, and for the little beef that is raised there are innumerable marketing problems.

In minerals the country is not blessed in iron ore, coal, manganese, or oil. It does, however, produce one fifth of the world's bauxite, accounting for nearly 30 per cent of the colony's exports, 15 per cent of its total revenue and about 9 per cent of its national income. Other mining consists of small workings of diamonds and gold.

Industrial activity is found mainly in the processing of local raw materials—rice, sugar and timber—and some light manufactures such as cigarettes, matches, shirts, and soft drinks for local consumption. The lack of raw materials, power, and a trained labor force and the smallness of the market virtually exclude any heavy industry. Some new light industries are possible.

In general it seems fair to say that British Guiana can never be much more economically than a comparatively poor country and that only by heavy expenditures of capital and hard work can the country advance at all.[4]

Human exploitation, though, also enters into the picture. Cheddi Jagan lays all responsibility on the sugar planters. This charge has some substance but in many respects is erroneous. The importance of the plantation system to the country, however, is beyond doubt. At present the estimated population of 450,000 consists of 45 per cent East Indians, 36 per cent Africans, 11 per cent mixed, 4 per cent Amerindians, and the rest Europeans and Chinese. The Negro racial group is explained by their former use as slaves on the plantations, and the East

[4] The International Bank Report does not argue one way or the other, of course, but a careful reading of certain sections leaves one with this conclusion. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of British Guiana* (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 3-15 for the general setting, pp. 113-118 for agriculture, and specifically pp. 133-145 for sugar, pp. 145-160 for rice, pp. 351-355 for minerals, and pp. 339-351 for industry.

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Indians by their work as indentured laborers on the same plantations after the slaves were freed.

Today the sugar plantations are characterized by their great size and absentee ownership. Three big sugar companies, registered in England, own most of the estates. Booker Brothers, the largest, owns twelve of the seventeen plantations, eleven of the sixteen sugar factories, and over fifty subsidiary companies in the colony. This monopolistic stranglehold on the economy can surely be criticized. Jagan's other main complaint, though, that the sugar planters deliberately maintain a surplus labor force for cheap manpower needs further explanation.[5] First of all, his charge that the sugar planters deliberately keep 50 per cent of their 170,000 acres idle to maintain surplus labor around the sugar estates is misleading. The land he mentions consists of that lying under flood fallow each year, canals and trenches, pasture, and some given over to ground provisions and dwelling areas.[6]

Next, his claim that sugar interests have frustrated schemes for reclaiming and draining coastland because it will make cultivable land available too quickly does not take into consideration the tremendous cost of these schemes and the fact that three reclamation schemes are in progress that will eventually add nearly 25 per cent to the cultivated land on the coast.[7] The charge that the colony's Rice Marketing Board deliberately sets rice prices low to drive the rice farmers off their plots to the sugar estates is also wrong, as Guianese rice is of poor quality and would receive no higher prices if put on the world markets at free prices. It is true that there is underemployment on the estates, but some of this is due to the seasonal nature of the work and the rest due to the planters' desire to spread work.[8] There is no doubt that the sugar owners want large supplies of labor available continuously so they will not be short at harvest time, but they do not go to the extremes that Jagan suggests.[9]

[5] For Jagan's many elaborations of this argument, see Jagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-30.

[6] Internatonal Bank, *op. cit.*, p. 133. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[8] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission 1954* (British Guiana, 1954), p. 18.

[9] The desire to have large supplies of labor on hand is also quite common in corporation farming in this country. See Carey McWilliams, *Factories in the Fields* (New York, 1939), pp. 70-134, and Harry Schwartz, *Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States* (New York, 1945), p. 74.

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The enormous profits that the sugar producers make is also an exaggerated charge. Heavy costs in drainage and irrigation have cut profits to the extent that additional capital has had to be found either by skipping dividends or by new investment to keep the industry going on a sound basis.[10] Finally, the complaint of Jagan that representatives of sugar have become nominated members of the Legislative and Executive Councils and have appeared on various boards and committees seems rather naïve. Certainly they have been well represented in the government to protect their own interests, but this is understandable, and their influence on other governmental officials is not as extreme as Jagan suggests.

In a certain sense the real criticism belongs to the whole institution of corporation sugar farming per se. Working conditions must of necessity be extremely hard.[11] The very fact that the large sugar estates occupy so much of the coastal area leaves little room for new land development schemes. There is a lack of diversification in agriculture in the colony and foodstuffs must be imported. The growth of a peasant class of independent rice proprietors is hindered. The assumption that the whole institution leads to these results, however, calls for a drastic change in the institution. Jagan wants this. He finds the Puerto Rican schemes laudable. There estates have been limited to five hundred acres, with the excess lands being bought by the government and distributed for individual family plots up to twenty-five acres and for proportional profit farms and coöperatives. Eventually Jagan wants complete nationalization of sugar.[12] With the issue thus drawn, conflict was inevitable. It was of little surprise that Jagan's government fell on the issue of a labor bill affecting the sugar estates.

II

In 1953 British Guiana went through an intense period of political and economic strain that finally led to the suspension of the Constitution. Many factors contributed to this, but all seemed connected in one way or another with the aims and motivations of vigorous nationalist leaders within the colony.

[10] *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission 1954*, p. 20.

[11] For a graphic description of these working conditions see Sam Pope Brewer, "Bitterness in Guiana's Sugar Bowl", *New York Times Magazine Section*, November 1, 1953.

[12] Jagan, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

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Cheddi Jagan and his wife Janet have been the most important leaders. As a boy Jagan was a resentful observer of poverty on the sugar estates. For his education he went to the United States instead of Britain. He spent some time at Howard University in Washington, D. C., received a degree in dental surgery at Northwestern University and another one in sociology from a Young Men's Christian Association college. While at Northwestern he met his wife, a nurse and member of the Young Communist League. He was indoctrinated by her and ever since has freely acknowledged his sympathy with Marxist ideas. In 1943 they returned to British Guiana, where he set up a dental practice, and both immediately plunged into political activities.

Another leader of stature is Forbes Burnham, a Negro. He read law at London University after becoming the "Guiana Scholar" for 1942 and is now a leading lawyer in British Guiana. His dislike of the sugar interests does not go as deep as Jagan's. However, he hates Britain intensely, largely because of color discrimination he experienced while in London.

In 1948 these leaders and others helped form the Guiana Industrial Workers' Union. This was by no means the first union in the colony. The first was formed in 1922, nine more were established during the depression years, and others followed. The sugar workers were organized into the Man-Power Citizens' Association, a union of rather static qualities. On the whole this old union movement was splintered, divided into racial groups, and lacked vigorous leadership.[13] The Guiana Industrial Workers took advantage of these conditions. They successfully incorporated both East Indians and Negroes and spread their influence among the sugar workers after strikes were called on the estates. They were dynamic almost to the point of being irresponsible.

On the political front Jagan and others formed the People's Progressive party in 1950. Their immediate aim was complete self-government. They criticized the past constitutions as being unfit for the colony. In some respects they were correct. For a long time previous to 1928 the colony was governed by a two-chamber legislature that awkwardly divided legislation according to whether it was financial or nonfinancial.[14] The 1928

[13] Jagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-41.

[14] For criticisms of this governmental structure see British Guiana, Constitutional Commission, *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission* (London, 1927), pp. 1-5.

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Constitution, subsequently amended but still in effect in 1953, was loaded with checks. In the Legislative Council the elected members were in a minority. In the Executive Council the members were wholly appointed by the Governor. The Governor retained reserve checks and the British government retained control of defense matters and foreign relations. The majority of workers were virtually excluded from the right to vote as the franchise was hedged in with income and property qualifications.[15]

Yet in another sense the British were only practicing their evolutionary or step-by-step approach to self-government. In comparison to other British colonial constitutions at that time, the 1928 Constitution was in no sense reactionary and in fact was one of the more advanced ones.[16] Furthermore, in March 1953 a new Constitution was adopted following the recommendations of the Waddington Commission in 1951. It still contained checks, but was a great advance over the 1928 Constitution. A lower house, the House of Assembly, was to consist of twenty-four elected members together with three ex-officio members. An upper house, the State Council, would include nine members—six nominated by the Governor directly and three others on the recommendations of the majority and minority groups of the House of Assembly. An Executive Council would be the policy-making body. It was to consist of ten members with the Governor as chairman—six ministers elected by the House of Assembly, three officials, and one member selected by the State Council.[17]

From the outset Jagan and his followers opposed this Constitution, claiming that it had more checks than balances. They did not like the nominated State Council which had the power to delay for one year legislation passed by the lower house. They deplored the fact that the Governor had an absolute veto over bills and could declare as passed any bills which had been rejected by the legislature. Finally, they did not like the fact that Britain reserved the important questions of defense, foreign relations, tariffs, and constitutional revision. What they wanted instead was a single-chamber government, all members elected,

[15] Jagan, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[16] See Martin Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions 1947* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 40-68, for a comparative study of the many different constitutions.

[17] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the Constitutional Commission 1950-51* (London, 1951).

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with the Governor's and Britain's powers to be reduced to an absolute minimum.[18]

The latter viewpoint certainly does not accept the evolutionary approach. Also, the 1953 Constitution was more liberal than Jagan made it out to be. If a popular party could win fourteen of the seats in the House of Assembly, not only would it be in a dominant position there, but it also could make certain that the six elected ministers of the important Executive Council would be loyal followers. This is exactly what happened in the April 1953 elections. Jagan's People's Progressive party won eighteen of the twenty-four seats in the House of Assembly in a landslide victory and then named six ministers to the Executive Council. It was thus in a strong position to influence decision-making and legislation, as the next six months dramatically showed.

The attempt at coöperative government was drastically ended in October 1953 with the suspension of the Constitution and the calling in of British troops. Immediately each side in mutual recrimination held the other responsible for the breakdown. For popular consumption the British unfortunately pictured the Jagan movement as on the verge of instigating a Communist plot and violence. This glossed over very real and basic difficulties. The charges of an alleged Communist plot evolved from the fact that many of the leaders had Marxist ideas, known to the British long before, and had traveled to Communist-front meetings in various parts of the world.[19] The alleged violence charges were even worse. Sentences were lifted out of context from various speeches, political rhetoric was taken too seriously, and an elaborate arson plot was manufactured with virtually no evidence at all.[20]

The real trouble derived from the overzealous way the People's Progressive party went about to change certain conditions. This was especially noticeable in its policy toward the civil service and police. There is no doubt that previously many civil servants on important boards and committees had little sympathy with Jagan's movement and that the police were not com-

[18] Jagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46.

[19] The London *Times*, October 21, 1953, p. 9, in an editorial was highly skeptical of the Communist-plot charges.

[20] See Jagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-59, for a refutation of the violence charges. This was later corroborated by others.

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pletely neutral in bitter labor disputes on the sugar estates. Now, however, the Progressive party ministers wanted to purge everybody not completely loyal in their departments and to change the composition of the police forces to the extent that it would be beyond the Governor's control.[21]

The dispute that generated the most animosity in the period was over recognition of trade unions. Here again certain reforms were necessary, but the way the People's Progressive party set out to get them led to complete disharmony. The party rightly claimed that its affiliate, the Guiana Industrial Workers' Union, had often been prevented by physical force from entering the sugar estates in attempts to organize the workers. The sugar interests preferred to deal with the Man-Power Citizens' Association—a weak and ineffective union. Jagan insisted that if the workers were given a free choice they would change unions. This seems feasible considering the fact that the People's Progressive party carried almost all of the sugar constituencies in the April election.

The methods of replacing the Man-Power Citizens' Association, though, were rather extreme. After the Sugar Producers' Association refused a request to recognize both unions, the People's Progressive party called for a strike among the sugar workers. While the strike was still on, the party produced a labor relations bill for immediate debate and approval. This bill empowered the Minister of Labor to authorize a poll in any industry in which there was no recognized union or where there was a dispute between two or more unions for recognition as the bargaining agent. In the former case an employer was forced to recognize any union that secured 51 per cent of the votes, but in the latter case the challenging union had to secure at least 65 per cent of the votes. Jagan and the others argued that if the Man-Power Citizens' Association were truly a representative union, it had nothing to fear, as it needed only 36 per cent of the votes at any poll.

This bill would have had momentous implications on the sugar estates. Yet in many respects it was a fair bill, somewhat resembling the United States National Labor Relations Act. Jagan and his party representatives, however, tried to ram it through the House of Assembly in one day. When the Speaker

[21] *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission 1954*, pp. 45-48, 52-54, 66.

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refused to suspend the Standing Orders, Jagan and the others walked out.[22]

This excessive zeal bordering on extremism and the refusal of Jagan and his top men to discuss matters thoughtfully irked the Governor and other British authorities most of all. The ex-officio members of the Executive Council claimed that their presence at meetings was hardly tolerated. The People's Progressive party ministers infuriated them by announcing and putting into effect important changes in government policy without first informing the Governor or the Executive Council. The party ministers believed their popular mandate gave them the right to dictate policy. Rightly or wrongly the British authorities believed that Jagan and the others had no faith in the Constitution and were trying to create a constitutional crisis which might force the giving of unlimited self-government.[23]

Meanwhile the colony had stagnated in terms of both local and foreign private investment because of the uncertain conditions. The Governor's decision to suspend the Constitution in October 1953 was thus due not to the danger of a sudden coup, but rather to the belief generated from a cumulative series of events that Jagan and his followers were moving too fast to the detriment of the whole colony. Unfortunately Jagan and his cohorts had completely lost the trust of the British, and in the final result achieved but little in the way of any legislation. A more moderate position and willingness to go slower probably would have achieved more long-term results.

III

The next two years saw Cheddi Jagan continuously frustrated as he attempted to dramatize and publicize his cause. He began by calling a general strike and a boycott of all British goods a few days after troops were landed. The sugar workers struck on twelve of the seventeen plantations, but the general strike and boycott never did develop, and the sugar workers soon returned to work.

Jagan and other People's Progressive party leaders then left for Britain where they hoped to convince the Labour party leaders

[22] See British Guiana, *House of Assembly 1953*, Hansard Report of the Proceedings (British Guiana, 1954), pp. 574-587, 598-725, for the many controversial debates regarding this bill.

[23] Michael Swan, *British Guiana* (London, 1957), pp. 138-140.

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of the necessity of pressing the Conservative government for the withdrawal of troops and the reëstablishment of the Constitution. The actual revocation of the Constitution had to await an Order of Council passed by the House of Commons, and as Commons would not meet until late October, Jagan had time to make his appeal known.

Even before he arrived, Labour leaders showed concern. James Griffith, former Colonial Secretary in the Labour government when the Constitution was planned, called the charges vague and inadequate and asked for a White Paper before Parliament met. He conferred with Labour leaders Clement Attlee and Herbert Morrison about the situation, and Aneurin Bevan assailed British action in speeches.[24] After talks with Jagan, the Labour leaders made it known that they would introduce an amendment in Commons. This amendment stated that, while they deplored the action and speeches of some of the British Guiana leaders and condemned the methods that tended toward the establishment of a totalitarian régime, nevertheless the situation did not justify the extreme step of suspending the Constitution. On October 23 this amendment was voted down 294 to 256 after a dramatic debate.

The speeches of this debate make clear, however, the fact that the Labour leaders had become somewhat disillusioned with Jagan and the others after talking to them and receiving more information about the situation in British Guiana. Clement Attlee said talks convinced him they "were either Communists or Communist dupes," and argued that if the Conservative government had prorogued the Guianese legislature and forced another election, Jagan could have been damaged more effectively than by suspending the Constitution.[25] There was later no doubt about how the Labour party felt. In early November the National Executive Committee advised its local branches not to provide a platform for Jagan and the other leaders.[26] Jagan later made it emphatic that he had become as disillusioned with the Labour party as it had with him.[27]

[24] *New York Times,* October 10, 1953, p. 6; October 11, 1953, p. 3; October 18, 1953, p. 31.

[25] For full debates see London *Times,* October 23, 1953, pp. 12 and 13.

[26] *Daily Herald,* November 6, 1953, p. 2.

[27] Jagan, *op. cit.,* pp. 92-94.

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Attempts to obtain help from Nehru in India were also only moderately successful. Jagan and Burnham were given the opportunity to explain their cause in speeches before the Indian Parliament, and they received a sympathetic hearing from the press in the country. They expected much more, however, in view of Nehru's anti-colonial record and the fact that Jagan and 45 per cent of the British Guiana people are of East Indian descent. Specifically they wanted Nehru to plead their cause before the United Nations and before the British government. This Nehru would not do. Possibly his unwillingness to offend London and his foreboding that he would have to repress Communists in his own country some day led him to this decision.[28]

The endeavor of Jagan and Burnham to explain their case before the Tenth Inter-American Conference meeting in Caracas in early 1954 was completely unsuccessful. The leaders of the People's Progressive party appealed to the conference as a whole and to the heads of all twenty delegations to admit them as special observers. This was not done.[29] Yet the fact that hemispheric colonial problems were heatedly discussed in special committees, and that British Guiana was hardly mentioned, gives support to the assumption that the Latin Americans were exceedingly wary of treating it as a case of reactionary colonialism.[30]

The Latin American countries, in fact, were hardly critical of the British at the time of the suspension of the Constitution. The Guatemalan Congress did pass a resolution protesting against the "aggression of British Guiana by imperialistic English troops," and called on all the parliaments of Latin America to express their indignation.[31] The Guatemalan Congress was pro-Communist at the time, however, and no other legislatures of Latin America passed similar resolutions. This was in direct contrast to the many resolutions and student rioting resulting from the alleged intervention of Castillo Armas in Guatemala.[32]

[28] *New York Times,* November 24, 1953, p. 8.

[29] *Ibid.,* February 28, 1953, p. 30.

[30] For the debates and various proposals see *Décima Conferencia Interamericana: Acta y Documentos,* Union Panamericana (Washington, 1954), vol. II, pp. 170-172 and 358-400.

[31] *El Imparcial,* Guatemala, October 16, 1953, p. 1.

[32] See Daniel James, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude* (New York, 1954), pp. 12-14.

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Most of the reporting in the papers about the British action was of a matter-of-fact nature. There were no inflammatory editorials assailing the British. The few that were written treated all facets of the problem objectively.[33]

No appeal was made by Jagan to the United States. This was due to the fact that the State Department firmly backed Britain's action in suspending the Constitution. The State Department announced that it had followed events closely and would be gravely concerned about hemispheric security if British Guiana fell under communism.[34] Jagan later laid the blame for British action on pressure from the State Department, an unsubstantiated accusation that was denied vigorously by Britain.[35]

In early 1954 Jagan announced that his followers would start a campaign of civic disobedience against the authorities. The campaign involved breaking the emergency restrictions prohibiting meetings of over five persons and the travel restrictions imposed on several of the leaders. The strategy was to force the hands of the police by committing only minor breaches. If the leaders were arrested, they would receive sympathy from the people as martyrs. If not arrested, the authorities would look foolish in not enforcing regulations. During the year Jagan served six months in prison for traveling outside the capital city illegally, and when he was released, his wife served three months for holding illegal demonstrations. Thirty-three other party members were arrested at one time or another. The strategy was of some success as the police often had to use tear gas to break up demonstrating crowds outside the courtrooms, but on the whole it was of a negative type as the British became even less disposed to consider a new constitution and elections.[36]

[33] In Uruguay, *El Dia,* October 8, 1953, p. 6, was sympathetic to Britain. Impartiality characterized the reporting of *El Nacional* in Mexico, *La Prensa* in Peru, *El Mundo* in Argentina, and *Correio de Manha* in Brazil. *Diario de Costa Rica,* October 11, 1953, p. 29, and *El Diario Ilustrado* of Chile, October 14, 1953, p. 3, were very careful to explain the British position. Criticism was found in the Brazilian Communist paper *Imprensa Popular,* October 11, 1953, p. 3, and the Mexican pro-Communist paper *El Popular,* October 13, 1953, pp. 3, 7.

[34] *New York Times,* October 10, 1953, p. 7.

[35] Jagan's charges are extremely weak—*op. cit.,* pp. 86-89.

[36] *New York Times,* April 4, 1953, p. 28; April 5, 1953, p. 5; April 6, 1953, p. 15; April 7, 1953, p. 14; August 28, 1953, p. 13; August 29, 1953, p. 47.

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In 1955 a serious split took place within the People's Progressive party. A party conference in February adopted a no-confidence motion against the leadership of Jagan and his wife. In the shuffle of the party executive, Forbes Burnham, former party chairman, was elected to replace Jagan while another man replaced Jagan's wife in the important post of secretary. Jagan was demoted to senior vice chairman of the party and his wife became treasurer. The British believed the split was organized deliberately in the hope that they would become convinced that a more moderate branch warranted a new constitution. The split, however, was real. Burnham, as anti-colonial as ever, believed that the issue of communism had blurred everything and de-emphasized the importance of the national struggle.[37] For Jagan the years of 1954 and 1955 saw little in the way of tactical accomplishments.

IV

After the suspension of the Constitution, Governor Savage set up an interim government consisting of appointees to Legislative and Executive Councils for a period of four years. Renewal of self-government was to be delayed. Instead, the emphasis was to be placed on speeding up economic development and carrying out certain reforms in the hope that a more moderate party would appear and that the populace would be disposed to vote for it.

Britain had already carried on a sizable development program in the post-war period, and the International Bank Mission had found the results, on the whole, satisfactory. The Mission, however, also found some shortcomings in the program. It thought that there was a comparative neglect of such areas as agriculture, transportation, light industry, and forestry while an overgenerous proportion of funds was spent in social welfare fields such as housing, health and education that were only indirectly productive. Thus it advocated an increase in the more productive factors.

It also noticed that administratively there was a lack of a well-knit over-all program and policy, a tendency to engage in *ad hoc* planning, inadequate coördination among government departments, and a rapid turnover of staff. To help correct

[37] Swan, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-135.

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these conditions it advocated the formation of an Economic Council. The lack of private institutions to grant credits, another problem, was to be solved by the formation of a Credit Corporation. The Corporation's function would be to stimulate private investment by local and foreign capital. Credits would be given in the fields of agriculture, industry, forestry, fisheries and housing. Finally, the Mission recommended a propitious climate for private investment, as its increase was essential in the development program.[38]

Britain went a long way in the next few years in carrying out the recommendations of the International Bank Mission. In early 1954 the authorities announced the inauguration of a two-year development program that would cost $44,000,000, embrace seventy-nine projects, and be financed partly by colony funds derived from loans and accumulated surplus-revenue balances and partly by grants received under the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. This was a fairly large sum considering the fact that the International Bank Mission had recommended an investment program of $66,000,000 over a five-year period from 1954 to 1958. An Economic Council to coördinate the program and a British Guiana Credit Corporation to give loans were also formed as suggested.[39]

The program allocated one quarter of the funds for housing, health and education—considerably more than the Mission recommended. This action was explained as necessary to put the emphasis more on immediate individual concerns.[40] In the light of British political objectives the reasoning is understandable. The program unfortunately was slow in getting started, the first year being spent mostly in preparation. At the end of 1955 only about 57 per cent of the funds had been spent. The unexpended balances, however, were incorporated into a five-year development program for the period 1956-1960.[41] Since then the program has increased in tempo.

[38] There is further elaboration in the three chapters on development in International Bank, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-48.

[39] See Great Britain, Colonial Office, *British Guiana—Report for 1954* (London, 1955), pp. 9-19, for details of the specific projects and financing of the program.

[40] British Guiana, *Legislative Council 1954*, Hansard Report of the Proceedings 1955, p. 371.

[41] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *British Guiana—Report for 1955* (London, 1956), p. 3.

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The part of the program to increase both local and foreign private investment was not very successful. Explorations for minerals took place, but that was about all. Many investors felt that the political transitional state of the colony precluded safe investments. Booker Brothers, for instance, reploughed its current profits in Guiana but made most of its new investments in Canada and Africa. Some foreign investors, particularly from the United States, felt that they were not wanted at all in the colony.[42]

Economic development was not the only attempt to build up moderate groups and win over public opinion. In early 1954 the British Trades Union Congress announced that it had picked British Guiana as the first territory within the Commonwealth and Empire to receive special financial and advisory assistance in building a healthy and vigorous trade-union movement. After exploratory observations, the British unionists picked the Man-Power Citizens' Association as the medium through which "genuine" trade unionism could be encouraged among the sugar workers. A grant of $8,400 was allocated for the purpose of carrying out plans for a complete reorganization of the union.[43] The Man-Power Citizens' Association certainly needed advice since it had been steadily losing ground throughout the years and was the only alternative to the Jagan-dominated Guiana Industrial Workers' Union. Advice was not enough to rebuild this union, however, as is evident by the results of the 1957 election.

Reform of the local government structure in British Guiana was a more significant move in the attempt to improve conditions. Previous to 1956 local government consisted of forty-six village and forty-six county district councils in the rural areas. These councils had the important functions of maintaining village roads, supervising the use of many drainage and irrigation canals, laying out land for building purposes, controlling trades, and keeping the areas sanitary. Many things were wrong with these councils. They were not directly responsible to the people, as one third of the village councilors and all of the county councilors were nominated officials. Often they indulged in petty graft. They were not popular or influential among the

[42] *New York Times*, October 27, 1956, p. 28.

[43] British Guiana, *Guiana Diary—Important Events of the Year for 1955* (British Guiana, 1955), pp. 57-59, 65.

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people and in the majority of cases they lacked the drive to accomplish anything properly.[44]

In 1955 a British expert was asked to make recommendations for improvement. After investigation he recommended the abolition of the village and the county district councils and the establishment of a single-tier system dividing the entire coastlands into eighteen areas, each administrated by a twenty-four-member rural district council. These officials would be elected, and the franchise, previously restricted to property owners, would be enlarged to include tenants. These recommendations were made in the hope that self-help and responsible political leadership could be learned at the local level.[45] Soon afterwards the British Guiana government began to carry out these recommendations.

V

By 1956 it was evident that the three-year effort of the British to draw the electorate away from Jagan was unsuccessful. Economic development and local government reform had not developed to the point where it made a visible impression upon the people. Complaints about the slowness of land resettlement projects were prevalent. The other parties were torn by factionalism, personal interests, intrigues and racial difficulties. Jagan had been weakened by the split in the executive of the People's Progressive party, but he had somewhat compensated for this by increasing his influence among the rice workers of the colony.

The British, wanting to reëstablish some semblance of popular government, were thus placed in a difficult position. They decided not to restore the old Constitution, much to the chagrin of all the parties in British Guiana. Instead, in April 1956 they offered a new Constitution with many more checks. This Constitution provided for a Legislative Council of twenty-four members, equal to that under the old Constitution, but with twelve elected and twelve appointed members instead of the previous scheme of twenty-four elected members. In the Executive Coun-

[44] The inadequacies of local government were recognized by nearly everyone. See Jagan, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Swan, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-67; *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission 1954*, pp. 20-21.

[45] A. H. Marshall, *Report on Local Government in British Guiana* (East Demera, B. G., 1955), pp. 15-22, 66.

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cil of ten members, the Governor was to choose five from the elected members and two from the nominated members of the Legislative Council, and the remaining three were to be colonial administration officials serving ex officio. The Governor retained the decisive vote. No prime minister was provided for. In October 1956 the Governor liberalized the Constitution somewhat by increasing the elective seats to fourteen and reserving the power to appoint fourteen. He still retained the power, though, of rejecting Executive Council measures and that of dismissing any or all members of both the Executive and Legislative Councils.[46] With the adoption of the Constitution elections were scheduled for August 1957.

The elections confirmed what many had suspected—Jagan's popularity had hardly diminished through the years. The British hoped that the opposing parties would coalesce against him. This was a forlorn hope. The Burnhamite faction of the People's Progressive party unsuccessfully attempted to agree with the middle-of-the-road United Democratic party under John Carter. Similarly the latter party was unable to make common cause with the somewhat left-of-center National Labor Front. During the campaign a tangible influence of racial alignments was noticed for the first time. Burnham and Carter, both Negroes, received most of the Negro vote while Jagan's main followers were East Indians. Altogether fifty-five candidates ran for the fourteen seats in the Legislative Council. The final tally showed that Jagan's followers won nine of these seats, Burnham's followers three, and the United Democratic party and National Labor Front one apiece. In 1953 Jagan won eighteen of the twenty-four seats and received 51 per cent of the popular vote. Now with nine of fourteen seats and 48 per cent of the popular vote, he could claim a victory almost as complete.[47]

After the election Governor Renison, who had replaced Governor Savage in 1955, took cognizance of Jagan's popularity by appointing as ministers all members of his party. Jagan himself was given the most important ministerial position. Later in the year he was also appointed head of a seventeen-man industrial development advisory committee. The confidence of the Gov-

[46] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *British Guiana—Report for 1956* (London, 1957), p. 203.

[47] For the campaign and election see *New York Times,* July 6, 1957, p. 5; August 11, 1957, p. 22; August 15, 1957, p. 6.

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ernor seems warranted. Jagan finally appears to have matured politically. He has by no means abandoned the goal of self-government. But the stark realities of the need for British development aid and private investment have had a sobering effect upon him. He has moderated the tone of his speeches, promised to help make the Constitution work, and appealed for private investment. Cynically one might say he can do little else because of the many checks in the Constitution. This is true to some extent. His change, however, seems due largely to the fact that he has reflected on the shortcomings of his past strategy in trying to promote the welfare of British Guiana.[48]

Cheddi Jagan has also evaluated anew the question of whether British Guiana should join the West Indian Federation. The whole issue was thoroughly debated in the Legislative Council in 1955. The opposition contended at that time that there would be uncontrolled movements of people from some of the overpopulated islands swelling the unemployed in the colony; that British Guiana's future belonged to the mainland; that the colony would have only six votes in the Federation's Legislature; that up to 25 per cent of the revenue collected from customs would have to be surrendered.[49] Most of the East Indians have been strongly against the Federation. Outside of it they can increase in power by numerical superiority to the Negroes, but inside the Africans would form a vast majority.[50] Jagan, an East Indian, is aware of these fears, and has also believed that joining the Federation would hinder the speed with which British Guiana achieves ultimate independence. Lately Jagan has shown more sympathy to the Federation and advocates a future plebiscite on the matter. The extent to which he is able to solve this problem and the many others will largely determine the future of the colony.

ROBERT D. TOMASEK

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

[48] An analysis by Tad Szulc is given in *New York Times*, August 19, 1957, p. 3. See also *Study Mission in the Caribbean Area, December, 1957*, Report of Senator George D. Aiken to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, January 20, 1958, p. 18.

[49] For the various pro-and-con arguments see British Guiana, *Legislative Council 1954*, pp. 1874-1876, 1933-2604.

[50] Swan, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

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REASON, WILL AND WEAPONS*

IF it is true, as we are often told, that no problem is more important than disarmament, it is also true that none is more difficult. The difficulties have always been present. The sense of urgency produced by the thought that war now holds the possibility not merely of death for some but of annihilation for all has seemingly led increasing numbers to the conclusion that at least some of the weapons of war, and perhaps war itself, can be eliminated. Since the days of the First Hague Peace Conference more man-hours of diplomatic negotiation have gone into the problem of securing arms limitations than have been devoted to any other international problem. Recurringly since the Second World War we have been told that a given proposal or series of negotiations represented the last hope of mankind to escape from destruction. Repeatedly little or nothing has happened. Seldom has so much effort been so ill rewarded. Yet optimism is not dead. Two of the most doggedly optimistic, The Rt. Hon. Philip Noel-Baker and Dr. Linus Pauling, have written books that are now before us.

Philip Noel-Baker, Professor of International Relations at distinguished English and American universities, long prominent in British politics, associated with the League of Nations from its inception and in the forefront of those who sought disarmament under its aegis, lays claim to qualifications on the subject of disarmament that few others can even aspire to. The richness of background, the depth of concern, the breadth of coverage make *The Arms Race* an immensely informative book, whether or not one accept its premises, ascriptions of cause, and pre-

* This review article is based on the following books:

The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament, by Philip Noel-Baker. New York, Oceana Publications, 1958. xviii, 579 pp. $6.00.

No More War! by Linus Pauling. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1958. ix, 254 pp. $3.50.

Inspection for Disarmament, edited by Seymour Melman. New York, Columbia University Press, 1958. xv, 291 pp. $6.00.

Arms Control and Inspection in American Law, by Louis Henkin. With a Foreword by Philip C. Jessup, and Preface by John M. Kernochan. New York, Columbia University Press, 1958. xii, 289 pp. $5.50.

1970 Without Arms Control: Implications of Modern Weapons Technology, by the NPA Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control. Washington, National Planning Association, 1958. vii, 72 pp. $1.25.

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scriptions for cure. This reviewer does not. It is difficult to share his optimism, for it is difficult to understand or accept the basis of it. There are two major problems. They are worth discussing, for they often appear in essays on disarmament. First, he tends to write as though the important barriers to disarmament are technical ones, which intelligence is sufficient to overcome. All that remains then is for statesmen of good will to apply what others have contrived. This is apparent in his explanations of the successful disarmaments of the past. The demilitarization of the United States–Canadian border is, for example, presented as a triumph of courage and good sense on the part of British and American statesmen, producing in G. M. Trevelyan's words a border defended since 1817 "by the sole garrison of trust and good will. . . ." Pointing out that the possibility of disarmament there rested initially on the decreasing ability of Canada to invade the United States and on the abilities of the British Navy to defend Canada by striking at our East Coast does not disparage the accomplishment. It does make the case more instructive. One way of estimating the possibilities of disarmament now is by taking note of the instances in which it has come about, but the purpose is not well served if past cases are put in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that he who will, can. Where disarmament has been achieved it has depended on highly special circumstances, and it is only by looking at them carefully that we can derive lessons of present relevance. If, however, one takes the line that the successes of the past have rested simply upon intelligence, courage, and good will, the failures can be explained in similar terms. Thus persistently one finds the author saying, or at least implying, that the world would be a radically better one had a good plan been forcefully put forth at the strategic moment or a bad plan been properly amended.

When distrust and fear are great, the competitive building of arms intensifies. As the arms race intensifies, distrust and fear grow greater. The result may be to no one's taste, but even were the distaste universal the arms race would not be eliminated. Saying to all states that reason dictates disarmament is like saying to each person that he must guard his cash box as best he can and then urging everyone to negotiate for the outlawing of revolvers. If we could assume a universal wish to forgo the use of firearms, disarmament would appear to be possible. Seemingly one can say that he will give up his revolver if everyone else will too. But if one still must guard his cash box, competition will shift to such other means as bodily force and

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cunning. In the use of these, some will be relatively unskilled. Foreseeing this, they may be unwilling to agree in the first place. Or, having agreed, they may perceive their disadvantage and seek to abrogate the agreement. Or they may lose their cash boxes by having unwisely entered a system that works to their disadvantage.

The second difficulty of Mr. Noel-Baker's analysis is a more general one. He does not argue simply for stopping the testing of nuclear devices, or for bringing the hydrogen bomb under control, or for reducing the numbers of men in national military establishments. Indeed he argues that no disarmament limited to one type of weapon can be successful. This is a virtue of the book, for pellucidly the point is made that limiting any one weapon will shift emphasis to competitive building of others. The partial quality of the Washington Naval Treaty is given as the reason for its passing out of existence in 1937. This is one of many examples of his pushing political reality aside, but the essential point remains. Fewer capital ships may well mean more light cruisers. Eliminating nuclear weapons may well mean more bombers for the carrying of conventional explosives. The point is intrinsically a good one, and it has the merit of prompting the author to bring within his purview all types of weapons, including gases and biologicals. But the comprehensive quality of the disarmament that is then required compounds the difficulty of achieving it. If we have been able to agree with the Soviet Union about so little, how can we ever expect to agree about so much? It does not appear this way to the author largely because of his confidence in reason and will and the stimulus given to them by present weapons technology. But what are reason and will to contrive? The answers given are varied. For anarchy must be substituted the rule of law under the United Nations. There must be an agreement not to use, test, make, or stock nuclear weapons. There must be effective inspection, and technically there can be if inspection is part of a general disarmament. Finally, to maintain the panoply he has described in detail, there must be an international atomic military force.

There is an air of reality about this. Force has to be available to control the possession and use of the instruments of power by the separate states. War is outlawed within every state. Internationally, if the instruments of war are to be effectively limited, agencies must exist to give effect to the prohibitions and a sense of security to the states abiding by them. Like international lawyers of the present, disarmers are often led to the

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conclusion that the better ordering and the safety of the world require international bodies possessing more and more of the qualities of government. Thus at times the author's arguments for disarmament seem to require an argument for world government. To be effective an international police force must be strong. If strong, it must be firmly controlled. The thought could be well established by pointing to instances where there has existed a strong military establishment alongside a weak national government. So long as the United Nations remains a "service organization", as Secretary-General Hammerskjold has recently and rightly described it, the problem of who will control the controllers will remain, whether one hope for an improved international law, an international inspectorate, or an international police force. Mr. Noel-Baker, however, quite clearly thinks of these matters, not as problems that could be managed only by an international authority having the essential attributes of government, but rather as problems that can be solved by arrangements reasonably made and voluntarily kept.

It is difficult to believe that any state will perform the act that would touch off a Third World War. But it is comparably difficult to believe that every state of consequence will always restrain itself so nicely and calculate so precisely as to avoid the result that presumably no state wants. War is possible. In another sense, it is impossible. The impossibility of war is a major theme of Dr. Pauling's book.

> I believe [he writes] that the development of these terrible weapons forces us to move into a new period in the history of the world, a period of peace and reason, when world problems are not solved by war or by force, but are solved by the application of man's power of reason, in a way that does justice to all nations and that benefits all people (p. 3).

The impossibility of war is put not in terms of efficient causes, the conditions that could reasonably be expected to produce a world perpetually at peace. It is put instead in terms of a final cause, perception of the intolerable horror that would result were the nuclear capabilities now extant widely employed. There is an unavoidable relation between the proclaimed end of behavior and the circumstances that condition our acts. Insisting on the importance of the end may, however, do nothing to change these conditions and may consequently leave behavior unaffected. Still final cause is not irrelevant. The spur of financial need helped to make Mark Twain a prolific writer and platform speaker—we never know how much we can do until we have to. But his determination to save the family's

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honor by paying off its debts could not have made him either a wit or a writer had he not been endowed with certain capabilities from the start. If his most salable asset had been skill as a plumber, he might have driven himself to despair trying, or he might have decided that family honor is not so important after all. The problem, which may be insuperable, is to make the final cause efficient. Yet continually in politics we are urged to make efforts toward some goal, and the importance of the goal, not the demonstrated possibility of achieving it, is given as the basis for hoping that it can be reached. On the question of how to reach it Dr. Pauling is of no help. He points to the discrepancy between the ethical principles applied to personal behavior and the immorality of national leaders. "A military leader who is given a choice between the principles of humanity and an effective defense of his nation always abandons the principles of humanity" (pp. 151–52). Should he instead abandon the "effective defense of his nation"? Statesmen and military leaders are responsible for the security of their states; no one at all is responsible for humanity. This may be deplorable, but so long as it is true it is difficult to see how leaders can walk away from their assigned responsibilities; difficult even to believe that they should. Dr. Pauling would not have them do so. He would have them meet their responsibilities in new ways. With war ruled out as a means of settling disputes, other means must be found. How are they to be sought? Dr. Pauling proposes a "World Peace Research Organization, within the structure of the United Nations." Its purpose would be to carry out "research on how to solve . . . problems of the kind that have in the past led to war" (p. 201). With more research it may well be that solutions to some or even, as Dr. Pauling thinks, to many international problems could be found. There would still be the difficulty of getting the solutions applied. (It is carefully specified that this is to be a search-for-the-truth organization and not a policy-making body.) Nevertheless, if it were true that wars are resorted to merely to settle immediate points at issue, one might share his optimism. Optimism vanishes when one recalls that war is often the means used by states in their attempts to determine the answer to the calamitous question: Who shall dominate whom? Research, however well financed and vigorously conducted, cannot supply a generally acceptable and widely applicable answer to this question.

Where, before the Second World War, Communists ruled about one eighth of the world's people, they now control one third. The Soviet Union, having grown immensely in capabili-

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ties, shows no convincing signs of lessening its ambitions. Under the circumstances, the very attempt to discuss disarmament seriously as a proposed policy of government must somehow seem unreal. But not all discussion is irrelevant. Much is presently written and said about the deleterious effects of continued testing. Dr. Pauling's book is replete with data on and analysis of the likely effects of continued testing. If his statements are correct, and they are highly convincing, a suspension of testing all around would promise great benefits. Suspension of tests is a result that conditions have temporarily produced. An agreement to solidify the result would be useful. This would, of course, not be disarmament. Many, however, write or speak as though it would represent the first in a series of disarmament steps. President Dwight Eisenhower, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet delegate to the Geneva Conference on banning nuclear tests, Semyon Tsarapkin, and Professors Louis Henkin and Jay Orear, the last-named, author of one of the essays in *Inspection for Disarmament,* come immediately to mind. It is more reasonable to say that a suspension of tests is possible in great part because it is not itself disarmament and none of the parties to an agreement would need fear its leading any further.

As long as the difficulties previously mentioned remain, and they will exist so long as independent states endure, armaments will be an important part of every country's foreign policy. Statesmen work within a narrow range of choice. The Columbia Inspection Study, edited and with a summary report written by Professor Seymour Melman, helps one to see what the possibilities and attendant difficulties are. In a system of self-help, trust is no substitute for certainty, as Professor William T. R. Fox points out in his Foreword, since for its protection each state must ultimately rely on its own devices. Taken together the twenty-one papers, most of them written by scientists or engineers, convince this reader that by ingeniously combining a number of techniques an inspection system could be devised that would reduce to a fully acceptable minimum the chances of undetected evasion of a general disarmament agreement. So great would be the chances of being found out early in the stages of a clandestine attempt to rearm that it would be irrational for one state to make the effort and at the same time safe for other states to rely on the inspection system to expose the illegal effort to public view before rearmament reached dangerous proportions. The difficulties of inspected disarmament are not so much physical as they are political. Whatever system is devised will promise to the various states differential gains and losses, a

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thought well put by the Spanish delegate to the 1932 Disarmament Conference at Geneva in an allegory at once charming and disconcerting. When the animals met to discuss disarmament, he related, "the lion looked the eagle in the eye and said 'we must abolish talons.' The eagle looked him full in the eye and said 'we must abolish claws.' Then the bear said 'let's abolish everything but universal embraces.'"[1] Thus the United States has sought inspection without disarmament; the Soviet Union, disarmament without inspection. The more inspection we get, the more we gain; for we now know less of the Russians than they of us. The more disarmament without inspection, the more they gain; for within a system of partial disarmament they can more easily arm clandestinely and within a system of general disarmament more readily employ nonmilitary means in near-by theaters of action.

In domestic politics there are difficulties as well. It is often said that Soviet governance precludes a far-reaching system of inspection. Professor Henkin, in his *Arms Control and Inspection in American Law,* asks if our federal, constitutional system does not also pose difficulties. Could we accept and implement the control and inspection devices we have often proposed? In answering this question, he relates international events (the experience of the United Nations Emergency Force and the European Coal and Steel Community, for example) to political practice and to judicial interpretation in international as well as in domestic law. His conclusion, carefully argued and cautiously put, is that under our constitution the likely provisions of an armaments control plan could be enforced. The relevance of the conclusion depends upon one's estimate of the probability of such an agreement being made, but even for the pessimist the study makes many useful points along the way and contains a quantity of valuable information.

The Pauling, Melman, and Henkin volumes may convince one first of the importance of ending tests and then of the practical possibilities of doing so. On the more profound problem of actually securing some disarmament, the international difficulties standing in the way appear implicitly throughout and sometimes explicitly in the Melman, Noel-Baker, and Pauling books. The domestic difficulties are delineated by Professor Henkin. The conditions that will exist in the continued absence of an agreement on arms are considered in terms of catastrophe by Noel-Baker and Pauling; in terms of expenditures and future

[1] Quoted in Hoffman Nickerson, *Can We Limit War?* (New York, 1934), p. 163.

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weapons development by the National Planning Association pamphlet, *1970 Without Arms Control,* which is the first of a series on "Security Through Arms Control" and contains in brief compass a large quantity of useful information. Together the five books under review provide a representative sampling of present-day writings on disarmament and, despite the note of optimism struck by some of the authors, very little encouragement. One misses the kind of analysis that along with humanitarian reason, good will, and technical knowledge would give political meaning to the information conveyed and the conclusions reached.

KENNETH N. WALTZ

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

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REVIEWS

Man and Crisis. By José Ortega y Gasset. Translated by Mildred Adams. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1958. —217 pp. $4.50.

The Human Condition. By Hannah Arendt. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958.—vi, 333 pp. $4.75.

These two books are attempts to describe the basic intellectual and moral orientation of modern culture and to show why that orientation is wrong. One argues that modern culture is based on unchecked confidence in pure reason; the other argues that the keynote of modern culture is a fundamental skepticism about the powers of the human mind to discover the nature of reality. But both assign the disease they describe to the same figures—for example, Galileo and Descartes—and locate the disease in the same general areas—for example, "rationalism", "utilitarianism". And both are expressions of the increasingly popular "existentialist" strain in contemporary philosophy which argues that there is a kind of thought that has a deeper validity than the thought that fits the canons of science and traditional logic.

Ortega's book sets out to be an account of Galileo's effect on history, but it leaves this subject quickly in order to analyze the notions of "the generation" in history and of "crisis". Within this general philosophy of history Ortega argues that modern culture is the outcome, like Christianity, of a struggle for simplification, a struggle against a culture that had become too intricate and rigid for the human spirit to endure. Out of this necessary process of simplification, Ortega believes, there came an oversimplification, a "false perspective" reflected in an "ultimate faith in science, in pure reason" (p. 83). Such a perspective, he argues, must inevitably collide with a larger perspective—"the perspective of life"—which any culture needs, and which provides a more complete insight into truth.

Miss Arendt's book is an attempt to describe, and to philosophize upon, one main aspect of "the human condition"—the *vita activa*, to which modern culture has ascribed the supreme value once reserved for the *vita contemplativa.* The *vita activa* consists of three fundamental human activities—"labor", "work", and "action". "Labor" is the activity by which men keep themselves and their species going; its products are short-lived and are immediately

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consumed in the interests of the life-process. "Work", in contrast, aims at the production of articles for use, and not simply for quick consumption. It populates the world with durable things, and offers "mortals a dwelling place more permanent and stable than themselves" (p. 152). Finally, "action" is the individual's behavior with respect to other human beings; it is the aspect of his activity that makes stories and history; and so it is that part of the *vita activa* that gives moral significance to all the rest.

According to Miss Arendt, the modern world has given "work" the supreme place in the *vita activa,* and so it developed a utilitarian perspective in which everything is viewed as a means to something else, and even the structure of reality itself is conceived as a free construction of the human mind. When it is taken out of its proper place in the natural hierarchy of human activities, "work" produces a view of the world in which nothing has any intrinsic value of its own, and represents an ideal that cannot sustain itself. Accordingly, "labor" has come increasingly to take its place, and the ideals which are now coming to the fore are the ideals of "labor". So "the good society" toward which we seem to be moving is a society of consumers, insatiably devouring more and more, and passively oscillating between the anodyne of routine and the shock of cheap sensations. This, in Miss Arendt's view, is an account of "what we are doing."

In the space available it is plainly impossible to deal adequately with two books that offer such encompassing interpretations of the modern scene. The historical circumstances and tragic "existential" experiences which give Ortega's and Miss Arendt's arguments their poignancy and their appearance of plausibility are too obvious to need mention. Ortega and Miss Arendt are ambitious and they have the courage to synthesize. They invite and deserve attention and sympathy, therefore, even though sympathy and fairness toward points of view not their own are not among their strong points. Nevertheless, while both books contain arresting insights, neither, it seems to me, makes anything like a case for its fundamental thesis.

Ortega's book rests in the end on one fundamental concept—"the perspective of life". Ortega makes much of the point that "life" always contains more than can be suggested by any faith or system of ideas, and there is clearly a sense in which what he says is true: in so far as modern culture has a "perspective", it is limited like any other. But even "the perspective of life", since it is a human perspective, must also be limited; and a perspective that was *not* partial would not, after all, be a perspective at all. It would illuminate nothing and it would commit a culture to nothing; it would, in short, be quite lifeless. Indeed, Ortega's

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phrase, "the perspective of life", which suggests that "life" itself, rather than definite human beings, has a perspective, and a single, all-encompassing one at that, seems to me a phrase without any assignable meaning.

Miss Arendt, for all her impressive learning, is first and foremost a moralist, and a not ineffective one. Her distinction between "labor", "work", and "action", though it fades when it is pushed, nevertheless suggests three possible levels of sensibility and aspiration, and three standards by which we can appraise what we are doing with ourselves in industrial society. It is nowhere clear, however, whether "labor", "work", and "action" refer to three distinct classes of activities (as Miss Arendt usually seems to suggest) or to three elements that can be found, at least potentially, in any activities. Miss Arendt's moral arguments are marred, furthermore, by a tendency to state personal, and sometimes rather odd, preferences as though they were universal psychological truths. "Love", she writes, for example, "is unconcerned to the point of total unworldliness with *what* the loved person may be, with his qualities and shortcomings no less than with his achievements, failings, and transgressions" (p. 242). But, most of all, her moral judgments are marred, as are her historical judgments, by the fact that we must accept a metaphysics that she barely spells out or defends if we are to understand any of the essential distinctions she makes. Only her metaphysics could possibly explain her repeated claim, for example, that modern science is built on ultimate skepticism, and that it elevates "introspection into an omnipotent device to conquer nature" (p. 307). And a metaphysics that yields such conclusions does not do anything to assuage one's skepticism about it. *The Human Condition,* despite its obscurities, is filled with trenchant comment on the forgotten moral aspects of labor and work in contemporary society. But it asks us to accept an entire theory of modern culture that is based on principles that are undefined and undefended.

CHARLES FRANKEL

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Foundations of Political Theory. By H. R. G. GREAVES. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; Fair Lawn, N. J., Essential Books, 1958.—208 pp. 21*s.*; $3.80.

Despite modest disclaimers, H. R. G. Greaves here aims at nothing less than to establish democratic political values on an empirical basis. As a rational modern man he finds himself unable to put faith in abstract principles about the nature of the universe,

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and he is accordingly bereft of metaphysical absolute values. Nevertheless, he is not content with political theory that consists merely of value-free description of behavior or account of the institutions through which behavior is given regularity. He sees people constantly making value-judgments and believes that political science must assist them. "Political theory must produce guidance on how to deal with . . . [practical problems], or perish" (p. 7).

Greaves takes as his point of departure a disagreement with T. D. Weldon. Whereas Weldon states that democracy rests on metaphysical foundations and that nothing practical follows from its high abstractions,[1] Greaves argues that democratic values can be founded empirically, although not scientifically. He considers the political theory on which democratic values rest to be an appraisal. While such an appraisal is not amenable to proof or demonstration in the manner of pure science, it nevertheless has objective validity within a practical context. Greaves admits that appraisal may ultimately rest on nothing more than personal preferences, but reasons: "These preferences are facts and there is agreement in holding many of them. This agreement gives them the authority of numbers or even of the generality of their acceptance. From such facts of preference and of agreement thereon we can claim that the principles in which they emerge contain a certain stability, and it is this stability which it is perfectly admissible to characterize as giving them objectivity, provided we admit its dependence upon the processes of individual judgment which give it its basis in fact" (p. 67).

This sounds at first like simple majoritarianism, and Greaves does later argue that, although "there is no presumption of rationality about majority, or public, or mass opinion" (p. 175), when the need for actual decisions arises "the only practical procedure is to find the majority view" (p. 173). However, Greaves explicitly denies that he is an ethical relativist (p. 95). Instead, he founds specific democratic values upon a morality which is in turn derived from an empirical analysis of how human nature is best served. He is aware that human nature is not an absolute constant. But there is constancy in his definition of morality as self-realization (in ch. v), by which he means "the development as a part of each individual separateness of a rational activity which, directed upon the total of experience, issues in what may be called a *Weltanschauung* or practical philosophy of life, and the integration of behaviour in harmony with it" (p. 80). And Greaves is gratified to find that "comparative study reveals much uniformity of moral

[1] T. D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics* (London, Penguin Books, 1953), p. 97.

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judgments" (p. 95). In other words, a great deal of *relative* constancy in human nature may be assumed from the facts, and the author firmly places his analysis "in the utilitarian tradition with the implication that morality has to do with the satisfaction of the sum-total of needs" (p. 108).

Of course it is a new utilitarianism which Greaves advocates. The traditional version was too mechanistic and materialistic. A new emphasis "can best be sought, not by discarding the utilitarian tradition with the attack on poverty to which it led, and the socialism into which it developed, still less by decrying it, but rather by looking at it afresh . . ." (p. 159). And a fresh look will reveal the validity of a utilitarianism resting confidently on subjectivism. In Greaves's opinion subjectivism is not an invitation to chaos, but instead exhibits essential order and regularity as an empirical social phenomenon (ch. ix, esp. p. 150).

Greaves concludes with the affirmation that political theory "may produce reasons for preferring one set of ideas, institutions, or machinery to another; but those reasons will take the form of arguing that they better secure the satisfaction of human needs and the realization of human ends, not that they more closely conform to an *a priori* first principle. . . . The 'ought' they imply will thus be, as it were, a common 'ought', a quintessential 'ought', expressing an attempt at the most rational interpretation of experience, not an 'ought' behind experience dictating conclusions . . ." (p. 180). The content of the "quintessential 'ought' " is of course maximum freedom of self-realization.

The great difficulty with all this, even if Greaves is deemed to have been convincing so far, is the same one which utilitarianism has been consciously facing at least since the day of John Stuart Mill. The implications of this political theory project an essentially negative rôle for the state on the one hand, while on the other hand practical dependence upon majorities produces a constant contradiction in the form of decisions for positive government. It becomes necessary to set limits to restrain tyranny by majority, and for this the theory is ill-equipped. Not only does Greaves, for example, let slip a number of rather ominous practical suggestions, such as: "Because of its importance to social life we regard it as right that the state should concern itself with promise-making to ensure, as far as its sanctions can do so, that promises are kept" (p. 120); the state "must aim at preventing disputes from arising by seeking out the sources of conflict" (p. 116); and "there is no room within a democratic society for an authoritarian party, economic undertaking, church or trade union" (p. 200). If it is true that "maintenance of bodily health and the free operation of the mind are indeed the patent prerequisites for the achievement

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of human purpose" and that "the state is bound by them" (p. 108), then it is difficult to see where the state ought to stop in an effort positively to implement these goals, but only too easy to see that this effort may make a mockery of individual moral autonomy. Will the empirically founded democratic state stop short of *Kraft durch Freude?*

Aside from this central difficulty, *The Foundations of Political Theory* is a stimulating and suggestive work. Greaves has read widely in contemporary philosophy, psychology and sociology. If he does not succeed in solving all the problems he faces, his analysis has the outstanding merit of being lucid and brilliantly up-to-date.

STEVEN MULLER

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist. By PETER GAY. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—xii, 417 pp. $6.00.

Despite the varied and voluminous literature on Voltaire some aspects of his life and thought still merit more searching analysis. This is particularly true of his politics. Peter Gay's patient and penetrating appraisal has now "placed Voltaire's political ideas in the framework of his time." Although each of the seven chapters here is in one sense a discrete essay, all sustain a single premise—that "Voltaire's politics has long been the victim of clichés" and this treatment has distorted and oversimplified the facts.

Few serious students of eighteenth-century history will be disposed to challenge this contention, the less so after examining the detailed and documented evidence assembled here. By restoring familiar but misconstrued quotations to their context, the author demonstrates how frequently Voltaire's ideas have been narrowed, falsified, and dogmatized. By relating many of his writings to the circumstances or controversies that provoked them, Mr. Gay helps to exculpate Voltaire from the charge that he had an "overweening confidence" in reason and indulged in "abstract literary politics."

Within these limits *Voltaire's Politics* is a valuable work of clarification and rehabilitation carried through in the face of exhausting complexities. The disguises, denials and equivocations to which Voltaire so frequently resorted to mislead the censors (and from less defensible motives) make it exceptionally difficult to determine where his personal convictions lay. Few writers have shifted their position so evasively or assumed so many masks. To seize and hold him fast, as Menelaus grasped Proteus, until he reveals his true shape, is an enterprise so frustrating that Mr. Gay's pertinacity in attempting it compels admiration.

How fully he succeeds must remain a matter of opinion. "Vol-

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taire", the Prologue affirms, "has had many reputations, most of them unjustified." In this study he acquires yet one more, hitherto underemphasized—"Voltaire as a practical, realistic political thinker." The likeness that emerges, set against a patiently re-created background, appears reasonably convincing to this reviewer. From the opening chapter on Voltaire in England through successive essays on his rôle at the court of Louis XV, at Potsdam, Geneva and Ferney, the accumulating evidence reveals him as a more realistic observer, a shrewder judge of political essentials, and a more pragmatic mediator than the majority of his biographers have conceded.

In defending Voltaire against the accusation of "shallow and pretentious intellectualism" Mr. Gay not only reveals, he frankly avows, his own convictions. "Voltaire and the Enlightenment", he insists, "need no apology. They need only to be understoood." Admiration for the *philosophes* impels the author to pass somewhat severe judgments on dissenting critics with whom he disagrees. He has, however, discharged most of his impatience in what he terms "my polemical prologue," and has endeavored to keep the body of the book "an objective historical study."

Three appendixes, a critical Bibliographical Essay of forty pages, and an admirable index increase the scholarly value of this volume. Mr. Gay, who is an associate professor of history at Columbia University, pays generous tribute to the eminent colleagues who aided and encouraged him, to the Council of the Humanities at Princeton where he held the Alfred Hodder Fellowship in 1955-1956, and to the Columbia University Council of Research in the Social Sciences for financial assistance.

GEOFFREY BRUUN

ITHACA, N. Y.

Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal. Edited by DOUGLAS F. DOWD. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958.—xii, 328 pp. $5.00.

This collection of seventeen essays, by a list of authors thickly sprinkled with distinguished names, commemorates the one hundredth anniversary of Veblen's birth, in 1857. The majority of the contributors are scholars who would gratefully acknowledge indebtedness to Veblen for orienting impulses and problem-defining concepts. In such hands, the "critical reappraisal" is of an appreciative sort—as is fitting in a work of this kind. It touches on well-known peculiarities and defects more lightly than Joseph Dorfman did in his definitive biography, paying chief attention to interpreting Veblen's essential views, and examining them for con-

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tinued relevance. The contributors are mostly economists, but include one sociologist (Norman Kaplan), one physicist (Philip Morrison), and one economist-turned-lawyer (Walton Hamilton).

The general plan of the work is to assign to different contributors different aspects of Veblen's thought, including its sources (Dorfman), scope and method (Morris Copeland), his instinct theories (C. E. Ayres and Kaplan), relation to the orthodoxy of his day (Lawrence Nabers), to Keynesianism (Melvin D. Brockie) and to Marx (Forest G. Hill); also the impact of modern industry on the United States, Australia and New Zealand (Carter Goodrich) and on Japan and Russia (Dowd). However, Veblen's more general ideas ramify through the various subdivisions, with the result that the reader gets diverse judgments on the same matters from different contributors, and this diversity is one of the instructive features of the book. For instance, Forest Hill, harking back to Veblen's first economics paper, suggests that his aim (as then expressed) may have been more like the current welfare state than like outright socialim, and stresses difference between Veblen and Marx (pp. 145-147), while Paul M. Sweezy considers Veblen's thought basically like that of Marx; and Myron W. Watkins denies that Veblen was a reformer.

He had basically Marxian themes, but put them in different terms, including biological concepts. While recognizing increased productivity, he foresaw a progressive deterioration of the performance of the economy (esp. p. 168); at times envisioning an increasing poverty as unqualified as Marx's version, and a tendency of business cycles to subside into chronic depression, leading to a social mutation. He saw a class struggle, but redefined the classes in line with his distinction between business and industry and the domination of industry by technology and applied science. The technicians (innovative and operative) were the only group who could, if they would, organize an economic revolution that would abolish business ownership and substitute control of industry by a "soviet of technicians", necessarily backed by the active support of the trained workers in the primary industries, and the acceptance of the rest of the "underlying population". This outcome he conceived, not as particularly probable, but as the only tolerable one, the chief alternative being one that could fairly be called fascism.

As to the function of price, Veblen in his later phase was explicitly committed to the curative effect of freeing production from the necessity of charging prices that would cover cost: a liberation that would multiply output several hundred per cent; but beyond this, uncertainty sets in. Allan G. Gruchy says (p. 169), "In Veblen's regime of workmanship the national economic budget would be used to supplement the price system as an allocator of

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economic resources. There is nothing in Veblen's inquiry into socialism to indicate that he would dispense with the price system." On the other hand, the reviewer is not aware of any positive indications that he would use a price system, or, if so, with what modifications.

To check Veblen's views for their current relevance is a severe test. His last major economic work appeared in 1923, and some of his ingrained preconceptions date back at least forty years earlier. Of the revolutionary changes since his time, some clearly fit with the trend of his thought, others equally clearly do not. Outstanding are Keynesian economics and the fuller development of the welfare state, while forty-five years of expansion and improvement in quantitative economics—a prerequisite of his form of industrial revolution—furnish also evidence contrary to some of his pessimistic expectations. They show a persistent long-term increase in per capita productivity, far outweighing all the "businesslike" obstacles Veblen contemplated, with reduced inequality of distribution, including a reduction in the proportionate share going to corporate profits, without preventing a vigorous flow of investment. The shortening of working hours even suggests the prospect of a new kind of leisure class.

In view of all this, it is interesting how much the authors of these essays find in Veblen's thought that is currently relevant. He conceived of business as monopoly, insufficiently moderated by competitive pressures—and monopoly is still a threat, as Walton Hamilton's essay indicates. Veblen had a distinctive theory of cycles which is worth examining, though his idea that "borrowed funds do not increase the aggregate industrial equipment" (pp. 200-201, citing *Theory of Business Enterprise,* pp. 101, 103) appears valid only under extreme conditions. He saw the business system as inflicting qualitative damage on our cultural standards; and such qualitative damage appears today as perhaps the system's direst liability, and the one most neglected by current economics. He envisioned a drive toward catastrophe, and catastrophe may come, in which case some part may be played by some of the Veblenian factors. And so on. He was a seminal iconoclast, raising problems and suggesting answers so disturbing that open-minded students could not ignore the challenge, though their responses necessarily varied from the Veblenian model.

Of all this and much more the current volume reminds us, enlighteningly if not definitively on all points. One intriguing question to which the structure of the book does not lend itself is: to what extent do differences between Veblen's earlier and later statements reflect changes in views or merely in methods of expression? To what extent did views formed in the late nineteenth

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century persist under changed conditions? In any case, this volume presents a highly useful survey of one of the great formative influences in the transformation of our economic thought in the past half-century.

J. M. CLARK

WESTPORT, CONN.

The Pursuit of the Millennium. By NORMAN COHN. Fairlawn, N. J., Essential Books, Inc., 1957.—xvi, 476 pp. $9.00.

This book is a worth-while popularization of the history of medieval utopian and millennial movements. Mr. Cohn divides his volume into chapters on the tradition of apocalyptic hope, medieval messianism, flagellant movements, amoral elitism, and egalitarianism. He concludes his study with an appendix on the Ranters in Cromwell's England.

While there is much that is enjoyable in this book, there is also much to criticize. Mr. Cohn's point of departure possesses a certain obvious validity. He makes a useful effort to relate the passions expressed by groups caught up in millennial movements to the paranoid and megalomaniacal insanity of individuals as defined by clinical analysis. I believe that few would care to disagree with his insistence upon this relationship. On the other hand, his basic definition runs the risk of being polemical because he lacks any sympathy for the movements and ideas which he treats. What he seems to forget or to underestimate is the fact that phantasies such as the restoration of paradise, ages of progress, and the dream of achieving a universal Christian brotherhood haunted the minds and inspired the actions of many medieval men, and not just of madmen. Moreover, when we think of these ideas with some measure of human sympathy, we perceive conceptions that reflect the eternal hope of the weak before the strong, the promptings of conscience that restrain the powerful, and the hope for an advance in the human condition that defines much that is best in medieval man's—or, for that matter, modern man's—experience. Again, when we consider what lies behind the megalomaniacal excesses of medieval or modern elitism—another of Mr. Cohn's bête-noires—we are faced by conceptions and actions that cannot be described as wholly harmful. Can we even imagine a history of man without elites? A history of armies without their Old Guards? What Mr. Cohn has the right to lament, I feel, is excess or madness, not utopian phantasy or elitism.

A similar criticism may be made of Mr. Cohn's attempt to relate millennial mass movements to specific social situations. First, however, let it be said that there is much that is worth while in

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his treatment. He asserts, for example, that poverty alone did not drive men toward revolution and religious excess. The principal stimulus in this direction was the insecurity produced in individuals by the rapid changes and dislocations characteristic of a growing and expanding society. His argument, however, is open to some criticism.

Mr. Cohn draws a familiar contrast between an old order and a new disorder. The old order was the agrarian "manor", and the new disorder the towns that developed in Europe from the tenth century. According to Mr. Cohn and many historians of medieval society, the old order possessed qualities that both inhibited change or invention and that were conducive to social stability. These qualities, in turn, are considered to be derived from the closeness and intimacy of the personal and social relationships formed within relatively small and homogeneous social groups, that is, family and village groups. This conception of the source of social stability seems wholly false to me. Abstractly considered, the small size of a social unity and the intimacy of its personal relationships are no evidence of social stability. A good division boasts more stability and solidarity among its soldiers than does a bad company. Moreover, my reading of history allows me to perceive nothing *unusually* stable about the seignories and village communities of the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries. Quite the contrary, I am impressed by the fact that Mr. Cohn's old order seems to have had a great hand in producing urbanism, his new disorder.

Besides, is urban life always more disorderly than rural? The long history of town life from classical times to today does not seem to indicate this. But perhaps it is so, if we limit our perspective to the medieval town. Possibly, but the evidence of medieval religious excess does not help us to prove this point. In the first place, many countryfolk seem to have shared this madness. Many of Mr. Cohn's own examples are rural or semirural. And there are more. In short, it is unlikely that there is any particular thing that can be described as "town-heresy" or "urban-excess". There are only the excesses of men.

We must confess, however, that towns produced spokesmen for more heretical movements and more developed forms of millennial excess than did the countryside during the Middle Ages. But this need cause no astonishment. Towns also produced more orthodoxy, forms of popular devotion, rationalism and skepticism—in fact, more articulate forms of every idea than did villages. Indeed, is it not simply a function of the larger permanent groupings of men, that is, of towns, to lead in the development of ever more specialized forms of thought or action?

JOHN H. MUNDY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Communism and Social Democracy, 1914-1931. Volume IV, Parts I and II of *A History of Socialist Thought.* By G. D. H. COLE. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1958.—x, viii, 940 pp. $14.50.

The recent death of Professor G. D. H. Cole at the age of sixty-nine again reminds us of the passing of an era. Of that distinguished group of writers and teachers, including Cole, Shaw, the Webbs, and Lindsay, who played an important rôle in the rise of British Labour, only R. H. Tawney is still alive. Cole's most original contributions to social and political theory appeared during the First World War and in the 1920's when he published a number of books and articles arguing the case for guild socialism. Nevertheless, he continued to write and teach in the field of political and social thought and to publish histories of the British labor movement and, more recently, of the international socialist and trade-union movements. His latest book, which is Volume IV of his *A History of Socialist Thought,* centers on the reactions of the various socialist groups to the events of the First World War, especially the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and on the continuing conflict between Communists and Social Democrats during the 1920's. Students of socialism will be grateful that before his death Professor Cole had completed the fifth volume of his history, which presumably will carry the story of the international labor and socialist movements through the years of the Great Depression and the Nazi victory in Germany.

In the period covered by the volume under review there is very little of significance to record in the field of socialist thought. The last major contributions, the wartime writings of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, were dealt with in the preceding volume. The 1920's saw no new theoretical developments by either the Communists or the Social Democrats, unless one views Stalin's writings as important doctrinal contributions. Professor Cole does not elect that view: "I at any rate find it impossible to regard these developments as advances in Socialist thinking" (p. 15). Consequently, the volume is, for the most part, a narrative of the major developments in the various socialist and Communist parties and in the trade unions, rather than a history of socialist theory. Indeed, several of the best chapters—those dealing with Russia, Germany and England from 1917 to 1931—are essays in which Cole discusses with clarity and insight the over-all political and economic history of the period, although he keeps the central focus on the labor and socialist movements.

Cole's guild socialism, with its overtones of Proudhon and William Morris, was based upon his fundamentally pluralistic and

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libertarian philosophy and temperament. He was always an opponent of centralized, bureaucratic socialism, whether it was achieved by reformist, parliamentary methods or by Bolshevik revolutionary tactics. The problem of the organization of the factory and industry which would secure freedom for the worker, rather than political and governmental questions, was at the center of his attention. Understandably, he was unsympathetic with Bolshevism, although he continued to believe that on balance the Russian Revolution was "one of the very few great and admirable events in world history" (p. 603). He admits that in the 1920's he failed to appreciate clearly the strength of totalitarian tendencies in the Soviet Union, and that he was insufficiently aware of the extent to which the dangers of bureaucracy and dictatorship were inherent in the Leninist system, even before Stalin made terror and coercion the mainstay of the régime. It is noteworthy that Cole was repelled primarily by the ruthlessness of the Bolsheviks' attacks on all those —including Socialists—who opposed the absolute rule of the Communist party and by the Communists' rejection of any moral code in their dealings with their enemies at home or abroad. In opposition to Marx and Lenin, Cole did not believe in the Revolution as an end in itself or in classes as somehow more real than the individuals of whom they are composed. He was a humanitarian—the heir of the English Utilitarians.

> I believe [he writes] that nothing counts finally as valuable except the well-being and happiness of individual men and women. I believe in Revolution only when and where I am convinced that it can be used to promote such well-being and happiness, and that these goods cannot be procured by less unpleasant means. . . . I also hold . . . that whoever elevates the Revolution to the rank of an end in itself or regards a class as superior to, or more real than, the individuals who make it up, is guilty of sin against the spirit of humanity (p. 603).

At the same time, Cole was highly critical of the gospel of parliamentary gradualism as preached by Western European Social Democrats, who insist that all peoples everywhere must pass through the entire process of capitalist development before arriving at socialism, and that socialism is inevitably linked with the acceptance of parliamentary and democratic political institutions on the Western model. Cole's sympathies in the period after World War I were with the Centrists—such as the Independent Social Democrats in Germany, the Austrian Socialists, the French Socialist party, and the I. L. P. in Great Britain—who formed the so-called "Two-and-a-half" International, the Vienna Union, which unsuccessfully attempted to act as a bridge between the revived Second International and the new Communist Third International. The absolute inflexibility of the Comintern leaders and their hostility

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to such Centrists as Longuet, Friedrich Adler, and Serrati were demonstrated beyond any doubt in the famous "Twenty-one Points" of 1920, and the Comintern policy of using the non-Russian Communist parties and the world communist movement as instruments to promote the interests of the Soviet Union as a world Power left the Centrists no alternative but to merge with the Berne or Social-Democratic International in the new Labour and Socialist International, formed in 1923.

Professor Cole's Centrist sympathies are, on the whole, an advantage to him in his treatment of the conflicts between the forces of social democracy and communism. He knows the socialist movement from the inside, and yet he stands aloof from each of the two major contestants; thus he can describe and evaluate their programs and actions without partisan bias. He can be equally critical of the timidity and errors of the German S. P. D. in 1918 and 1919 and of the disastrous policies pursued by the German Communists in the 1920's, especially their tactic of giving assistance to the Nazis against the Social Democrats on the ground that a Nazi triumph would be short-lived and would serve only to deepen the revolutionary situation, thereby contributing to an eventual Communist victory.

The reader who finds a work of more than nine hundred pages somewhat forbidding will do well to read Cole's Introduction in the first volume and his Conclusion, "Communism and Social Democracy from 1914 to 1931", the last chapter in the second volume. These two chapters summarize Cole's conclusions; after reading them, the reader can refer back to those sections of the book in which he is particularly interested. As in the earlier volumes in this series, an extensive bibliography is appended.

HERBERT A. DEANE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919-1957). By IRVING HOWE and LEWIS COSER. Boston, Beacon Press, 1958.—x, 593 pp. $6.75.

This is an excellent political, social and cultural history of the American communist movement from its beginnings in 1919 to its virtual demise in 1957. In their preface the authors frankly state that they approached the subject with "strong predispositions". In general their point of view is that of the anti-Communist Left, although they might prefer the term anti-Stalinist Left. The book is well documented and the sources utilized are principally published material, especially the party's own publications. Aside from their use of Bella Dodd's inside picture of the purge of Earl

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Browder in 1945, the authors seem to give little credence to the testimony of such ex-Communists as Gitlow and Budenz. Major attention is focused on what the authors call the "public history" of the Communist party with little mention of spy rings, underground operations, or other conspiratorial activities.

The work is eminently readable. Although the subject matter is involved, the authors succeed in presenting a picture of the party which is both vivid and illuminating. There are superb vignettes of individual Communists, drawn with humor and insight. The comic as well as the tragic incidents in the party's history are narrated with equal skill.

American Communists have always been certain that they are the wave of the future. As William Z. Foster confidently asserted in 1928, "the day will surely come when the Communists will be the *only* party in the United States." Believing themselves in possession of a total method of understanding history, the leaders of the CP consider themselves men to whom power would certainly come if only they could find the correct slogan or maneuver themselves into the leadership of the working masses. They are always certain that the party line is correct, always has been correct, but (somehow) is never properly carried out.

One of the main conclusions of the authors is that the principal reason for the failure of the American Communist party has been its lack of understanding of the actualities of American life. Belief in an early Bolshevik revolution in America as well as in Europe dominated the thinking of the American Communists in the first years of their existence. In the first decade of the party's history the lack of real contact with either the labor movement or American social life also helps to explain the fury with which the rival factions in the Communist party turned their frustrations against each other.

One of the best chapters in the book is entitled "The Intellectuals Turn Left". In the thirties a large number of gifted and distinguished American writers in search of an ideology promising worldly salvation approached communism with uncritical adoration and reverence. In spite of many defections among the intellectual fellow-travelers, caused by events such as the Moscow trials, the influence of Stalinism in the intellectual world seemed to be on the rise until the Hitler-Stalin pact destroyed—at least for writers of any intellectual independence—their vision of the Communist party as an infallible authority.

The greatest single achievement of the Communist party in the thirties was its penetration of the CIO. Although the Nazi-Soviet pact marked the end of the literary Popular Front, it did not destroy the party's influence in the trade-union field. Even after

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the war one fourth of the CIO members were enrolled in unions controlled by the Communists.

In the last chapter the authors inject their quasi-Trotskyist interpretation of Stalinism as "counter-revolutionary". That the international communist movement is today primarily an instrument of Soviet imperialism this reviewer would not question. However, one's explanation of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution is largely irrelevant in a history of the American Communist party.

In the same chapter the authors examine the reasons for the wide appeal of "Stalinism" in America. The authors accept with important reservations the interpretation of the American Communist party as a disciplined conspiracy functioning as an agent of the Kremlin. Between the continually changing mass membership at the bottom and the professional leaders at the top the authors see an enormous gap. Only the leaders and the hard core of party militants who remained in the party for some length of time can be considered as conspirators obedient to the demands of the Soviet state. Estimates of the number of Americans who passed through the party range from half to three quarters of a million, and countless others came in varying degrees under the influence of the CP. This history of the Communist party concludes that the influence which the party exerted over American radicalism for four decades was on the whole "profoundly destructive and corrupting."

HILLMAN M. BISHOP

THE CITY COLLEGE, NEW YORK

Communism in Guatemala: 1944-1954. By RONALD M. SCHNEIDER. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959.—xxi, 350 pp. $6.00.

This is an important contribution to the recent history of Latin American politics. It is a thorough study of the Communist party of Guatemala, the only such organization to come within striking distance of power in Latin America. It deals principally with the party's activities during the revolutionary period of 1944-1954, although it also sketches quickly the evolution of the party since the fall of the Arbenz government in June of the latter year.

Dr. Schneider's study analyzes the Guatemalan Communists' leadership, organizational structure and tactics. It deals with their methods of organizing front groups, their means of capturing control of the labor and peasant movements. It studies their relationships with Presidents Arevalo and Arbenz and their penetration of the government apparatus.

There is no doubt that the Guatemalan Communists had organizational ability. Many of their leaders, Dr. Schneider points out,

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had had training in Communist organizations in Mexico, Chile and other countries. They knew what they wanted and they were able in seeking to obtain it. As is usual with Communists, they were willing to do "the dirty work" in any organizations in which they participated, in order to get a grip upon them.

The Communists of Guatemala also enjoyed the advantage of advice and direction from skilled Communist leaders from other countries during the whole period of the revolution. For their part, the Guatemalan Communists' actions "were conditioned by the international situation and attuned to the aims of the world Communist movement directed and dominated by the Soviet Union", in the words of the author.

Dr. Schneider's book bears out the thesis that the great tragedy of the Guatemalan Revolution was the fact that it failed to develop a party of the democratic Left, which could have given it direction and made it possible for it to avoid the pitfalls set by the Communists. The author devotes considerable attention to this aspect of the Communist rise to influence during the revolution. He shows in detail the attempts which were made to establish such a party, and the successful efforts of the Communists to prevent it.

The lack of a democratic Left party created a political vacuum. As there was no other disciplined party with a well-defined ideology among the revolutionaries, the Communists found it comparatively easy to divert the vague nationalist sentiments and the desire of the young leaders of the revolution for fundamental changes in the archaic economy and society of Guatemala into anti-Yankee channels and in the direction of Communists-inspired "popular-democracy".

Another major advantage of the Guatemalan Communists, aside from the absence of an effective democratic revolutionary party, was their connection with President Arbenz, which Dr. Schneider explores at some length. He concludes that Arbenz was not himself a Communist, and probably was less impressed by the Communists' ideology than by their organizational ability and willingness to help him resolve problems, while being modest in their claims for political spoils.

There are two minor criticisms which one might make of Dr. Schneider's study. First of all, one might question the accuracy of his labeling of some individual Guatemalan leaders as Communists. In most cases, he is quite careful, but there are some instances which might be open to question.

In the second place, there is remarkably little in the book concerning the rôle of the United States in the development of the Guatemalan Communists. Although he does indicate that the attitude of the United Fruit Company and the International Rail-

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ways of Central America played into the hands of the Communists upon various occasions, particularly in the labor movement, there is little indication that the policies of the United States government did the same thing several times during the Arbenz period.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

International Politics in the Atomic Age. By JOHN H. HERZ. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—viii, 360 pp. $6.00.

It would be hard to imagine a clearer demonstration of the impact that the specter of "mutual suicide" is having on thoughtful and sensitive men than John Herz's *International Politics in the Atomic Age.* The author undertakes an "agonizing reappraisal" of the very concepts of international politics he has done so much to establish in the minds of students of world affairs. In his earlier study on *Political Realism and Political Idealism,* he defined international relations as the realm where "the ultimate power units . . . are facing each other as monades irreducible to any further . . . coordinating power" and where their power politics are mitigated only by the balance of power. Now he finds that these monades, the territorial nation-states, have become obsolete and that the classical balance-of-power system has ceased to function.

According to Herz, two new and revolutionary factors explain this radical change. First, the dawn of the air and nuclear age has broken down the walls of "impermeability" built around the nation-states which formerly made them relatively reliable "units of protection and pacification". Now, the "era of absolute exposure", if it is not already with us, is approaching in which "penetration in its extreme form will mean not mere damage or change but utter annihilation of life and way of life." The second factor is a bipolar concentration of power in two bloc-controlling superpowers. While the two blocs "have maintained themselves in equipoise for over a decade", they leave little room for a balance-of-power system and balance-of-power policies of the classical type. Gone, among other things, is the effective "balancer" which could shift its weight to the momentarily weaker side, and the ideological rift adds to the rigidity of the two-Power system.

Taken literally, Herz may seem to contradict himself. After all, the essential tendency of the two blocs, as he sees it, is not to eliminate territoriality but "to form vast impermeable units of territoriality" by shifting the "hard shell" from the nation-states to the rim of the alliance regions. Moreover, the old balance-of-power policies reappear as efforts—not necessarily vain—to preserve a nuclear balance of power or "balance of terror", upon which mutual deterrence and what peace there is has come to rest. However,

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whether or not the current situation is wholly novel, Herz, who himself warns of exaggerating its newness, succeeds in demonstrating that the process of change in international relationships has been sufficiently far-reaching in recent years to warrant the most careful scrutiny.

The reader is warned not to expect a solution to the acute "security dilemma" of our age as the result of immediate radical changes of attitudes and behavior. The best expedient that one can presently hope for is a temporary "holding operation". While it lasts, the two blocs would agree, in ways not explained, on the prerequisites of peaceful coexistence: the delimitation of their respective spheres, the definition of aggression and the limitation of war. Although such a "holding operation" would, in Herz's opinion, lessen world tensions even to the extent that nuclear weapons, eventually, would no longer appear as a threat "because their use would have become implausible", he regards it as being far from an adequate solution. The atomic bomb must become an attitude-maker. Nations and rulers must be converted to a "universalism" that will induce them to place the interests of mankind above those of the nation and, specifically, to grant to a supernational authority a monopoly of nuclear power. Universalism he defines as "that comprehension of mankind as a group or entity which imposes itself on those aware of the absolute peril in which the atomic bomb has placed mankind as such."

One may doubt whether Herz, who calls himself a "liberal realist", has escaped the pitfalls of utopianism which he has so ably criticized in the past, particularly when he suggests that the "planetary mind" may win out, not as a result of some powerful "world sweeping movement" or universalist revolution, but through a kind of "self-selection on the part of those who are gripped by a sense of responsibility . . . and . . . possess the broadness of vision which is required to grasp the common survival interest of mankind." Yet, if this be Utopia, it is not surprising that Herz should prefer to be "guided by an ever so faint ray of hope" when the only alternative he can see to his universalist solution is a resigned acceptance of "the insufficiency of man . . . to provide for his own survival".

In this study, Herz makes a substantial and imaginative contribution to knowledge of the peculiar features of international politics under nuclear conditions as well as to the theory of the actors and political systems in international relations. The book is commendably readable even in its treatment of such technical subjects as nuclear deterrence.

ARNOLD WOLFERS
WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

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The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs. By HOLBERT N. CARROLL. Pittsburgh, The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958.—xviii, 365 pp. $5.00.

This volume appears to be the first full-dress study devoted to the House of Representatives. Although Professor Carroll makes a substantial contribution, he does not deal with all aspects of the four powers by which the House influences, and in some cases determines, foreign policy—legislation, appropriation, investigation, and resolutions reflecting public opinion. Only the first two of these are studied in detail.

The influence on foreign policy of legislation on the tariff, agriculture, Merchant Marine, atomic energy, the executive establishment, the military and foreign services, and other matters has become increasingly continuous and significant. It is surpassed only by the influence of appropriations, for they determine the adequacy of defense preparation, of treaty observance, of the foreign services, and of economic aid to foreign countries—all matters which have become major elements in foreign policy in recent times. It was, in fact, in the field of appropriations that the House first exercised influence in connection with the Jay Treaty in 1796. But on this, as on subsequent occasions, the argument presented by the President of moral duty to maintain national good faith persuaded the House to vote the necessary appropriations.

Since World War II the increasing influence of all types of legislation on foreign affairs and the tremendous increase in defense and foreign aid appropriations have given a new importance to the House, compared with the Senate and the President in the conduct of foreign relations, although its influence is still the least of these three bodies. An understanding of how it functions is, however, necessary for an understanding of foreign policy and, as William Y. Elliott writes in his foreword, "students of this problem have long been waiting for an authoritative book on this subject." Professor Carroll's volume, based on observation of the functioning of the House and its committees, as well as on an understanding of its traditions and constitutional position, goes a long way toward meeting this demand.

The book includes a brief chapter on the House in history, a longer one on the House in transition, particularly since World War II, followed by detailed chapters on the politics of committees in general, on the making of economic foreign policy, on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the Appropriations Committee, on the functioning of the House as a whole, and on its relations to its own leadership, to the Senate, and to the Executive.

The author quotes Edward Corwin's statement that "the constitution is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing

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American foreign policy" (p. 6, quoting Corwin, *The President*, p. 208) and writes:

> These Committees work in jealous isolation from one another and compete for the foreign policy business of the House. Commonly, the scheme of the separation of powers maintained by checks and balances is discussed in terms of the judiciary, the President, and the Senate and the House. But the House of Representatives is afraid of its own power. A scheme of checks and balances has evolved throughout the House, and especially at the committee level (p. 36).

After dealing with the making of foreign economic policy, the author notes that "more than half of the 19 standing committees of the House of Representatives and several special joint and select committees held pieces of the puzzle, themselves components of the overall foreign economic policy objectives of the United States" (p. 73).

The Committee on Foreign Affairs is theoretically king in this field. The detailed study of its work indicates that its "control resembled erosion. . . . The Committee's activities are poorly coordinated with those of other committees and centers of power and influence in the lower chamber. Carelessness has marked the selection of its membership" (p. 137). "The even more important committee on appropriations", he says, "is neither the ogre pictured by its critics nor the efficiency expert and realist that it pictures itself . . . but the committee has occasionally displayed dangerous irresponsibility" (p. 192).

The House as a whole, he says, is little more effective than it was when Woodrow Wilson looked at it in 1885. "The body is larger, and its leadership is once again dispersed. Whether the House behaves coherently and responsibly depends largely upon loosely organized leadership of varying quality" (p. 279).

Of the relations of the House to the Senate, Professor Carroll writes, "The lofty role carved out by the Senate serves to widen the gap between the two chambers and to acerbate the natural friction and jealousy characterizing their relations" (p. 318), and of its relations to the Executive, "Friction, tension, uncertainty, a tug of war, the jockeying for power, position, and prestige, maneuvers to protect or to advance particular interests" (p. 349).

With these comments, the author's conclusion seems optimistic:

> . . . above and beneath the surface, a web of relationships exists that in sum eventually propels the House, Congress as a whole, and the Executive *to compromises backed by substantial public support*. . . . The system, if it may be described as such, has permitted the United States to make a swift and remarkable adjustment to its world leadership role. The strengths and virtues of the system outweigh its deficiencies. The principal deficiency, inadequate unity and discipline, is one of degree,

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> not requiring a drastic transformation in the system itself. . . . Basically, its achievement depends upon the qualities and attitudes of individual men who are masters of the art of politics (p. 350).

Let us hope this optimistic appraisal is correct. The power position of the United States relative to the Soviet Union has steadily deteriorated since World War II, international tensions have increased, world opinion of the United States in Asia, Africa, Latin America and even in Europe has become less favorable, total destruction of civilization by atomic war, or gradual destruction by nuclear fall-out from testing, is a distinct possibility. A new look at foreign policy is in order and it would seem that the exercise of its large powers by the House of Representatives, reflecting local public opinions which Gallup polls suggest are woefully unenlightened with little capacity or inclination to view the world situation as a whole, requires the careful scrutiny which Professor Carroll presents, but perhaps justifies a less optimistic appraisal than that which the final paragraph of his important study presents.

QUINCY WRIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

The Trouble Makers: Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939. By A. J. P. TAYLOR. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1958.—207 pp. $3.50.

From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft. By GORDON A. CRAIG. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. —xvii, 156 pp. $4.50.

Various institutions provide opportunities for scholars to deliver series of lectures, occasions often used by them to give condensed accounts of their work. Summaries of their thought rather than the minutiae of archival delving are apt to be the result of such undertakings, the quality of which is very variable. Both of the present small books are examples of this activity: Professor Taylor spoke on the B.B.C., Professor Craig delivered the Albert Shaw lectures at the Johns Hopkins University.

Professor Taylor is himself fond of the iconoclastic outlook and sets out to survey the rôle of the dissenting tradition in the British milieu in the particular domain of foreign policy. The British climate has been congenial to dissent, in simplest form the rejection of the established order, which reciprocates with a reaction of scorn. But to contend that the dissenting view represents generally advanced thinking, which in the course of time becomes accepted, is too facile a generalization.

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By its nature dissent must put first stress on principle. Principle makes for intransigeance; yet even in the conduct of practical affairs insistence on principle can have the great value of placing limits and restraints on too opportunistic a behavior. But, conversely, a too uncompromising adherence to principle can lead to lack of understanding, oversimplification, even not a little distortion; for facts are stubborn things and the clash of opposing interests is seldom a clear case of right and wrong, but rather falls in the grey zone of different degrees and kinds of rightness. These shades are apt to irritate the dissenter, who will at times go to great lengths in order to constrain recalcitrant reality into the neater mold of theory, if not of preconceived notion.

Interestingly enough, the picture that emerges from this book is to a large extent that of the weaknesses and shortcomings of dissent, perhaps a dissenting view in itself. To say that "the Radicals plucked up courage whenever the Conservatives were in office, knowing that their Dissent would be ineffective" (p. 91) is one of those generalizations that hold a measure of truth yet almost amount to harshness perhaps a little less than fair. The above quotation refers to the time of Gladstone, than whom no one could be more earnest, verbally, on the score of principle. But perhaps the shortcomings of dissent are best illustrated in the period between the two world wars. The judgment that "the Dissenters blamed their political opponents for the catastrophe of 1939 . . . but they themselves contributed to it" (p. 169) is sound; for Brailsford to bemoan the wrongs inflicted on the superior Germans by the inferior Slavs—he seemed to have forgotten his beloved Macedonians—has implications of strange principle and a consistency that verges upon aberration.

Professor Craig concerns himself with more concrete and narrower aspects of the conduct of foreign policy. His polished essays seek to analyze the deeper reasons for the successes and failures of German policy from the time of Bismarck. The great Chancellor he admires, and the comparison between his interpretation and Taylor's work on the same subject is full of interest. Bismarck's great merit stemmed from his possession of the three qualities demanded by Max Weber of the true statesman: passion (meaning dedication), a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Bismarck's accomplishment was masterful in reorganizing the Prussian foreign service, yet his very success to a degree contained the seeds of its undoing, for the personal dominance he achieved and his insistence on rigid discipline encouraged unquestioning subservience rather than independent thought.

His three successors, "the epigoni: Holstein, Bülow, Kiderlen-Wächter", failed "because they no longer held the values and

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possessed the qualities that inspired the statecraft of their great predecessor" (p. 58). The new régime after the empire had fallen gave an opportunity to fresh talent and blood, though the increased complexity of affairs and the tendency to bureaucratization served to curtail initiative. Germany was especially well served by Stresemann who operated in unusually difficult circumstances. His great accomplishment lay not so much in his recognition and acceptance of the inevitable, as in his "ability to exploit the act of surrender, and to make the most of the circumstances created by it" (p. 72); his suppleness paid handsome dividends. To Hitler the art of negotiation was alien; diplomats and their craft he held in low esteem; ultimately the primary reliance on crude power had similar effects to those of Wilhelmine Germany, a strong argument in favor of diplomacy.

Once more, after defeat, Germany has been ably served by Konrad Adenauer. He has known how to make the most of favorable circumstances and with tenacity has pursued a policy that is a combination of practicality and idealism, rising above the narrowly parochial German outlook. Again, his personal dominance and his somewhat authoritarian tendencies contain seeds of danger, but it is in any case too early properly to appraise his accomplishments, the final verdict on which will depend upon the uncertain future course of events.

Read together these two books strongly convey the impression that Germany would profit from greater cultivation of the dissenting tendency that seems to prosper in the British climate.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's Struggle Against Tyranny. By GERHARD RITTER. Translated by R. T. Clark. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.—330 pp. $7.50.

Viewed in the perspective of time, the German resistance against the Hitler régime was a movement of heroic and tragic dimensions. Those who participated have punctured the illusion of the monolithic unity of a totalitarian state, and have demonstrated anew that the spirit of humanity and morality cannot be crushed permanently. Although no mass movement arose to challenge the power of the dictator, there were many who bravely took part in the resistance against terrific odds and with heavy sacrifices—those formerly active in politics and the trade unions, members of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the Army.

The story of the resistance has been chronicled already by such authors as Allen W. Dulles, H. B. Gisevius, Hans Rothfels, F. V.

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Schlabrendorff, and John Wheeler-Bennett. But Gerhard Ritter, the eminent German historian, provides further depth and understanding by focusing his attention on Carl Goerdeler, a leading member of the resistance, and on the movement as a whole. Thus, the author personalizes history and provides its broad contours. He undertakes this task with consummate skill, detachment and objectivity, as well as great sympathy and understanding. The study, condensed in this English translation, has drawn on the great number of Goerdeler papers, documents in West German and Washington archives, correspondence and conversations with survivors or relatives of those who did not survive. There will always be some lacunae in the record of the resistance since many plans and experiences were not committed to paper, but even if more information is forthcoming in the years ahead the grand design will remain the same.

Carl Goerdeler typified the bourgeois and conservative tradition which is so firmly imbedded in much of Western society. He was a humanist, a romanticist, and a capable administrator too. These qualities stood him well in his political career and during the resistance years. He rose to become Lord Mayor of Leipzig in 1930, broke with the Nazis in 1936 on a matter of principle (when a statue of Mendelssohn was removed by them over his veto), and out of moral and religious convictions joined the resistance, eventually emerging as one of its chief theoreticians. His numerous travels within Germany and abroad enabled him to keep in touch with the several conspiratorial groups, especially top Army officers who were becoming swiftly disillusioned by Hitler's direction of the military campaigns. Goerdeler constantly formulated elaborate and rather conservative political and economic plans for the post-Hitler era, which met much criticism among the groups. Before the July 20, 1944 plot, time was spent on the drafting of cabinet lists, in which it was agreed that he would become chancellor. Because of his moral opposition to the principle of assassination, he did not directly participate in the abortive plot to kill Hitler, but met the same fate as those who did: execution by the Nazis in February 1945.

The author weaves the Goerdeler story into the fabric of the resistance movement. He describes extensively the tragi-comic disputes of high Army officers and Nazi officials with Hitler, and the impact of the war on the fortunes, or shall we say misfortunes, of the opposition. He does not deal with, and refers the reader to, the already published cloak-and-dagger accounts of the numerous attempted putsches. But one might wish that more space had been devoted to basic and certainly difficult philosophical issues, such as the rôle men should perform in a totalitarian system, or the rela-

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tionship of treason to moral duty. One may also be critical of his implicit major apportionment of guilt for the ultimate failure of the resistance effort upon Western political leaders. It is, of course, true that Western lack of support for the movement and the policy of unconditional surrender weakened the will to resist, but should one not likewise emphasize the internal weaknesses of, and the lack of popular support for, the opposition circles?

There will always be differences of interpretation on these controversial matters, but they should not detract from the outstanding contribution which Professor Ritter has made in this volume to the story of the German resistance to Hitler.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

The Commonwealth in the World. By J. D. B. MILLER. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.—308 pp. $5.00.

For a book written and originally published in England this is an astonishingly cool and unsentimental analysis of the British Commonwealth. The author is an Australian, now professor of politics in the University of Leicester. He devotes more space to Australia than to Canada (and wastes some space in debunking some recent fantasies about the Commonwealth by eminent Australians), but otherwise his sense of balance seems to this reviewer to be generally sound. The volume is divided into a short introductory section giving a sketch of Commonwealth history, a long middle section dealing in turn with each individual Commonwealth member-state, and a concluding section on the nature and future of Commonwealth relations. It is illustrated by four cartoons by David Low—which is perhaps the author's device for avoiding the temptation of allowing his own sense of irony to color his austerely factual analysis.

"The method throughout is empirical, in that the emphasis is thrown upon the actual relations between members and upon the policies which they pursue, rather than upon the relations which one might expect them to have if one assumed in advance that the Commonwealth was a particular kind of international body." Thus does Professor Miller explain himself at the outset. As an empiricist he reaches negative conclusions about most of the enthusiastic explanations of the Commonwealth's positive purposes which are usually expounded by English and Australian authors.

Concerning "consultation": the member-states do not consult about everything, the prime ministers in conference do not talk about any topic which any one of them wishes excluded; "consultation is interpreted in a Pickwickian sense". Concerning the British

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tradition of parliamentary institutions and a free society: parliamentarism is being undermined in some of the younger states; the British kind of freedom is likely to be weakened as indigenous traditions push their way up in Asiatic and African communities, since it is only the governing élites in these communities who have absorbed British traditions, not the masses of the people.

Professor Miller goes on to point out that what preserves the Commonwealth as a going concern is mainly a negative agreement among its members about some things they do not want to see happen in the world. But they will not subordinate their individual national interests to any general Commonwealth interest. Nor can the Commonwealth as a whole be expected to stand for such positive ideals as the abolition of racial discrimination, or to set up any standards of conduct which would involve the resignation or expulsion of any member-states. As he sets forth these conclusions in his very matter-of-fact way, they appear to be unanswerable.

Finally he has this to say: "For Britain, Canada and Australia it is difficult to see any difference between the actual relations with the United States and with another Commonwealth member. . . . In foreign policy each of these three is as close to the United States as to one another." This would be passionately denied by many worthy citizens in each of these three Commonwealth countries. For most Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth citizens are still in the mental condition of Walter Bagehot's Englishmen. They require a considerable apparatus of "dignified" institutions to make the "efficient" institutions of their government palatable to them. In the foreign policy of the older Commonwealth member-states, Commonwealth relationships are passing over to the dignified side; while American relations dominate the efficient side.

FRANK H. UNDERHILL

OTTAWA, CANADA

Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change, 1939-1952. By NICHOLAS MANSERGH. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958.—xvi, 469 pp. 63*s*; $10.10.

Professor Mansergh had previously written a survey of the affairs of the British Commonwealth from 1931 to the outbreak of World War II. The present volume carries the story to the accession of Queen Elizabeth II. A brief introductory chapter sets the stage for the detailed study which follows. The author emphasizes that as late as 1938 "The dominions did not favour resolute resistance

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to aggressors; they favoured appeasement" (p. 16), and that this attitude influenced Chamberlain's policy at the time of Munich. It was Hitler himself who brought about a reversal of this attitude by his destruction of Czechoslovakia in 1939, so that when the British government declared war against Germany it was assured of a support from overseas which would have been doubtful a year earlier.

Chapter II describes in great detail Commonwealth coöperation from 1939 to 1941, together with the domestic situation in Eire, South Africa and India. Apart from Eire the governments were prepared to assist in every way, but at the same time most of them opposed the creation of any centralized organs of control which would make their coöperation more effective. Only Australia urged the resurrection of the Imperial War Cabinet of World War I, and in considerable measure this was due to her growing uneasiness about Japan's policy, and her belief that Britain was so engrossed in the war in Europe that she paid too little attention to the situation in the Pacific. There is an enlightening discussion of the difficulty of establishing a War Cabinet when the only authoritative dominion representatives would be their prime ministers, and they felt themselves unable to leave home except occasionally.

On the rare occasions when a dominion prime minister visited London he attended meetings of the United Kingdom War Cabinet. For the greater part of the time, however, coöperation had to make do with the machinery evolved during the inter-war period. A great volume of information was exchanged daily by means of despatches, cablegrams and radio: there were daily meetings in London between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the dominion High Commissioners; and the United Kingdom representatives in the dominions also kept close liaison. By these means the governments of the British Commonwealth were kept informed of United Kingdom policy and communicated their views and counterproposals. On the whole the system worked remarkably well, though occasionally consultation was inadequate; for example, Churchill's decision to send a force largely composed of Australians and New Zealanders from North Africa to Greece. The surprising thing really was that such failures were so few in view of the multiplicity of decisions which had to be made. The United Kingdom government modified its policy when possible to conform to dominion views, but the final decision lay with it and not with the Commonwealth. This was especially true when the dominion governments gave conflicting advice. In the words of the Balfour Resolution of 1926, there was equality of status but not of stature in the determination of policy. This was due in part to the lack of adequate machinery for consulta-

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tion, but an even more important reason was the superiority of the United Kingdom in power.

The chapter on the conduct of the war from 1941 to 1945 describes how the relative importance of the dominions lessened after Pearl Harbor. The United Kingdom government continued to consult them, but inevitably the higher direction of the war in all its aspects was concentrated in Washington and London. There is a very clear account of how Australia's long-standing dissatisfaction with the policy of "Hitler first" came to a head when Japan entered the war, and led the government to make renewed efforts to obtain a decisive voice in the conduct of the war in the Pacific. The result was as before: Australia was consulted but at no time did she play any important part in the making of decisions.

The second part of the book deals with the emergence of the Asian dominions and the final establishment of the Irish republic. The author discusses with approval the formula which enabled the Asian republics to continue to be members of a monarchical Commonwealth. He points out that it was pressure from the dominions which reversed the original intention of the United Kingdom government that the secession of Ireland meant the ending of Imperial Preference and alien status for Irish citizens in the United Kingdom. Professor Mansergh argues that this is an advantage to the United Kingdom. The principal benefits appear to be that foodstuffs from Ireland with which the world market is oversupplied retain their British market, and that her people who are unable to make a living at home migrate freely to the United Kingdom. One could wish that these advantages had been argued at greater length.

The concluding section of the book describes the reaction of the Commonwealth to post-war events down to 1952. The salient development was the educative effect of the war upon the dominions and particularly Canada: they had learned that isolationism was no safeguard against aggression. The realization was not immediate: the initial impulse was refusal to accept Smut's prediction of 1943 that the post-war world would be dominated by the Soviet Union, the United States and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom. In 1945 the dominions tried with little success to limit the rights of the Great Powers in the United Nations and to enhance their own position in it. Eventually they accepted the facts of the post-war world, and became members of whatever regional alliance best promoted their security.

The author usually refrains from expressing his own opinion and restricts himself to a meticulous analysis of the facts. There are, however, three general ideas which underlie his account. The first is the capacity of the Commonwealth system to sustain unity of purpose and effort during the war. The governments were de-

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termined to work together, and they showed that, given this attitude, it was possible to achieve remarkable results with very imperfect instruments. The author also emphasized the adaptability of the Commonwealth to post-war changes which modified its previously British and European membership. The third conclusion, of which the end is not yet, is Professor Mansergh's belief that the Commonwealth can preserve its cohesion in the vastly changed conditions of the post-war world.

LENNOX A. MILLS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Canadian Jurisprudence: The Civil Law and Common Law in Canada. Edited by EDWARD MCWHINNEY. Toronto, The Carswell Company Limited, 1958.—xvi, 393 pp. $7.50.

Although this is the fourth volume in the University of Toronto Faculty of Law Comparative Law Series, it is the first one to concern itself wholly with the comparative study of law within Canada. Its purpose is, to quote the editor, "to examine, at this present stage of Canadian legal development . . . whether or not there has emerged as yet anything that might be described as an indigenous, autonomous, distinctively Canadian jurisprudence—neither English nor French *stricto sensu,* nor for that matter American, but involving something of a blending or fusion of the two main legal developments in Canada, the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and the Common Law of the English-speaking Provinces" (p. vi). It consists of a series of essays, most of them by the younger generation of Canadian law teachers, on the basic topics in "lawyer's law", public law being represented by only two essays and those rather specialized ones. On each basic topic, namely the legal system, contract, tort, land law and succession to property on death, there are two essays, one by a common lawyer on his law and the other by a civilian on his. Three of the essays by the civilians are in French.

As a law teacher I respect the thought and the labor that went into the planning of the collection and the writing of the essays, as a Canadian I welcome the book itself as an attempt, rare in Canada, to look at Canadian law as a whole and from a broad viewpoint, but as a reviewer for an American periodical I cannot really recommend it to Americans. What this collection shows is that, despite what those who sound off at conferences like to call "the unique experience of Canada", the "lawyer's law" of the common-law provinces is, except for statutory divergences in minor points of detail, simon-pure English law; the judges rely on and follow English decisions, English texts and English periodical writ-

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ing and, except in the field of land law, the legislatures watch the Mother of Parliaments and if, as and when she makes a timid little dab with her broom at the mess in the Augean stables, they make the same little dab too and when, which is nearly all the time, she does nothing, they do nothing. There is almost no "cross-fertilization" between the law of the common-law provinces and the law of the Province of Quebec; it is not "unique", it is merely English and, as such, is not worth separate study by Americans. As this collection also shows, however, Quebec law is. Cut off from France, exposed to influences derived from the common-law systems of criminal law and public law (which under the Canadian Constitution are in force in Quebec too) and infiltrated by the common-law notions of the English-speaking judges on the common courts of appeal (the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada), who could not say, as a professor would, "it's not in my field" when a Quebec case came before them but had to decide it as best they could, the law of Quebec *is* "unique" and *is* worth study by outsiders—but a study far too specialized to be of general interest.

For these reasons only two of the essays are likely to interest Americans, Maxwell Cohen's "International Law and Canadian Practice"—but it has, of course, nothing to do with "lawyer's law", comparative or otherwise—and the lead article by the editor, Edward McWhinney, on "Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada". Given the purpose of the collection, which I quoted in McWhinney's own words in the first paragraph of this review, this article was the easiest to write, for it covers all, or nearly all, those very few points, and those mostly in the field of public law, where there has in fact been obvious interaction or collision between English-Canadian ideas, French-Canadian ideas and American ideas in the "law-in-books" of Canadian law. To a Canadian law teacher of the older generation it tells little he did not already know, but to many Canadian practitioners and, I imagine, to all Americans, most of what McWhinney says will be new. It is well done—and would have been better done if McWhinney had taken the trouble to write it in clear vigorous English and had pruned it of most, perhaps all, of the irritatingly "learned" footnotes. One other essay *has* to be mentioned, though it does not even pretend to be on comparative law, David Kilgour's "Procedure and Judicial Administration in Canada". It is a little gem; wearing its learning lightly and talking in words of one syllable, it treats the neglected subject of procedure as if it were *for* something, which indeed it is.

As to the rest of the essays, they are, good as some of them are, for Canadians only. Faced with the impossible task of looking, in his own corner of "lawyer's law", to see whether there is any

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"distinctively Canadian jurisprudence" or any "cross-fertilization" between the Quebec law and the common law—when he well knows from the beginning that there is not—each contributor writes what he pleases and the essays go off in all directions. For this the blame must rest on the editor—though, to be fair to him, this is what usually happens in symposiums. As a Canadian, however—and up to this point I have been reviewing the book for Americans—I welcome any Canadian writing on any Canadian legal topic and, as a Canadian, I found all of the essays interesting and learned something from each one of them.

JOHN WILLIS

FACULTY OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

The 1926 Referendum. By AARON WILDAVSKY. *The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government.* By DAGMAR CARBOCH. Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire Pty. Ltd., 1958.—xxvi, 292 pp. 40/-.

These two monographs, bound in the one volume, are welcome additions to the very small number of studies in the field of Australian political history since the inception of the Commonwealth. Despite the fact that each is an autonomous study, binding them together was justified by a variety of factors. Both cover important aspects of political change in Australia during the years 1926-29; both center on the fate of proposals put forward to change substantially the Australian system of industrial arbitration; and both reveal the degree to which, in the instances discussed at least, group and state interests dominated decisions on the federal level of Australian politics.

Mr. Wildavsky's study deals with the constitutional referendum arising from proposals of the Bruce-Page National-Country party coalition government to deal with the problems of industrial unrest. These proposals involved the enlarging of the jurisdiction of the federal system of arbitration courts, by removing the constitutional limitation which confined the power of those courts to interstate disputes. Despite the fact that the bills setting in motion the amending process were passed with the support of the opposition Parliamentary Labor party, the ranks of Labor outside of Parliament were deeply split over the proposals. In New South Wales the opposition was particularly intense, for in that state the Labor party prized its forty-four hour week. To increase the jurisdiction of the federal arbitration system, which still operated with the forty-eight hour week, seemed to threaten the shorter working period, and in New South Wales, Labor politicians and union leaders were

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virtually unanimous in their hostility to the suggested amendments. In Victoria, the majority of Labor and union leaders apparently favored the proposals, though somewhat half-heartedly. Certainly there was little nation-wide evidence of Labor's vaunted solidarity, despite the fact that the amendments were in line with the Labor party's traditional position favoring the enlargement of federal powers, and were akin to ideas once sponsored by the Labor party government of Andrew Fisher.

The pattern of group conflict within the ranks of Labor was paralleled by similar stresses within the pastoral, commercial and industrial groups which usually supported the Bruce-Page ministry. As Mr. Wildavsky shows, local and immediate interests exerted greater power than did traditional attitudes, party solidarity, or any concern for the national interest.

Something of the same measure of confusion—of clashing intra-group and intra-party conflicts—emerges in Miss Carboch's study of the downfall in Parliament and subsequent electoral defeat of the Bruce-Page government in 1929. Though further proposals of this ministry for changes in the system of industrial arbitration—proposals in most ways directly counter to those advocated in 1926—seemed to be the main issue in the election, Miss Carboch seeks to show that such a welter and confusion of factors entered into the contest that it was doubtful whether the issue emerged in the election at all.

If the conclusions of the authors of these two studies, that politics makes strange bedfellows and that sometimes the issues on which elections are fought seem to be unidentifiable, come as no surprise to observers of the American political scene, they do have an element of novelty in Australia. There the apparent existence of a Left versus Right party conflict has tended to offer a simplified and all-embracing explanation of political behavior and to obscure the rôles of pressure groups within each side. Further, there has been a lack of just such studies as those of Mr. Wildavsky and Miss Carboch. More of them will make possible a richer interpretation of the Australian political scene.

These studies are based largely on parliamentary debates and other published materials, though Miss Carboch did have access to the William M. Hughes papers in the custody of Professor Fitzhardinge of the Australian National University. Australian political leaders do not yet seem to have either the habit or the facilities for the accumulation of their correspondence, and students are still substantially dependent upon published sources.

DONALD C. GORDON

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

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Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt. By DAVID S. LANDES. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.—xvi, 354 pp. $6.00.

The core of this excellent book is a story centered on three characters. First, there was Edouard Dervieu, one of the many thousands of Europeans who flocked to Egypt in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a sanguine speculator and promoter of schemes. Secondly, his Paris correspondent, Alfred André, a leading merchant banker and perfect representative of the conservative French Protestant *haute finance*. Thirdly, there was his client, the Khedive Ismail, one of the numerous Middle Eastern potentates who set out to Westernize their country and in the process accumulated huge debts which led to their undoing. Professor Landes has had access to the voluminous and very frank correspondence between André and Dervieu and has supplemented it with extensive research in the British and French archives. Moreover, although unable to use the Arabic and Turkish archives in Egypt, he has drawn upon all available secondary sources based on these and other records. The result is the most interesting case study of Western enterprise in the Middle East, written in a very attractive and vivacious style.

But that is only part of what the book has to offer. In order to put the Dervieu episode in its proper setting, Landes has two introductory chapters. The first provides an excellent short account of the rise and development of merchant banking and investment banking, with particular emphasis on the ties of kinship linking the members of financially influential minority groups, such as the Jews, French and Swiss Protestants, Quakers, and Greeks, while the second chapter describes the Bull Market of the 1860's. And in unfolding his story, he gives a very interesting account of the development of the Egyptian economy during that decade, a subject which has been almost totally neglected by economic historians. Finally, there is a thoughtful conclusion from which the following passage may be quoted:

> More than anything, more even than the enormous material costs of imperialism, it was the imposition of inferior social and moral status that shaped the reaction of the Egyptian to the European. Actually, the one implies the other: material exploitation is difficult if not impossible without the sanction of a double set of values and a corresponding double code of behaviour; if they were not there to begin with, the exploiter would have to create them. The fact remains, however, that in the many-sided impact of imperialism, it is the injury to self-respect that hurts most. It is the resentment aroused by spiritual humiliation that gives rise to an irrational response to rational ex-

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ploitation. The apparently unreasonable, and certainly unprofitable, resistance of many of the world's underdeveloped countries today to Western business enterprise makes sense only in this context.

Occasionally, but only very occasionally, the author's lack of first-hand knowledge of Egypt shows itself. Thus, it is not true that the fellahin live in "poverty unmatched even in India and China" (p. 318); Egypt's population under Mohammad Ali was probably over three million, not two (p. 77); the "uncertain monetary unit" of page 332 is most probably the tallari, or fifth of an Egyptian pound; and one might quote one or two other slips. But these are very minor criticisms of what is an extremely valuable contribution to the study of the economic history of Europe and, still more, to that of the Middle East.

CHARLES ISSAWI
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Iraq. By STEPHEN HEMSLEY LONGRIGG and FRANK STOAKES. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959.—264 pp. $6.50.

Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. By GEORGE L. HARRIS and others. New Haven, Human Relations Area Files Press, 1958.—xiii, 350 pp. $7.00.

The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957. By FAHIM I. QUBAIN. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958.—xxi, 277 pp. $6.00.

These studies constitute a welcome addition to the scanty literature on Iraq. Inevitably, all three cover large stretches of the same ground and there is considerable overlapping between them, but there are also important differences in both objectives and approach. Longrigg and Stoakes, two Englishmen with long and intimate knowledge of Iraq, give a thoughtful, balanced and well-written general account of the country's past and present. Harris, who worked with a team of American and Iraqi scholars, has a more incisive approach; more questions of interest to the social scientist are asked and more aspects of social behavior explored; moreover, his book contains a useful statistical appendix. Qubain, an American scholar of Arab origin, has written the most detailed study so far available on economic and social developments in Iraq since the Development Board was established in 1950.

All three books were in the press when the Iraqi revolution broke out on 14 July 1958 and, although minor modifications were made in the proofs of the Longrigg book, it is best to regard them as a summing up of the *ancien régime.* On the whole, they are eulogistic, which is just as well since in politics it is more commonly true that *de mortuis nihil nisi malum.* Whatever new system emerges in Iraq is surely going to claim the credit for many achieve-

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ments for which the groundwork—and indeed several of the upper floors—was laid down under the monarchy. For, in its last few years, the monarchy made good use of its oil revenues. Huge dams have once and for all controlled the floods which used to devastate the country every three or four years and are providing vast quantities of water. Irrigation and drainage canals are making it possible to expand cultivation greatly. An impressive network of roads has been laid down, and many factories have been built or ordered. Nor has the social field been neglected. The school population rose from under 10,000 in 1923 and 131,000 in 1945 to 439,000 in 1956; there was a vast expansion in medical facilities and treatment; incidence of some major diseases, notably malaria, has been sharply reduced (Qubain, chapters 10-12); and a study of production and import statistics shows a rapid increase in the consumption of such staples as wheat, sugar, tea, cloth and kerosene. Altogether, there is every reason to believe that the country was far better off than it had ever been and that it was making rapid progress in all directions.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that when the revolution did break out, not one hand was raised in defense of the old régime. One might give the Tocquevillean explanation that revolutions take place precisely when conditions are improving. But one can also point to elements of weakness in the régime mentioned in the books under review. There was the rising cost of living, especially during the war years, which together with a regressive tax system, and a certain amount of white-collar underemployment, hit fixed incomes and hurt the middle class (Longrigg, pp. 140-42, 178). There was the widespread feeling that very little of the benefit was reaching the peasant masses and too much the landlords (Harris, p. 249, and Qubain, chapter 7), and there was much criticism of the Development Board both justified (*ibid.*) and ill-informed. The Baghdad Pact aroused intense hostility (Longrigg, p. 225). The government tended to "react to all opposition as western governments react to subversion" (Harris, p. 83) and so forced all opponents underground, where they joined extremist groups of Right or Left (*ibid.* and Longrigg, p. 242). After the abortive revolt of 1952, it became obvious that the army was the "ultimate arbiter" (Longrigg, p. 243) and observers began to wonder whether it would not follow the Egyptian example. The issue became: "immediate reform or revolution" (Qubain, p. 261), and revolution won. And "an authoritarian government such as Iraq's, once infiltrated, provides a starting point for swift transition to dictatorship, whether Communist or other" (Harris, p. 85).

CHARLES ISSAWI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate. By STEPHEN HEMSLEY LONGRIGG. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958.—xi, 404 pp. 42*s.*; $6.75.

As far as the reviewer is aware, this is the first inclusive history of the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon. The conditions under which these Mandates were established were most unfavorable for their orderly development under the noble principles of the mandatory system of government for dependent areas.

The author does not belittle the obstacles which the French faced in this Mandate. The territory of the old Turkish Ottoman Empire, having suffered from misgovernment and oppression, made poor soil into which to plant the Mandate. Both British and French made promises to the Arabs, which they failed to redeem. The French bitterly resented the expansion of British interests in lands in which they felt they had a traditionally recognized claim to exert their "civilizing mission". And the Arabs refused to accept the Mandate as a valid substitute for independence.

The Mandatory Power increased some of these difficulties, and created some of its own making. The Mandate suffered from a mixture of expert and inexpert administrators with unhappy results. The distinguished General Weygand was an excellent High Commissioner, but General Sarrail exhibited opposite qualities, as did General Dentz, a Vichy appointee, and M. Helleu at the end. The fragmentation of the territory further strained the patience of the populace. The divisions not only were political in character, but were on strict confessional lines as well. Religious feelings ran deep, as the remark of a French Consul revealed in saying that "at home it would be fatal for me to go to Mass, in Syria fatal to keep away."

For generations the French people and their governments had been so dominated by the idea of the priority of their interests in Syria and the Lebanon, that they believed the people were equally committed to France and French culture. They were gravely mistaken, as the report of the King-Crane Commission in 1919, sponsored by President Wilson, clearly showed. The painstaking work of the Commission, as it moved from village to village to ascertain the will of the people, revealed that they opposed a Mandate, but if necessary they would accept the United States, or Great Britain, but in no case France. The Mandate was given to France! The consequences were disastrous, for the French refused to believe the clear meaning of the King-Crane recommendations. They labored under the delusion that the Arabs had an affection for and a sense of gratitude toward France which just did not exist.

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Both the French and the British had to their discredit through these years a trail of broken promises and resorts to violence, to lead the Syrians and Lebanese to mitigate the harshness of their attitudes.

The most cruel period of the Mandate was at its end, when the French were driven out of Paris in 1940, and out of much of their homeland by the Nazis, and established their capital at Vichy. The Free French movement under the then intractable General de Gaulle set up a rival government in North Africa, and brought under its aegis Syria and Lebanon. The French civil war extended to the mandated territory, resulting in Vichy French fighting Free French, and equally tragic the British in the Levant in bitter conflict with their erstwhile French allies in the general war. This new confusion of conflicts deepened the tensions and jealousies with which the French had for some time viewed "the obsessive myth of British designs in Syria" (p. 406), and ascribed mob action in the mandated territory to British agents. Further, the effect of these misunderstandings was to increase the bitterness of Arab nationalism.

There was much untruth, according to Brigadier Longrigg, in many of the charges heaped upon the French in the conduct of the Mandate. The character of the times, the too-frequent failures of high officials, and the impatient course of Arab nationalism combined to doom the Mandate to failure in the political field. In the social and cultural areas of life, there was much in which the Mandatory could take pride. But the undue concern of the French for their prestige was definitely another drawback in the situation.

This volume contains five useful Appendixes, the last one of which is an excellent and extended Bibliographical Note, and in addition three sketch maps of the area. The scholarly and impartial character of this book is indeed to be commended as an important contribution to a balanced understanding of the Middle East.

EDGAR J. FISHER

AMHERST, VA.

The Pathans, 550 B.C.—A.D. 1957. By OLAF CAROE. New York, St Martin's Press, 1959.—xxii, 521 pp. $12.50.

The hardy tribes living in the northwestern mountains of Pakistan have earned a well-deserved fame for their bravery, chivalry, independence and hospitality. Their tribal structure of society has prevented their integration into any higher form of cohesion, and their love of freedom and independence has made of them doughty warriors. The area which forms their homeland is generally forbidding and stern, supplying them with a terrain that makes it

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easier for them to defend it against all empire builders and conquerors, who have often been content to establish control over those fertile valleys that were important to them for maintaining their lines of communications. Whenever the tribes have been agitated and have seen fit to make common cause against authority, they have come within reach of annihilating it. Mostly they have failed in doing so because they find it difficult to sustain a long war. Moreover, their internecine jealousies break out, which the conqueror finds it easy to exploit.

Despite their shortcomings—and what people can be free from them?—there is much in the character and the way of life of the tribes that is romantic and also excites admiration. Even those who have fought them and tried to subjugate them have often come to like them and have developed a respect for their manly traits. They have by no means lost either their good qualities or their importance; but they pose a challenge to all the statesmanship that Pakistan possesses, because the integration of such a people into a national state requires patience as well as tact. Pakistan's task has not been made any lighter by the attitude of her neighbor, Afghanistan, which has developed ambitions in the area since the departure of the British. The causes of Pakistan's success hitherto in her efforts to integrate the tribes become intelligible from Sir Olaf's work. The book, therefore, is of considerable importance for students of the area. It has been written in an interesting and extremely readable style and manages to include plenty of useful information on many aspects of the history of this romantic people.

The author was the governor of the North-West Frontier Province during the last two years of British rule in the subcontinent. He thus had opportunities of personal observation which are not easily available to every scholar. Moreover, before he was appointed governor he had been responsible for India's foreign relations as a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council and in this assignment also, the relations with the tribes formed an important segment of his duties. He thus speaks with authority on many topics. Naturally he writes with obvious nostalgia for the days when British empire builders established and expanded their influence in the area. His history, therefore, is highly selective and the student who handles the book without supplementing his knowledge from other sources will find himself carried away by Sir Olaf's enthusiasm. The British success in dealing with the tribes was not as uninterrupted or smooth as the unwary reader would be led to imagine. Sir Olaf uses the efforts of Akbar and Aurangzeb as a foil to set off the measure of British

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success. In this and in some other historical interpretations, such as the numerous assumptions built upon the identity of the Ghilzais with the Khaljis despite the correctness of the main thesis, the professional historian will find good reason to be critical.

I. H. QURESHI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Land Reform in Japan. By R. P. DORE. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959.—xix, 510 pp. 55*s.*; $8.80.

The title of Dore's study is misleadingly modest, for it deals with much more than "just" the land tenure reform in Japan. It deals with the agricultural sector of Japan's economy, the social structure of her villages, and the relationship of her political structure and problems to her agricultural and social problems and policies as well. The author is as much—if not more—concerned with such non-economic matters as village politics, youth groups, and social control in the hamlet as he is with the legislation and administration and the purely economic consequences of the land reform movement per se.

On the basis of this broad coverage and on the basis of sources of information utilized, tools of analysis employed, and judgment exercised in the interpretation of the data, the study warrants very high praise. It seems bound to become at least a frequently used if not a standard work not only in the relatively narrow field encompassed by its title, but in the broader fields of rural sociology and political-economic development as well.

Dore can use the Japanese language, and his study rests heavily on written primary sources of information, interviews, and personal experiences accumulated during two separate eighteen-month periods in Japan between 1950 and 1956. He has obviously weighed most of the data, analyses and interpretations available in both the Japanese and English languages in terms of comprehensiveness, reliability and usefulness and has constructed a more up-to-date and in some ways more objective and more comprehensive interpretation of agrarian developments in Japan prior to, during and after World War II than hitherto available.

The types of analysis employed by the author in the course of using these sources of information may be described in summary fashion by saying that Dore is both a macro-social scientist and a micro-social scientist. He treats the economic, political and

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social aspects of the movement for land tenure reform from both a national and a farm family point of view. With an ease that seems to be almost, though not quite, effortless, he turns back and forth from explanations of large tables of statistics dealing with national developments to case studies at the family, village and prefecture levels, points up the relationship of each to the others, and uses all to paint a balanced picture of Japanese society undergoing the stresses and strains of rapid change.

The author has approached his subject with both impartiality and good judgment. Unlike some other writers, he appears to have had neither an axe to grind nor a superior to please. Dore's writing reflects a sympathetic understanding of the problems of Japanese peasants as people, and their individual and collective relationship to the national economy of Japan. If it can be said that he leans to one side, it is to the side of regarding people as human beings and not merely as component parts of a table of statistics.

In a study that encompasses so broad a subject in approximately 500 pages, there are bound to be a number of matters about which the author and reviewers may disagree or quibble. Dore's work is no exception. For example, he states: "The post-war censuses show a good deal of under-reporting of cultivated areas. . . . Altogether, more than half a million *cho* [1.23 million acres] 'disappeared' from official figures or over a tenth of the total area, a fact which must also have its effect on the statistics . . . [which concern the immediate effects of the land reform]" (p. 182). The matter is then dismissed. My own research *(The Pattern of Land Tenure Reform in East Asia After World War II* [1958], pp. 42-44) leads me to believe that it is probable that as many as roughly 900,000 *cho* (2.20 million acres) disappeared and that tenancy was reduced by 65 per cent, 1947 through 1950, and not by 76 per cent, as the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and SCAP claim. Of the total of 2.20 million acres, about 1.19 million acres appear to have been landlord-operated land and 1.01 million tenant-operated land. It seems to me that the "disappearance" of 15 per cent of the cultivated and 15 per cent of the tenanted lands of Japan between 1935 and 1947—when the total number of households had increased by 19 per cent, the number of farm households had increased by 7 per cent, and there had been widespread shortages of food—calls for a far more detailed analysis than the author offers. It is simply too important to an evaluation of the success—or lack of it—of the land reform program to be thus virtually ignored.

Other constructive criticisms could be cited as well. It suffices to note the opinion offered by Professor Seiichi Tobata, former Director of the Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture

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and Forestry of Japan. He says: "This is one of the best books on Japanese agriculture written by a foreigner since the war . . ." (p. xii). It is easy to concur in such a judgment; it is eminently defendable.

SIDNEY KLEIN

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business. By EDWARD S. MASON. New York, Fordham University Press, 1958.—x, 87 pp. $2.50.

The Strategy of Economic Development. By ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1958.—xiii, 217 pp. $4.50.

In the current literature on economic development, the great debate between the planners and the defenders of the free market is almost matched by the schisms within the group of planners. The present two volumes exhibit many of these debates and schisms, even though they take off from approximately the same standpoint, which is expressed by Professor Mason as: "The really good arguments for planning lie in the obvious inadequacies of the market, and the really good arguments for the market rest on the deficiencies of planning" (p. 54). Both draw upon their own experience as economic advisers, Professor Mason in Pakistan and Professor Hirschman in Colombia. The analyses and conclusions, however, depart markedly, chiefly by way of the different treatments of equilibrium and of maximizing.

Professor Mason's book, which consists—in somewhat expanded form—of the Millar Lectures delivered at Fordham University in October 1958, begins with a broad survey of the present economic rôles of government and private business in the less-developed countries. He proceeds to a skillful review of much of the relevant technical literature, dealing with both the history and the theory of the developmental rôle of the state, especially in nineteenth-century Britain, Japan and America. Finally he comes to a deft application of this literature to recent experience, especially in Asia.

While the book does not present new research findings, nor does it propose a new theory, it is an urbane, perceptive and many-sided study. Particularly striking is the presentation of the analytic case for a large governmental rôle, as against the actual handicaps of central planning and administration. Professor Mason is ready to concede the limitations of traditional Western theory regarding the individual and the firm, as well as the special character of the experience on which that theory was based. Yet he is not prepared

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to give up the principle of "economic calculation"—which he finds sadly lacking in the five-year planning of India and other countries —although he recognizes the limitations of such calculations amid large structural changes in an economy. Thus he seeks to reconcile the orthodox economist's concern over operating wastes, with the developer's concern over wasted potentialities.

Professor Hirschman's orientation is more radical. His book is, in fact, the first full-length formulation of the doctrine of "unbalanced growth" which has recently appeared in several different forms, in opposition to merely numerical planning and mechanical interpretations of history. Hirschman finds the principal obstacle to development in the failure to mobilize real but latent resources, and correspondingly he stresses various mechanisms for "induced investment". These include the interactions between "social overhead capital" and "directly productive activities", as well as the vertical influences among industries which he calls "forward and backward linkages". Thus he locates the essence of the developmental process in the response of persons—both private and official persons—to emerging "opportunities", which are disequilibrium situations; and indeed he speaks of "development as a chain of "disequilibria".

This is a thoroughly dynamic view (in contrast to those "growth models" which merely introduce a variable t for "time" into their essentially tautologous equations); and it is thoroughly behavioral (in contrast to purely normative approaches). Furthermore, it is Professor Hirschman's view that "balanced growth" is both impossible and undesirable—in contrast with Professor Mason's view (pp. 53-54 of his book) that "balanced growth" is both possible and desirable, but unlikely!

Hirschman's "strategy" calls for the governments of retarded countries, as well as the sources of foreign capital assistance, to initiate developmental opportunities and pressures where they are lacking, and also to stand ready to alleviate these pressures if and when they become too heavy. But aggregate, predetermined "plans" are considered unwise, and likely to fail unless pushed through by brutal totalitarian force.

This doctrine is a powerful contribution to the theory of development as a process. It is a model which, in the present reviewer's opinion, fits a number of historical cases very well; and it suggests a settled policy of "commitment" in foreign aid, in place of the present policy of providing what we can spare.

On the other hand, the feature of the disequilibrium doctrine which remains troublesome is its extreme departure from criteria; or, rather, its subordination of the criteria of balance and of economizing to the supreme criterion of effectiveness. Very likely this is

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the only way to get on with the job of development at present, but it leaves the developing nation with no way of discriminating in advance between a "good" disequilibrium (oriented to development) and a "bad" one (oriented to disorder and waste). What is still needed here is a technique for evaluating, with regard to development but in advance of it, the degree and character of desirable disequilibrium.

EDWIN P. REUBENS

THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

Social Mobility in Industrial Society. By SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET and REINHARD BENDIX. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959.—xxi, 309 pp. $5.00.

This illuminating work is the product of more than ten years of study by two eminent social scientists and not inconsiderable staffs. Professors Lipset and Bendix, moreover, enhanced the value of their own contributions by calling upon the literature of social mobility produced by other social scientists in the United States and in Europe and Asia. By using what they call "secondary analysis" of data collected for primary purposes other than their own they have succeeded in deepening the meaning of their particular primary research. By going outside the United States for comparative data they have also succeeded in broadening what has been largely a parochial field.

This work is comprehensive, sophisticated, up-to-date. Nevertheless, this book has certain defects of its qualities. Its comprehensiveness is achieved in part by the pasting together of a number of articles—considerably revised and enlarged—already published in learned journals. Its sophistication sometimes results in stultifying overcaution, sometimes in the plausible rationalization of procedures whose product corresponds with the authors' point of view and the denigration of equally defensible (or indefensible) procedures whose product is less acceptable to them. Its timeliness, in turn, is achieved at the cost of consistent historical depth. These defects are as much the fault of the authors' methods and materials as of the authors themselves. They have usually done the most that could be done with the data available to them; part of the unintended illumination of their work is the light that it throws on the difficulties and limitations of rigorous social science lost among the multitudinous and shifting variables of human life, human society, and human values.

The authors have addressed themselves principally to three major

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themes: (1) the extent of vertical mobility—downward as well as upward—in industrial society; (2) the different rates of vertical mobility at different stages of industrialization; and (3) "the sources of social mobility in an industrial society." Their conclusions, baldly stated, are (1) that vertical mobility in the "open" society of the United States has been no greater than in the "closed" societies of western Europe and Japan; (2) that "the rate of social mobility" becomes high only *after* an industrializing society has reached a relatively high level of economic expansion; and (3) that the sources of social mobility are psychological as well as social and that even "the relation between social mobility and other features of the social structure" (not to speak of the relation between social mobility and individual psychology) remains obscure.

The authors' first conclusion, which they call "startling", is based essentially on the proportions of sons of "manual workers" who rose to "nonmanual" occupations in different countries. This mode of measurement has the advantages of "economy" and ease of comparison, but its "efficiency" may well be questioned. In considering their second conclusion, the authors acknowledge more than once that the rate and meaning of social mobility may be significantly affected by "two world wars and the political upheavals of totalitarianism." But their discussion is based almost exclusively on the more readily measurable "expanding opportunities in a politically stable society." As for the sources of social mobility, the authors simply recommend—with commendable if questionable optimism—more research of the type that has brought them as far as they have come. But how far have they come? On page 112, for example, they make the dubious acknowledgment that "even the concept of *social* mobility [italics theirs] is ambiguous." What they most likely mean is that it is difficult if not impossible to define this concept in such a way that statistical analysis of its facets might be made manageable or justifiable. But that is true of most other meaningful concepts too. Rigorous quantification requires a fencing in of concepts whose value to social analysis by other methods stems from the insight they afford beyond the statistical pale.

This is a substantial and useful book enhanced by much meaningful discussion of themes impossible to elaborate in so short a review. Its able authors show clearly the possibilities of the methods to which they are committed. By doing so they also show the limitations of their kind of work. Social science needs statistical analysis; but "society" will remain more than a statistical subject.

WILLIAM MILLER

RIDGEFIELD, CONN.

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Labor Union Theories in America: Background and Development. By MARK PERLMAN. Evanston and White Plains, Row, Peterson and Company, 1958.—xv, 313 pp. $6.00.

As Unions Mature: An Analysis of the Evolution of American Unionism. By RICHARD A. LESTER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958.—xi, 171 pp. $3.75.

American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918. By MARC KARSON. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1958.—xv, 358 pp. $6.50.

Since its beginnings in the early nineteenth century, the controversy which has raged over the rôle and impact of labor unions in our society has been influenced for better or worse by the more systematic interpretations of the American labor movement contributed by reflective partisans and academic observers. Professor Perlman's study provides an extremely useful summary and analysis of some of the more explicit theories about labor unions as they developed in this country up to the Great Depression. He finds it possible to arrange theories and theorists into five groups according to the emphasis given different aspects of unionism: (1) the moral (Richard T. Ely, Father John A. Ryan); (2) the political and revolutionary (Daniel DeLeon, William Trautman, William Haywood, William Z. Foster, Eugene Debs, Max Hayes, Norman Ware); (3) the psychological (Carleton Parker, Thorstein Veblen, Robert Hoxie, Frank Tannenbaum); (4) the economic (George E. Barnett); (5) the democratic or "jurisprudential" (Henry C. Adams, John R. Commons, Selig Perlman).

It perhaps may strike some as unfortunate that, as is apparent from the names listed, Perlman has restricted his survey to those theorists who, for one reason or another, accorded positive social value to unions as organizations. In a work devoted to "the major explanations of American unionism" (p. vii), neglect of unfavorable interpretations of the labor movement may be conducive to an (unwarranted) impression that the intellectual content of anti-unionism in America has been at a level too low to deserve analysis. Some attention to the theories of those who viewed trade unions as morally bad, politically ominous, psychologically harmful, economically unwise and legally iniquitous might have illumined more clearly the ideological components underlying the long and bitter history of industrial conflict in this country. Nevertheless, on its own terms Perlman's study stands as a valuable contribution in delineating the theoretical notions of those "defunct economists" and "academic scribblers of a few years back" which in the con-

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temporary scene continue to influence the actions of both "practical men" and "madmen in authority" (to use Lord Keynes's vivid phrases).

Professor Lester, with his analysis of trade-union evolution in America, carries forward and enhances the tradition of responsible scholarship by students of American labor. His objective is a theory of union development which will provide the "evolutionary perspective" that he feels is "necessary for intelligent long-run planning with respect to collective bargaining, labor legislation, and national economic policy" (p. 3). The analytic framework employed by Professor Lester seeks to separate from short-term swings the long-run trends growing out of "processes of internal union development" and "of external integration". The former are the product of "dynamic disturbances and strains (such as organizational expansion, increased competition and technological change)" and "stability-restoring influences, which include factors contributing to long-run trends" (p. 111). The central conclusion he reaches, after a masterful survey of the theory and practice of unionism both here and abroad, is that the "formative stage of American unionism is now largely completed. . . . American unionism has been maturing, and the features of institutional middle age should be increasingly evident in the years ahead" (pp. 154-155). Among these features of maturation he cites a "psychological ageing" of union organization, increased centralization of authority at the expense of local democracy, and a general decline in union militancy associated with the diminishing differences between union and management and other groups in the community.

The persuasive manner in which Lester marshals the evidence to support these conclusions, together with the wealth of insights into the distinguishing characteristics of the American industrial relations system which his analysis provides, makes this book worthy of close study by those seriously concerned with labor problems. Not the least of its contributions, however, may be the by-product of the discussion and controversy its central thesis is bound to provoke. There is cause for reflection in the fact that a case for "union maturity" similar to the one Lester makes could have been made for the AFL unionism of the 'twenties. Yet, within a remarkably brief period, as Professor Galenson has recently emphasized,[1] the "entire social structure of the country, its basic power relationships, were altered fundamentally" and the United States was "suddenly . . . propelled into the ranks of those nations in which the voice of organized labor counted." A theory which

[1] Walter Galenson, "1937: The Turning Point for American Labor" in *Festskrift til Frederik Zeuthen* (Copenhagen, 1958), pp. 107-117.

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characterizes such a fundamental change as a "short-run" dynamic disturbance (p. 112) may appear too "long-run" for comfort. In general, one might wish that Lester did not find it necessary to rely so heavily on the extrapolation of "trends" which have so often in the past proved to be notoriously bad tools for policy-making precisely at those times of change and upheaval when the need for intelligent and effective policy has been greatest.

The third book under review is intended to contribute to current policy discussions by aiding "people inside and outside the unions [to] acquire a deeper understanding of labor's political history" (p. ix). The focus of Professor Karson's efforts is to correct what he feels are mistaken impressions concerning the AFL which have been perpetuated by Professor Philip Taft and others. In his preface Karson lists the "newer generalizations" warranted by his investigations: (1) Gompers' leadership and character had "limitations and shortcomings . . . as well as strengths"; (2) the AFL was not nonpartisan but supported the Democrats from 1906 to 1918; (3) the AFL was racist in its support of restrictions on Asian immigration and its toleration of discrimination against Negroes; (4) American imperialism in Latin America and Asia met with AFL indifference; and (5) the Roman Catholic Church was a "vital force" accounting for the political moderation and generally anti-socialist position of American labor unions. Without the space for documentation, a reviewer runs more than the usual risk of doing an injustice in expressing a generally adverse reaction to a book. Suffice it to say that at least one reader found these generalizations either not so "new" or not so "true". Karson's analysis of the substantial amount of material he presents is deficient in important respects and generally unconvincing.

MARK W. LEISERSON

YALE UNIVERSITY

The King's War, 1641-1647. By C. V. WEDGWOOD. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1959.—703 pp. $7.50.

The King's Peace, the first volume in Miss Wedgwood's history of the Great Rebellion, ended with the passage of the Grand Remonstrance in the early hours of November 23, 1641:

> It was not five years [concluded Miss Wedgwood], since these three kingdoms [England, Ireland, Scotland] had seemed the most tranquil in Europe and their sovereign the happiest King in Christendom. The tranquility of the kingdoms, the happiness and the power of their King had proved to be illusions. In Scotland a formidable faction, controlling and directing the fervour of the Kirk, had bereft the King of all but the semblance of sovereignty. In Ireland the imposed framework of

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> government had been shattered by the popular rising. In England the King had pledged himself not to dissolve a Parliament which had destroyed his judicial powers, taken over the management of his finances and awaited his return with an indictment such as had never been presented to a reigning English sovereign. The crucial conflict had begun between the King and John Pym—the conflict for the ultimate source of all authority, the power of the sword (pp. 484-85).

From this dramatic point *The King's War* carries the story to January 20, 1647, when the captive King was surrendered to the Parliamentary forces by the Scots.

Miss Wedgwood is primarily concerned with a narrative of the events of those five years. She deliberately makes no attempt to assess the various interpretations of historians of the causes, nature and effects of the First Civil War. Nor does she try to simplify the story of the war. It "is immensely complicated," she writes, "and . . . I have tried to tell it in such a way as to bring out the hourly urgency and confusion through which contemporaries lived" (p. 11). In this she has succeeded. We see how in England, with Scotland and Ireland already in rebellion, both sides drifted into a war which very few on either side wanted or expected. Not many of those who originally supported Parliament were willing to go as far in the reduction of the monarchy as were John Pym and Oliver Cromwell. Many Cavaliers were disturbed lest a royal victory mean the triumph of popery in Ireland and, at the very least, its toleration in England. As the war progresses the author carries us back and forth among the three kingdoms and into the complexities of local campaigns—campaigns complicated by local feuds and local loyalties—which seemed as important to contemporaries as the great and more important battles such as Marston Moor or Naseby.

The story is told from the King's side or, as the author declares (p. 13), "rather as the defeat of the King than the victory of Parliament." Thus Cromwell is not the hero; his predominant rôle is reserved for Miss Wedgwood's next volume. But the incurably and incredibly optimistic Charles is not the hero either. If there is one it is Prince Rupert, who emerges not just as a dashing leader of cavalry but as a soldier of real understanding and capacity.

Miss Wedgwood's narrative, with its emphasis on the contemporary viewpoint, has much to recommend it. It would have been helpful, however, if she had paused from time to time and given us, with the aid of maps (there are not nearly enough in the book), an estimate of the situation. Also in a book so largely concerned with war one might expect some account of weapons and tactics. But to retell a story told in such detail by Gardiner took courage. Miss Wedgwood's wide knowledge of the sources (many

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of them unknown to Gardiner), her grasp of the monographic material produced since 1901 and a superb literary style justify her temerity. *The King's War* is an admirable book.

BASIL D. HENNING

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County. By MERLE CURTI with the assistance of ROBERT DANIEL, SHAW LIVERMORE, JR., JOSEPH VAN HISE, and MARGARET W. CURTI. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959.—x, 483 pp. $8.50.

This volume is a unique contribution to historical literature of the American frontier. Its purpose is to test the validity of the Turner frontier hypothesis objectively by means of both traditional historical and adapted social science methods. The control area is Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, which is situated on the Mississippi River immediately south of the pine woods frontier. That county presented to frontiersmen a combination of prairie and hardwoods similar to the oak opening areas to the south and in southern Michigan. All possible source and secondary materials, including the manuscript census returns for 1850-1880, were canvassed by Merle Curti and his assistants. So far as was possible the data were entered on punch cards and, guided by careful work papers, processed by counting and computing machines. All phases of the historical experience of 1849-1880 are analyzed, with especial reference to the several aspects of the Turner thesis. The findings are presented in multiple form: historical-biographical narrative, topical analyses, and statistical tables. Perhaps because Turner was most familiar with Trempealeau's type of frontier, which progressed from fur-trading to speculator organization and exploitation, to incidental lumbering, agriculture, and village-town development—lacking estate builders but experiencing an influx of European immigrants with a consequent change in ethnic character—the analyses validate his hypothesis to an extraordinary degree. Curti regards Trempealeau as one of many types of frontiers, and suggests wisely that others be analyzed similarly. His approach is genetic. Frontier primitivism is taken for granted. He analyzes the history of the Trempealeau frontiers in the light of the ideology and aspirations of the settlers and the larger setting of the era. The chief foci of interest are acculturation, the democratizing process, and Americanization under the influence of "free land" and the leadership élite; standards, statutes, and institutions introduced from earlier settled areas, the East, and Europe; and economic and political

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developments. The analyses validate the influence of "free land" upon thought, economic practice, elevation of farmers to farm laborers, partial economic equalization, and developing democracy. The democratizing and Americanizing influence of the governmental-statutory-party framework, stimulated by conscious application of democratic ideals, is also established. The Jeffersonian and frontier influences upon cultural striving are depicted and the rôle of rival religious denominations defined. The coverage is amazingly complete. The incidental contribution to local history is voluminous. The treatise is of obvious value to specialists in frontier history and theory, and to students of historical method and theory. It establishes the utility of social science techniques of data analysis for economic and social history. The high objectivity of the presentation demonstrates that this method facilitates historical objectivity, provided that it enters into original problem definition and work paper drafting. Curti's frank exploration of this possibility despite prior commitment to present-minded subjective relativism, and his unflinching demonstration that objective history can be written in terms of the era when the phenomena studied occurred, are most commendatory. So is the integrity that describes the contributions that the several assistants made to the completed volume. This supplies a needed precedent for director-guided projects of historical research, in which hitherto the large contributions of assistants have been frequently ignored by the director's avidity for exclusive authorship.

CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER

ASSOCIATE FELLOW
BERKELEY COLLEGE
YALE UNIVERSITY

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BOOK NOTES

With a single exception, the essays in *The Charm of Politics and Other Essays in Political Criticism*, by R. H. S. Crossman (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959; xi, 243 pp. $4.00), appeared in the *New Statesman* which mingles sharp, Left-wing political comment with first-class literary criticism. Like most good reviews, these are excuses for essays, opportunities for the author to share his opinions and convert his readers. In his mastery of this form, Mr. Crossman has few equals even among the gifted *New Statesman* regulars. He is erudite: after all he was an established Oxford don before the lure of politics seduced him away from academic pursuits. In one of the most appealing scenes in this collection, he recalls how H. A. L. Fisher, a great academic and a great political figure, advised him to undertake a political career while he was young. He is impatient of class distinction. Tory snobbishness rather than Tory politics offends him most. He writes stylishly and provocatively. A sample is the beginning of his review of Burns's *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox:* "Must a great political leader always be a great hypocrite? Was the essential difference between Disraeli and Gladstone that whereas both were humbugs, Disraeli knew that he was and Gladstone didn't?" He is an iconoclast, never so happy as when he is deflating some large reputation. By now Toynbee-baiting is a popular sport, but it was 1947 when Mr. Crossman wrote these pointed words: "Judged by any scientific or historical standard, *A Study of History* is a monstrous aberration." His judgments are certain, swift and unqualified: "Calvin Coolidge was a mean, cantankerous and insignificant man"; "Churchill is not a complex character"; Dr. Adenauer "is a superb example not of the golden but of the silver mean, a personality which never wears out because it has never exceeded its narrow limitations"; and R. A. Butler "conscientiously objects to Socialism because he positively believes in the principle of inequality." And so the verdicts go, plausible, incisive, even indulgent when the subject is a friend like Earl Attlee. It might seem that not many of the secrets of the human personality are hidden from Mr. Crossman. Such an impression is wrong, for he is a man baffled and charmed by a mystery, the inexplicable appeal of the parliamentary life. As he describes it, the life of the backbencher is without power (it says something both about Mr. Crossman and

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English politics that he does not consider power an important political motive), without influence, and without amenity. What on earth makes men, important in their own right, deliberately choose to be treated like schoolboys? Although the answer is not in this collection, there must be one, for Mr. Crossman shows no signs of returning to Oxford.—ROBERT LEKACHMAN, Barnard College.

The world's most venerable club meets in a chamber paneled with Shropshire oak treated with iron sulfate, whose floor measures 68 by 45½ feet. Here among others gather 66 Conservative and 27 Labour barristers, 96 trade-union nominees, 12 heirs to peerages, 99 directors of 419 companies, and, until 1951, an Irish earl. Although all members are now over twenty-one years of age, in the past minors have been admitted, notably Charles James Fox and Lord John Russell. Each of the 630 members is allowed a daily ration of free stationery consisting of two dozen full sheets octavo and two dozen half sheets quarto, together with envelopes. Club proceedings are occasionally enlivened by novelty: Mrs. Bessie Braddock, J.P. of U.S.D.A.W. and Liverpool, brandishing an air pistol, an act immortalized by a motion of censure; or Captain Richard Antony Pilkington, M.C., of Christ Church, the Coldstream Guards, and Poole, asking the President of the Board of Trade about hydrozinocarbonylmethyltrimethylammonium chloride, an utterance fortunately lost in the pages of Hansard. This is but a sampling of the fascinating lore of the British House of Commons collected in *Honourable Members: A Study of the British Backbencher* (London, Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1959; 285 pp. 30*s*.) by Peter G. Richards, Lecturer in Government at Southampton University and author of *Delegation in Local Government*. His central purpose is to examine the rôle of the backbencher in the Commons, which he does comprehensively (largely based upon an analysis of the members returned in 1955), describing the selection, election and qualification of members, the control of policy and administration, party discipline, and members and their interests. The conclusion of his analysis is that although backbenchers lack direct power, they are able to influence its use and to check its abuse by government and bureaucracy. Greater participation by backbenchers in the formulation and execution of policy is needed, however, in order to develop and strengthen this vital rôle. Other than the lack of any examination of the Conservative 1922 Committee, the most puzzling feature of this generally useful book is the superficial treatment of members and their interests. In the four chapters relating to this matter, Dr. Richards fails to discuss the

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problem of the "personal representation" of the powerful business, industrial, newspaper, and brewing interests. For example, the great breweries have been an important factor in British politics, at least since the 1874 election when Gladstone attributed the Liberal defeat to being "borne down in a torrent of gin and beer." Is it of no political significance today that the brewing families of Guinness, Whitbread, Bass, Cobbold, and Tollemache have family connections among the backbenchers, or that Southend is a "pocket-borough" of the Guinness family? Surely an analysis of such personal representation is fundamental to any understanding of British parliamentary politics, a point that needs no emphasis since the recent bank-rate inquiry.—NEAL WOOD, Columbia University.

In *Representative Government in Ireland: A Study of Dáil Eireann 1919-48* (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958; ix, 229 pp. 30*s.*; $4.80), J. L. McCracken identifies Dail Eireann as the historically constant element of the Irish constitution and describes its evolution, competence, composition, organization and electoral basis. He describes the relations of the Dail with the Senate and the executive. There is also a brief discussion of the rôle of the Dail in legislation and foreign affairs. The reader gathers from the historical account that the Irish politicians, so absorbed with opposition to Britain, have paradoxically led the country to an approximation to the British parliamentary system and for reasons that are inherent in the practical problem of governing. The author concludes that the two largest parties do not differ greatly in their composition, that elections have been more frequent than in Britain because of proportional representation, that the turnover in membership in the Dail has been less than that in the House of Commons, and that there has been a trend toward local government experience before a member's service in the Dail. The analysis of the composition of the Dail suggests the growth of a political class, and the long tenure of ex-revolutionaries in the political leadership suggests political consequences for a younger generation. But these matters are not discussed. The book combines two approaches without complete success. On the one hand it is a historical study of Dail Eireann. On the other hand it is a political science analysis of the Dail in its representative function. Neither approach is exhaustively pursued and thus the reader is teased with information behind which must lie a story or from which one might draw conclusions. For example, there is but the briefest mention of party organization within the Dail or of the relations of the parties within the Dail to organizations outside. We are told: "Regular meetings are

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held and party discipline is strictly enforced." We learn nothing of what these meetings are like and learn little of how discipline is enforced, though the points made are critically important in representative government. There is a striking omission of any real discussion of pressure groups though the power of these groups has been conspicuous in Ireland. Indeed, so many of Ireland's decisions have been determined outside the Dail or must be determined outside the country as to suggest that the Dail and the parties are mere façades of nationalism concealing substantial issues which find no path to solution in Irish government. The literary style of the book is good and much of the substance is useful but, like so many of the books on Ireland listed in the bibliography, there is a lack of theoretical focus. And Irish experience is rich in theoretical significance, especially in regard to representation.—WARNER MOSS, College of William and Mary.

All but one of the papers in *Evolving Canadian Federalism,* by A. R. M. Lower, F. R. Scott, J. A. Corry, F. H. Soward and A. Brady (Durham, Duke University Press, and London, Cambridge University Press, 1958; xvii, 187 pp. $3.50), were given at the Seminar on Canadian Federalism held at Duke University in the summer of 1957. They relate to different aspects of a broad question, so there is little in common between them. A. R. M. Lower discusses the theories of Canadian federalism by making plain that there are no theories. "The Fathers of the Canadian Confederation . . . considered only the historic monarchy. . . . Through this doorway to the past, the whole of English constitutional tradition entered". F. R. Scott deals with French Canada by showing how its cultural rights which were guaranteed in the Quebec Act of 1774 were continued and enlarged in the British North America Act. For French Canada, confederation meant the attainment of a measure of political sovereignty for itself, whereas for English Canada it involved a new union (with the Maritimes). Ever since 1867 French Canadians have defended their rights of language, religion, education and culture against encroachment by the English-speaking majority—a task demanding constant vigilance in view of the preponderant powers possessed by the Dominion. J. A. Corry discusses the core of the whole problem of Canadian federalism: legal jurisdiction and economic power. The depression saw the absurd situation where the provinces, as a result of judicial interpretation, possessed the powers to deal with the emergency but lacked the financial means. The Dominion had the means but lacked the jurisdiction. Since then a way has been found around this impasse via the federal *spending* power. The provinces (Quebec

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excepted) have coöperated with the federal government in providing the services demanded of a complex, interdependent industrial economy, yet centralizing constitutional amendments have been eschewed, and no long-term settlement of the problems of public finance has been reached. A pragmatic solution has been found in the tax rental agreements, which permit effective control of the national economy from Ottawa and effect some redistribution of tax revenues in favor of the outlying provinces. This arrangement has served to break down provincial boundaries at a time when the economic life of the country was coming to be dominated by corporate giants operating on a nation-wide scale. Only the federal government is big enough to exercise control over them. The courts no longer act as constitutional arbiter—the federal government dominates through the exercise of its spending power, and it goes unchallenged by both the provinces and business interests. F. H. Soward writes on external affairs and their effect on federalism and A. Brady draws some contrasts with the emerging West Indian federation. This book combines a wise perspective of Canadian development with an up-to-date review of the recent events in Canadian federalism. Nobody but an expert could fail to be enlightened by it.—HUGH G. THORBURN, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.

Professor Paul Studenski's *The Income of Nations: Theory, Measurement, and Analysis, Past and Present: A Study in Applied Economics and Statistics* (New York, New York University Press, 1958; xxii, 554 pp. $25.00) is a work of ecumenical scope and encyclopedic range. Are you curious to know what Catherine the Great did for Russian statistics, where you may find national income statistics for Nyasaland, or what estimation procedures are used in Japan? Professor Studenski will set you right. Most original and valuable is Part I (150 pages) which covers the history of the subject from Sir William Petty to the present day, and from England to the ninety-one other countries for which estimates (of one kind or another) are now available. Part II (140 pages), which reviews the controversial literature of recent decades on the methodology of national income, is for the most part sound, but not always well balanced and sometimes superficial. For example, a great deal more could, and something more surely should, have been said about such difficult and important matters as the deflation problem and the proper measure of depreciation. Part III (90 pages, including 25 pages on the Soviet Union) deals at length with the history and present state of the relevant statistics in a dozen or so countries in which much work has been done.

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Part IV (110 pages) brings up the rear with a summary of the situation in another sixty-odd countries for which less comprehensive data are available. Throughout the volume emphasis is placed on bibliography. Professor Studenski has wisely refrained from presenting data for their own sake, preferring to refer the reader to United Nations and other publications where the latest figures may be gleaned. Yet he has brought together so much, and such varied, material—much of it novel even to the most esoteric specialist—that the reader is left breathless. Omissions are hard to find. Perhaps deliberately, savings estimates are not covered: hence the work in this area of Goldsmith, the Survey Research Center and the SEC for the United States, and of the Oxford Institute for Britain, are not discussed. I caught only one significant error: when prices rise, the failure to value inventories at replacement cost causes business profits to be overvalued; when prices fall, to be undervalued (not vice versa, as stated on p. 282). The table of growth rates on pages 248-249 is seriously misleading and were better omitted, for it is based on data for five years or fewer. Altogether the volume is a large and solid achievement which will be useful to many. It is all the more a pity that it could not have been issued for a more reasonable price.—HAROLD BARGER, Columbia University.

National Wages Policy in War and Peace (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1958; 180 pp. $3.50) by B. C. Roberts consists of analyses of the governmental wartime wage policies in Great Britain and the United States; and the post-war wage policies in Great Britain under the Labour and Conservative governments, in the United States during the Korean emergency period, in Sweden (starting, however, from the 1930's), in Australia (considering the arbitration system from its beginnings), in the Netherlands, and in West Germany. The author's object is to set down, for future use, the lessons that can be drawn from these experiences in seeking to prevent inflation. This work is useful because of the large number of facts which are condensed between its covers and the comparative presentation of the material which helps make clear certain common features that might otherwise escape attention. Insights are provided into the behavior and the problems of trade unions in Great Britain. Explanations are advanced of the significance of the phenomenon of the "wage drift", the term coined by Swedish economists to designate the gap between negotiated wages and earnings. The major conclusion appears to be that centralized wage controls cannot be relied upon as a means of preventing inflation (p. 7).

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This language suggests that under all circumstances centralized wage controls are futile. In other parts of the work, however (e.g., p. 82), a less dogmatic conclusion is drawn, that centralized wage controls *alone* will not prevent inflation. This reviewer agrees with the latter conclusion but not the former. In the United States, at least, direct wage controls have not been regarded as capable of preventing inflation but rather as a helpful device, along with other measures, to maintain economic stability in general and price controls in particular. Although some emphasis is placed on the importance of political institutions in wage policy (p. 25), the author seems less interested in integrating the political element into economic analysis than in preventing any undue contamination by it. If, as the author admits (p. 173), it is impossible to keep wages out of politics, his quest for the situation where wages would not be in politics seems odd. His distinction between an economic and a political decision (p. 162) is unconvincing. In the course of the analysis values are introduced, for example, government should stay out of wage fixing (p. 175). It would seem to be incumbent upon the author of a work on public policy to indicate whose values these are, why they should be accepted as guides for making recommendations, and how these values are "managed" in cases where they are in conflict with one another. A number of inaccuracies appear in the description of the American experiences. For example, it is implied (p. 43) that the wage increase of 44.0 cents per day awarded in the Little Steel Case was due under the Little Steel Formula. In fact, only 25.6 cents were due on this basis. The remainder, 18.4 cents, was added because of so-called time equities in the workers' favor.—MOSES LUKACZER, Lincoln University.

The monograph, *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881,* by Richard Hill (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959; xii, 188 pp. 25*s.*; $4.00), as the title indicates, covers the period of sixty years of Egyptian rule over the Sudan. In his preface the author points out that his chief objective is to steer a middle course between those British historians of the Sudan who have been violently critical of Egyptian rule, dismissing it as one of "oppression, slavery and graft", and the Egyptian writers who have been equally partisan in pointing out the virtues of the period of Egyptian domination. On the whole Mr. Hill does an admirable job of summarizing the details of Sudanese history of the period. There is no doubt that his own writing fails to escape some of the bias he attributes to others; his viewpoint is that the Sudan today has a

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heavy legacy from the Egyptian administration. Whatever may be the future political bickerings between the two countries, the Sudan cannot help but maintain close cultural and economic ties to its northern neighbor. Mr. Hill's conclusion, while justified in the light of the facts he presents, does not, however, take into account sufficiently the trend of political development in the Sudan since independence. The Sudanese government, while acknowledging its cultural and educational debt to Egypt, will be loath to accept any Egyptian action that smacks of reassertion of Egyptian power over the Sudan—the more particularly so since the Sudan now seeks to play the rôle of bridge between the Middle East and Africa. Despite its selective approach, however, Mr. Hill's volume provides the student of this period with a useful and carefully detailed analysis.—L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia University.

The growth of interest in Africa over the past decade has brought forth several new volumes dealing with the history of European contacts, and the building of the present-day African states under colonial administrations. *The Making of Modern Uganda* by Kenneth Ingham (London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1958; 303 pp. $5.75) is representative of the works which recount the travels of the early explorers and traces the slow evolution toward self-government. Beginning with Uganda before the Protectorate, he develops in strict chronological order the main events in Uganda history down to 1956. On the whole the volume represents an admirable job of condensing and arranging the facts with clarity and precision. Some new material is added from the author's own research. The reader cannot but wonder, however, if there was not a greater element of romance to the history of Uganda than Professor Ingham has been able to inject into his writing. History consists of more than a judicious selection from a mass of facts; that added element that breathes life into retelling past events is not evident in the present work. —L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia University.

French political life in recent times has been so complicated and unpredictable that it has proved to have been an enticing challenge to a host of scholars who have attempted to describe its functioning and to lay bare its mysteries. One of the most recent of these investigators is Richard Barron of the University of Virginia, who has presented us with the fruits of his labor in *Parties and Politics in Modern France* (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1959; xii, 213 pp. $4.50). This work is largely a description of the operation of the parliamentary system and of political parties in

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France since World War II. Here one finds little of the political geography of François Goguel, of the material on public opinion polls analyzed by Russell Planck, or of the mature reflections of Maurice Duverger; but one does have in brief compass a lucid and fairly elementary exposition of the French political system and a clear statement of France's major political problems.—SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, Columbia University.

Edmund Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* is both a classic of eighteenth-century thought on esthetics, and a lucid example of the tradition of British empiricism in method and moral psychology. As Burke himself indicates, he was seeking for "an exact theory of our passions"; this he conceived as forthcoming from an analysis of their sources. In revealing the *origin* of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful and the conditions that cause and determine the nature of passions generally, he thought that a theory and the laws of "taste" might be established. Now, two hundred years after the first appearance of the widely read *Enquiry,* the first critical edition of this work has been published (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958; cxxx, 197 pp. $5.00) edited with an introduction and notes by J. T. Boulton. The text is based upon the second edition in which Burke had made revisions, and all changes between this and the first edition have been recorded. In an extensive introduction, Mr. Boulton discusses the sources of Burke's ideas and carefully traces the most important of the historical influences of the *Enquiry.* We are shown the various responses to Burke's ideas by painters, such as Fuseli and Mortimer, and many other writers and artists and notably by such men as Johnson, Wordsworth, Hardy, Diderot and Kant. For this well-documented survey and for his painstaking research in presenting us with the definitive text of Burke's *Enquiry,* Mr. Boulton is to be congratulated.—H. S. THAYER, Barnard College.

Archival collections have a permanence greater than the rapidly changing conditions of travel. In the days of economic stability *Baedeker* used to be a most dependable guide, and so the *Guide to the Diplomatic Archives of Western Europe* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959; ix, 389 pp. $7.50), edited by Daniel H. Thomas and Lynn M. Case, renders a service that will long have validity. Planned as a *volume d'hommage* to Professor William E. Lingelbach, this book is intended as "a *vade mecum* or a scholar's *Baedeker* for those interested in finding and making the

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fullest use of the original diplomatic documents of western Europe" (p. vii). It is arranged by countries and according to a uniform plan: a brief history of the available collections is followed by a description of their organization and content; another part, perhaps somewhat redundant with rather transitory information, contains practical information about the use of the collections; a useful bibliography, appended to each country, will prove a valuable guide to the researcher. A final section of the book, entitled "Special Archival Sources", deals with Bavaria, the League of Nations and the United Nations, Public Opinion, and UNESCO. Under this same "Special Sources" rubric mention might have been made of resources that exist in such repositories as the Hoover War Library, for example. The bulk of archival material naturally belongs to the more recent centuries. The vicissitudes of war, be they Napoleonic or those of our time, have had important effects on archival collections; if history has ever interested men, the obsession with the preservation of records as an organized activity is a relatively recent practice. In this domain as in others, one is impressed by the rapid increase in the rate of accumulation; documents nowadays are measured by the ton and the mile rather than by the page, a condition that leads one to reflect on the quantitative problem that is increasingly forcing itself upon the historian.—RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, Barnard College.

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